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 Abstract 
 
This work examines whether there is an agenda on the part of the newspapers owned 
by News International (Rupert Murdoch’s UK media company) where reporting on 
matters with regards to the British Broadcasting Corporation and Ofcom.  The agenda, 
examined via the content analysis of the relevant articles published in three Murdoch 
owned newspapers compared with three non-Murdoch owned newspapers of equal 
standing, proves an already existing theory discussed by the press and academics 
alike that Rupert Murdoch is particularly hostile towards both bodies; the BBC because 
it is a rival news provider, and a prominent, trusted voice in Britain; and Ofcom, 
because of its role as a regulator that has often stood between Murdoch and his 
commercial expansion plans.    
 
The research answers three key questions: to what extent News International’s 
newspapers seek to undermine organisations and competitiors that in some way 
interfere with the company and/ or proprietors expansion plans; to what extent this 
agenda is manifested in News International’s newspapers; and to what extent these 
compare with equal-standing, non-News International owned newspapers.  The 
findings identify a clear bias in the reporting, demonstrating for the first time that 
Murdoch exploits his newspapers in pursuit of commercial self-interest.   
 
This work demonstrates how the news agenda can be deliberately manipulated to suit 
the commercial self-interest of dominant owners, and provides evidence of the way in 
which proprietors such as Murdoch can exploit their dominance of media markets 
through the distorted or biased coverage of rival institutions or regulators in a bid to 
influence both popular opinion and the decisions of politicians and policymakers, thus 
undermining the democratic process.   
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Definitions 
 
 
 
Rupert Murdoch’s corporate entities: over the course of time, Rupert Murdoch’s media 
companies have changed names.  Throughout this thesis, where discussing his UK 
company, it is referred to as ‘News International’.  Only where appropriate and 
explicitly referenced by others has it been referred to as ‘News UK’.  References to 
‘News Corporation’ or ‘News Corp’ are in relation to his US holdings. 
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Introduction 
 
A free press is the cornerstone of any democracy. Even with the advent of digital and 
social media and powerful technology companies, traditional news publishers still 
retain the power to carry out investigative reporting that holds power to account and 
asks difficult questions, while providing a flow of uncompromised and unbiased 
information to reach the public and promote an informed electorate.  For broadcasters, 
certainly in the UK and across Europe, impartiality rules and a long-standing non-
partisan reporting culture ensure that these journalistic norms broadly remain intact.  
But for newspapers and online publishers, free to write what they want within the law, 
the selection of stories, how they are reported and the overall editorial stance are 
generally dependent on the newspaper owner’s political, ideological and commercial 
agenda.  
 
A single publisher with an editorial standpoint decided by the owner taking a strong 
line on any particular issue is not in itself a problem or a threat to democracy.  
However, if the proprietor also owns several other types of media platform, such as 
television networks, radio stations or internet sites, the opportunity to set the news 
agenda and the potential to influence both the public and politicians becomes a likely 
and potentially dangerous possibility.  The more media outlets owned by a single 
proprietor, the more power they command, and the more dangerous it can be for a 
healthy democracy that relies on a plurality of viewpoints.   
 
Issues around concentration of media ownership and the threat to democracy have 
frequently been raised by scholars in the UK, Australia and the US in respect of Rupert 
Murdoch’s ownership of multiple media outlets and platforms.  He owns media 
businesses that operate across a number of countries and is still considered to be one 
of the most powerful media proprietors in the English-speaking world.  He is known for 
having conservative views, a strong disdain for elitism and the ‘establishment’, and a 
strong desire to operate in free, commercially driven markets.  Most scholarly work 
has focused, rightly, on how Murdoch has exploited his media properties to promote 
this conservative worldview, whether it be through supporting (mostly) right-wing 
political parties and leaders such as Thatcher, Reagan and Trump or right-wing 
policies in areas such as taxation and criminal justice.  Less work, however, has 
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focused on whether and how he exploits his media outlets to promote his own 
corporate interests and denigrate his competitors.  This thesis aims to fill that gap with 
systematic empirical evidence from the UK. 
 
Murdoch is known to liken the ‘elite establishment’ with the British Broadcasting 
Corporation (BBC), which he described during his 1989 MacTaggart Lecture speech 
as having “debilitating effects on British society, by producing a TV output which is so 
often obsessed with class, dominated by anti-commercial attitudes” (Murdoch, 1989)  
The BBC was a direct competitor to Murdoch’s Sky TV, in a unique position as the 
UK’s public service broadcaster with guaranteed public funding via the licence fee.  
The BBC remains a prominent voice in the UK, as a trusted news provider, both on 
television and via the news stories it publishes on its website.  Echoing his father’s 
comments 20 years later, James Murdoch gave a similar speech at the MacTaggart 
Lecture in 2009, in which he criticised both the BBC and the powerful UK 
communications regulator, Ofcom.  Ofcom has often stood between the Murdochs and 
their commercial expansion plans.  At the time of the 2009 speech, the regulator was 
conducting an investigation into the Murdochs’ grip on the pay-TV market.   
 
This thesis aims to understand the nature of the coverage of the BBC and Ofcom in 
Murdoch-owned newspapers, compared with non-Murdoch-owned newspapers of 
equal standing, during a crucial 20-year period, in order to ascertain whether and to 
what extent both news and editorial content related to the political position, ideology 
or commercial agenda of the owner.   
 
In order to do this, an extensive content analysis has been undertaken to measure 
what percentage of the coverage in newspapers owned by Murdoch’s News 
International about the BBC and Ofcom was negative, in comparison with coverage 
over the same periods in newspapers not owned by News International.  The analysis 
looked at three News International newspapers – the Sun, the Times, and the Sunday 
Times – and three non-News International newspapers of equal standing – the Daily 
Mirror, the Independent and the Sunday Telegraph.  A total of seven years’ worth of 
data was collected over three separate time periods spanning 20 years, equating to 
3336 articles.  The key measure employed was whether the articles were deemed to 
be negative, positive or neutral in tone.  The analysis also considers other, secondary 
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measures such as the nature of the language employed, which are discussed in the 
methodology chapter. 
 
The starting hypothesis was that Murdoch-owned newspapers demonstrated a clear 
agenda in their news and editorial coverage of the BBC and Ofcom, driven by the 
Murdoch family’s commercial and competitive imperatives as well as their outspoken 
hostility towards the two institutions.  If Murdoch’s commercially driven desire is to see 
the BBC and Ofcom downsized to a position of relative impotence, or abolished 
altogether, he has the means and power to exploit his own media outlets as weapons 
of influence in the propaganda battle.  
 
Negative reporting of the BBC and Ofcom is significant not only because of the 
potential influence it could have on the public, but also on politicians and policymakers 
as a result.  While not making any explicit claims about the relationship between media 
proprietors and the politicians and governments they seek to influence, this thesis is 
premised on the ability of media proprietors to use the powerful force of their media 
holdings to drive policymaking that suits their commercial agenda.  In Murdoch’s case, 
this means policies which have allowed him to vigorously pursue levels of ownership 
that are argued to be in excess of what is desirable for a democracy.   
 
Recent political events in the UK, US and Australia highlight the power and influence 
Rupert Murdoch continues to wield via his considerable media holdings, such as the 
Brexit vote in the UK, the election of Donald Trump as President in the US, and the 
removal of the Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull.  Former Australian Prime 
Minister Kevin Rudd writes that “Murdoch’s agenda is patently ideological, commercial 
and of course political.  But it is also global.  Across much of the Anglosphere, these 
debates occur in parallel…  And for those who think it will all expire when Rupert dies, 
there’s another Murdoch in waiting” (2019)1. 
 
This warning about the continuing power of the dynasty through Rupert Murdoch’s son 
Lachlan is an important reminder of why we should continue to be concerned about 
 
1 https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/sep/06/democracy-overboard-rupert-murdochs-long-war-on-australian-politics 
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media concentration, even as policymakers turn their attention to Facebook and 
Google.  Murdoch continues to run one of the most powerful news organisations in the 
English-speaking world.  Although major technology firms are disrupting the traditional 
business of news production and consumption, assumptions that this disruption 
mitigates the threat of concentrated media ownership are misguided.  It continues to 
be the global news organisations, such as Murdoch’s News Corporation (and his UK 
newspaper holdings through News UK) that are the main producers of news content 
and thus able to dominate the news agenda  
 
Layout of the thesis 
 
This introduction is followed by a literature review that provides the background and 
context to this issue, made up of six chapters.  Chapter One: Media and Democracy 
considers the dependency of a healthy democracy on a free press, the role of the 
media in the democratic process, and the potentially damaging effects of media 
concentration.   
 
Chapter Two: The New Digital Environment examines the rise of technology, the 
internet and social media, and their impact on the provision of news.  Primarily focused 
on the role of the internet, this includes considerations of the changes that have 
occurred in the production and consumption of news.  The roles of social media and 
news aggregators are explored, in particular their distribution of news content and 
how, in spite of aggregators’ ubiquity, plurality of news sources is not increasing as a 
result.  The literature examined in Chapter Two will confirm that the traditional news 
providers, including Rupert Murdoch, continue to dominate the news markets.   
 
Chapter Three: Rupert Murdoch and News Corporation provides some background 
and history to Murdoch and News International in the UK, the expansion of his media 
business, and how his power and influence have allowed him to continue expanding 
his media empire.  Chapter Four: Media Economy – The Economic Imperatives of 
Consolidation considers the economic factors that affect media businesses, and the 
main drivers behind the vertical and horizontal integration strategies that have been 
deployed over the years to achieve economies of scale and scope.  Chapter Five: 
Current Framework looks at the regulatory framework that applies to the media in the 
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UK, and Chapter Six: Recent Policy and Regulatory Developments considers recent 
developments in regulation and policy that are relevant to the arguments advanced in 
this thesis around media concentration and media bias.  
 
Chapter Seven: The Research Questions and Chapter Eight: The Methodology 
describe in detail the hypothesis and research questions, and explain the methodology 
used to undertake the research.  Finally, the results of the content analysis are 
presented in Chapter Nine: The Results for the BBC and Chapter Ten: The Results 
for Ofcom, followed by discussion of these results within the context of the literature 
review in Chapter Eleven: The Discussion.  Chapter Twelve: The Conclusion provides 
the conclusion and the basis of this study’s original contribution to knowledge in this 
research area: that despite Rupert Murdoch’s explicit protestation to the Leveson 
Inquiry that he never promotes his business interests in his own media outlets, this 
research offers clear empirical evidence that his newspapers systematically produced 
news and editorial coverage that was designed to undermine both the BBC and, to a 
lesser extent, Ofcom.  While the Murdochs continue to own and run a major news 
organisation with a dominant voice in the UK, there is every likelihood that they will 
also continue to exploit their newspapers as weapons of influence to further their 
commercial and corporate agenda. 
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Chapter One: Media and Democracy 
 
“The media are an inescapable and ubiquitous a presence in our lives as the 
environment.  In fact, they are, to a large extent, the mental and cultural environment 
we inhabit every day, bringing us the first voices we hear in the morning, the opinions 
we absorb while driving, the stories and images that entertain us after work.  In so far 
as we are intelligent beings, the media are the world we share” (Ehrenreich, 2002, p9). 
 
Ehrenreich’s assumption that the intelligence of human beings is inextricably linked to 
the consumption of media as part of a common environment aptly denotes the need 
to consider the media within the context of a democracy.  If the media truly exist as an 
‘inescapable environment’ that provides the general public, either passively of actively, 
with necessary information about their environment, it surely contributes to the very 
foundations of a democracy.  Furthermore, with such a key role to play in the formation 
and sustainability of democracy, the diversity of the media should be well maintained 
so as to ensure a fair and equitable provision of information that derives from a number 
of sources.  This chapter will consider the role of the media in democracy in the UK, 
how such a role is undertaken, and the risks and benefits of the UK’s press to the 
democratic process.   
 
What is a democracy? 
 
Baker offers the explanation that “democracy is widely understood as respecting the 
view that each person equally should have a say in choosing at least its officials and, 
ultimately, its laws and policies and maybe its culture” (2007, p6).  Schumpeter offers 
a similar definition regarding the ‘democratic method’, stating that it is the “institutional 
arrangement for arriving at political decisions which realizes the common good by 
making the people itself decide issues through the election of individuals who are to 
assemble in order to carry out its will” (2003, p225).   
 
On this basis, it is reasonable to assert that the media play a fundamental role in a 
democracy given that they are the vehicle by which the public receive information and 
accordingly choose their political representatives.  It can be argued that people have 
the right to choose those representatives without accessing the media; the lack of a 
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newspaper or television does not remove an individual’s right or ability to vote for their 
chosen political party or leader.  However, there is little value in the process if the 
public do not have access to information regarding the political parties or leaders so 
that they can make an informed choice.   
 
In considering how the requirements of a well-functioning democracy are fulfilled, 
Dahlgreen states that it is “the engagement of citizens that gives democracy the 
legitimacy as well as vitality” (2009, p12).  In short, democracy is not achieved without 
the engagement and participation of citizens, albeit they can engage and participate 
in many different ways.  For some, participation in the democratic process begins and 
ends with voting in general elections; others live in a democratic society without voting 
at all.  Dahlgreen notes that “for most people most of the time in the west, while 
commitment to the principles of democracy remains solid, the realities of how it 
operates do not successfully beckon enough people to join in” (2009, p12).   
 
Like Dahlgreen’s consideration of the democratic process, Rosenstiel and Kovach 
claim that “in the real world, many factors work against these ideals of democracy, 
from business pressures in news organisations to lazy citizens to deceptive policies” 
(2007, p21).  While neither the government nor the media can control the extent to 
which the public consume the information, or the extent to which they use it to inform 
their choice, a well-functioning democracy requires that a fair balance of information 
should be available.  The ideal must then be a system where impartial news sources, 
whether print, broadcast or online, provide reliable information on the important and 
relevant topics necessary for the public to form opinions when considering their choice 
of leader, and where the public are engaged and interested to the point that they seek 
to learn about the relevant issues in a conscious and educated manner.     
 
With such provision of information, and an election process in place, a nation can be 
considered to be truly democratic.  Curran considers the requirements for successful 
democratic processes, which include the delivery of information that both encourages 
and allows the public to participate:  
 
“the democratic process assumes that individual citizens have the capacity to hold 
elected officials accountable.  In practice, political accountability requires a variety of 
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institutional arrangements including free and frequent elections, the presence of 
strong political parties and… a media system that delivers a sufficient supply of 
meaningful public affairs information to catch the eye of relatively inattentive citizens” 
(2011, p47).  
 
If the realities of democracy are not particularly conducive to public engagement and 
participation, the public’s reliance on the platforms upon which democracy is played 
out surely becomes even greater where the information need not only be 
communicated, but to also encourage or attract participation.  This is becoming even 
more important in the social and digital media age than it was when news was only 
gleaned from printed or broadcast sources. 
 
What roles do the media play in the democratic process? 
 
The media can be considered to play a number of roles in the democratic process.  
The UK enjoys a ‘free press’ system, where printed news (be it online or in hard copy 
form) are not in any way owned or funded by the government or state.  This also 
applies to UK broadcasters, including the publicly funded public service broadcaster 
(PSB) the BBC.  Although the BBC licence fee is set by the government, the 
broadcaster has always been constitutionally independent of direct government 
interference.  
 
When a general election is held, the public will most likely turn to television shows and 
information printed in newspapers or online to understand what each political party is 
proposing, which will then allow them to come to an informed voting decision.  
Furthermore, when the government of the day makes a policy proposal, or 
communicates intent with regard to its decision making, the public will likely be advised 
of this via the same methods.  Recent years have seen a major shift in the way in 
which news is consumed, given the strong presence of the internet and social media 
in people’s lives.  However a significant portion of what is read derives from traditional 
media sources (explored further in Chapter Two: The New Digital Environment).  
 
Additionally, the media, and in particular investigative journalism, have the ability to 
‘hold power to account’ and expose any wrongdoing or falsities to the public.  The 
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potential of this alone could be seen as a deterrent to those in power breaking electoral 
promises.  Curran describes the role of the free press in a democratic society as 
follows:  
 
“The market-based press is independent because it owes allegiance only to the public.  
The press is the people’s watchdog, scrutinising the actions of government and 
holding the country’s rulers to account.  Its reporting of the news keeps readers 
abreast of important events and developments and enables them to exercise informed 
judgements at election time.  By providing a forum of public debate, the press also 
facilitates the formation of public opinion.  This opinion is then relayed by the press - 
the people’s tribune - to those in power” (2011, p326).  
 
Curran describes the ‘dual role’ the press plays in a democracy, acting as a gatekeeper 
for the information that is exchanged between the people and those in power via news 
content.  While this is still relevant to some extent, technological and lifestyle 
developments have seen many changes in the way the public engage and the 
methods via which they can provide feedback and comment.  That said, the media 
industry is constantly evolving and adapting, so the media remain a powerful voice via 
which such information is communicated, albeit in new and changing formats.   
 
Dahlgreen argues that “the media are a pre-requisite - though by no means a 
guarantee - for shaping the democratic character of society; they are the bearers of 
democracy’s political communication beyond face to face settings” (2009, p2).  The 
media are the conduit by which information about democracy is communicated.  They 
reach more people more quickly than politicians could hope to do by other means 
(notwithstanding the internet and social media, both of which are explored further in 
Chapter Two), and as such politicians are heavily reliant on broadcasters and the 
press.  
 
This unique ability often leads to the media being described as ‘bearing witness’ to 
democracy.  However, as this chapter will examine, the media have become so 
inextricably linked to the democratic process that they must now be considered part of 
the process itself.  This is a result of both the media wielding considerable power and 
therefore having considerable influence over politicians, and politicians being heavily 
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reliant on the media to communicate messages that promote their proposals and 
policies.  As Dahlgreen states: 
 
“politics does not exist as a completely separate reality taking place independently of 
and outside the media, to then be ‘covered’ by our journalists.  Rather, politics is 
increasingly organised as a media phenomenon, planned and executed for and with 
the co-operations of the media, and in the process becomes unavoidably altered” 
(2009, p52).   
 
When the media’s influence is powerful enough to alter the democratic process, the 
media can no longer be considered to be separate from that process.   
 
Who owns the media and what role do they play 
 
At the time of writing, as reported by the Media Reform Coalition (2019), there are ten 
national newspapers in the UK, and 12 organisations producing and/or providing 
broadcast content.  Three companies dominate the market share of newspaper 
audiences, and five companies dominate the market share of online news audiences.  
With the exception of the BBC, all are funded privately (though it is worth noting that 
the three terrestrial channels ITV, Channel 4 and Channel 5 are all ‘commercial 
PSBs’), and in the case of newspapers and online news, all fall under the category of 
a ‘free press’.   
 
Curran and Seaton examine the ‘liberal theory of press freedom’, which asserts that 
“the freedom to publish in the free market ensures that the press reflects a wide range 
of opinions and interests in society” (2009, p326).  According to the theory – which will 
be contested by this thesis – the press is not influenced or directed in any way with 
regard to what it publishes.  Therefore, a plurality of privately owned news outlets will 
reliably and accurately reflect the different views, desires and opinions of readers, 
viewers and listeners.  As Curran and Seaton go on to state, elaborating on this theory, 
“if a viewpoint is missing in the press, this is only because it lacks a sufficient following 
to sustain it in the marketplace” (2009, p326).     
 
However, Curran (2009) explores a number of weak links in the liberal theory of press 
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freedom.  As previously mentioned, this thesis similarly seeks to challenge this 
viewpoint and aims to prove that press content is not free of influence or agenda, and 
that a missing viewpoint, or even a published viewpoint, is not necessarily 
representative of the public’s viewpoint.  Nevertheless, sustaining a free press in a 
democratic nation remains the ideal as the press retains the power to prevent 
governments from controlling or manipulating what is communicated to the public, and 
can perform the kind of investigative journalism that seeks out and uncovers 
information essential to fostering a healthy democracy.  
 
The public are reliant on accurate, trustworthy news content to provide them with 
essential knowledge about those running their nation, and therefore the media play a 
vital role in an individual’s participation in the democratic process.  Chapter Two will 
examine how the proliferation of online news, social media sites and the blogosphere 
is making the need for a supply of accurate news from well-resourced sources even 
more urgent than before. Despite the perceived growth in plurality, given the increase 
in the number of available ‘places’ to read or watch the news, the Media Reform 
Coalition (2019) states that a limited number of traditional providers continue to 
dominate the news supply both online and offline.   
 
The special nature of news 
 
With the system of a free-market-based press comes the risk of a concentration of 
ownership and/or voices in the media, which could result in limited or biased 
viewpoints.  A free press means the government, and to some extent the state, 
relinquish control over the setting of the agenda with regard to what the public will 
hear, watch and read about.  But where the free press is owned and controlled by a 
limited number of proprietors (whether individuals or corporations), the agenda is 
largely driven by what these owners believe to be relevant and important.   
 
Freedman considers the risks posed to democracy where there is a concentration of 
ownership, stating that “the founding scholars of communications and cultural studies 
identified diversified ownership as central to the ability of media to pursue an 
independent and critical role in public life” (2014, p50).  Freedman summarises the 
common findings of many scholarly works: to ensure independent media that are able 
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to pursue and uncover information that is of relevance to the public, and to truly hold 
power to account, they must operate in the absence of bias or too heavy an influence 
from the government or the market.   
 
Freedman’s work tests this theory, asking the crucial question “to what extent can we 
draw a clear line between media concentration and diminished diversity and, indeed, 
is there an actual problem with concentration in major media markets?” (2014, p51).  
He argues that these are empirical issues that require quantitative data to provide 
justifiable evidence in the form of precise metrics.  However, he notes that, regardless 
of such metrics, other measures should be sought, such as “ones that connect to more 
ideological questions about how, in neo-liberal circumstances, the market in particular 
presents as the most desirable and efficient enabler of productive symbolic activity” 
(2014, p51).  Freedman emphasises here that ‘the media’ must be considered a 
‘unique’ or ‘special’ product, i.e. unlike any other that exists in a free market, because 
the media are involved in the production of symbolic activity that transcends the typical 
considerations given to a commercially produced commodity.   
 
In his work on media markets and democracy, Baker (2002) states that media products 
have significant positive and negative ‘externalities’.  In this context, an ‘externality’ is 
defined as the value the item (the news story) has to an individual who does not 
participate in the transaction (the reader).  Baker explains the significance of such 
externalities in a democracy, and that the provision of unbiased information affects not 
only the individual consuming it, but the overall cultural and democratic structure of 
society: 
 
“people value a well-functioning democracy.  They are affected by whether the country 
goes to war, establishes parks, or provides for retirement and medical care - and 
hence can be greatly benefited by other people’s consumption of quality media or 
harmed by others’ ignorance or apathy produced by inadequate consumption or 
consumption of misleading, distortive, and demobilising media” (2002, p10).   
 
This special nature of news makes it all the more important to consider how it is 
produced, and by whom.  Meier and Trappel acknowledge the importance of studying 
the impact of media concentration on a democratic society: “media diversity is one of 
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the main preconditions ensuring political and cultural pluralism and effective citizen 
participation in democratic decision-making processes” (1998, p38). For a nation to 
function as a democracy, it is imperative that there exists a free and diverse press 
through which information is disseminated.  The public cannot be expected to make 
informed decisions when electing a government if the information that informs those 
very decisions is in any way biased, tainted or skewed by the influence of a corporation 
or media mogul.  Where media ownership is concentrated in few hands, the public are 
exposed to a limited set of opinions or information depending on the political allegiance 
or bias of those in charge: the media conglomerates.   
 
This thesis does not seek to claim that by virtue of owning a large share of any given 
media market a media conglomerate automatically conveys one-sided information, 
but, as has been proven by previous scholars and will be explored further in this work, 
the opportunity for bias is rife in such circumstances.  Conglomerates wield great 
power by virtue of owning profitable news production businesses, and as their success 
increases, it raises the barrier to entry for rival media organisations that could ‘balance’ 
the range of available information (and in some cases opinion). Curran and Alberg 
(2013) summarise that democracy in its most reduced form is still reliant on the 
consumption of news.  Democracy in a more developed form must therefore be reliant 
on accurate and reliable information, excluding partisan bias: 
 
“democracy relies on equal representation of citizens’ interest.  This representation of 
interest is dependent on an informed public.  Most people would agree that citizens 
should make informed choices rather than act out of ignorance or misinformation.  
Even the minimalist, monitorial model of democracy presupposes regular scanning of 
news in order to identify dangers to the personal and public good” (2013, p197).   
 
Baker (2007) examines the ‘normative egalitarian’ value of a one person/one vote 
democracy and how it applies to the ‘broader political sphere’.  Baker suggests: 
 
“the best institutional interpretation of this democratic vision of the public sphere is… 
an egalitarian distribution of control, most obviously meaning ownership, of the mass 
media.  The basic standard for democracy would then be a very wide and fair dispersal 
of power and ubiquitous opportunities to present preferences, views, visions” (2007, 
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p6).   
 
Baker describes this as a “democratic distribution principle” for communicative power; 
to achieve democracy there must be “as wide as practical a dispersal of power within 
public discourse” (2007, P6).  If the media can be considered to be a fundamental 
element of public discourse, their structure, ownership and control must be considered 
in the context of democracy, and furthermore, their impact on the democratic process 
where ownership and control have become concentrated in the hands of a small 
number of players.  
 
This line of argument is, of course, more complex than simply stating that there should 
be multiple voices.  Baker (2007) considers the issue from two viewpoints.  Firstly, the 
creation of content and its delivery should not be treated as being within the same 
market, so as to avoid misconceptions when assessing concentration in the market.  
Secondly, aside from any considerations given to economic efficiencies in the media 
markets, there are democratic issues that should be considered when making an 
assessment.  The UK, for example, has ten national newspapers, which some may 
consider ample when considering the number of voices from which the public can form 
opinions. However, ten newspapers do not guarantee ten different viewpoints.  If the 
newspapers are owned by only three or four different conglomerates, and those 
conglomerates choose to exert editorial control (or at the very least influence) to suit 
their own agendas, the number of actual viewpoints being presented to the public is 
then significantly reduced.   
 
The media owners’ role  
 
If the public relies on news content to inform them of political and public affairs, this 
raises a question about the power vested in those who control news content.  This 
power is arguably reduced where there are multiple media proprietors operating in the 
same market.  Where there are very few, the potential for exercising power and control 
can be much more significant, and this power is not acquired via any form of 
democratic process.  As Freedman states: 
 
“Concentrated media power, therefore, is antidemocratic both because it hands 
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definitional, analytical and interpretive power to unelected organisations and because 
it undermines the ability of citizens to acquire and exchange the range of information 
and ideas necessary to take informed decisions about public life” (2014, p12).   
 
If a member of the public in any democratic nation is exposed to only a limited number 
of news and media outlets, and the majority of those are owned by the same 
conglomerate or corporation, there is the potential for the messages being conveyed 
to conform to a particular corporate agenda.  As Baker notes, “for this reason, a 
country is democratic only to the extent that the media, as well as elections, are 
structurally egalitarian and politically salient” (2007, P7). 
 
The political agendas of the owners of news publishers may not necessarily be an 
issue, providing that there is a dispersal of ownership with a range of political 
allegiance across the board.  This is, to an extent, the situation with the UK national 
press as there are popular UK newspapers situated either centrally, or leaning to the 
left or right in the context of their political allegiance, meaning, in the current situation, 
there is a newspaper that represents each of these political standpoints.  Moreover, 
broadcasters are bound by impartiality rules, while a profusion of online sites and blogs 
provide myriad viewpoints.  Therefore, it can be argued that the public have a wealth 
of information available that derives from a range of political agendas and have a 
choice as to what they read and which editorial opinions they align themselves with.   
 
Doyle states that “political pluralism is about the need, in the interests of democracy, 
for a range of political opinions and viewpoints to be represented in the media” (2002, 
p12).  Doyle’s explanation of political pluralism does not assert that there must be a 
certain number of sources of political viewpoints, only that all of the viewpoints should 
be available to the public for consideration.  However, where there are dominant news 
providers that account for a concentrated share of the market, the public are in danger 
of being exposed to news content that omits alternative viewpoints or promotes 
specific viewpoints and agendas.  
 
For all of the scholarly discussion that exists with regard to media and democracy, it 
is still difficult to define or quantify what plurality should actually look like: how few 
news publishers or owners is too few?  The issue has become more prominent in 
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recent years, exemplified by the revelations relating to the News of the World phone-
hacking scandal that led to the Leveson Inquiry.  This is explored further in Chapter 6: 
Growing Awareness.    
 
Undue influence 
 
The threat that media power poses to a democracy does not end with the 
concentration of ownership eroding the plurality of viewpoints available to the public.  
Dominant owners of the press have long been known to wield considerable power and 
influence over politicians, and therefore the political and democratic process.  
Examples of this are explored further in chapters three and six, but by way of an 
example, Dean (2012) considers the issue from the perspective of democracy ‘under 
attack’ from the press, and the arguably dangerous influence that ensues.  
 
Dean references a speech given by Tony Blair when he was British Prime Minister 
about the UK media in which he avoided referring to the Daily Mail directly because 
“he feared what the paper would do to him and his family should he have targeted it” 
(2012, p342).  Furthermore, Dean states “there was a much wider group of MPs who 
were scared to challenge a different and even bigger media organisation, Rupert 
Murdoch’s national newspapers, over the allegations of widespread hacking of MPs’ 
mobile voicemail by the News of the World” (2012, p342).  
 
Both examples illustrate the type of influence a newspaper, or group of newspapers, 
can have on politicians’ behaviour.  If politicians are to alter their behaviour, their 
decision making or policy setting for fear of reprisals in the headlines or editorial 
columns of influential national newspapers, it is arguable that, as stated by Dahlgren 
(2009), the democratic process itself can be altered by the media.  Dean claims that 
ministers believe that the tabloids greatly influence public opinion and “adjust their 
decisions accordingly” (2012, p390).   
 
Dean (2012) contemplates the influence news reporting has on public opinion in many 
areas, and references a study undertaken by Professor M. Hough into the impact of 
inaccurate news reporting on public opinion on crime.  Drawing on results from the 
British Crime Survey, Hough (2005) found that two thirds of the public wrongly believed 
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that crime was going up, and concluded that “the simplest explanation for this trend is 
that people think crime is rising because they are told by the media that it is” (cited in 
Dean, 2012, p121).  Dean goes on to discuss an even more compelling example of 
media influence not only on public opinion, but public behaviour, considering the media 
campaign regarding the MMR vaccine which saw a significant reduction in the number 
of parents vaccinating their children. Dean asserts that the campaign “grossly distorted 
the risks of the vaccine which resulted in a damaging reduction in the number of 
parents taking their children to be vaccinated… The Department of Health and most 
other health observers are in no doubt what caused this dangerous slump; the anti-
MMR media campaign.  It did not just change attitudes, it changed behaviour” (2012, 
p390).   
 
While neither the example of crime rates nor the anti-MMR media campaign was 
necessarily the result of a concentration of ownership in the newspaper market, both 
aptly illustrate the considerable influence the media can have on public attitudes, 
opinions and behaviour.  With greater concentration of ownership of media outlets 
comes a weakening dispersal of information, and therefore different agendas, with a 
greater risk of manipulation by a single owner.  Dean examines where it ‘all went 
wrong’ for the British press, noting the first reason as being “because of the power 
which the Murdoch group was allowed to accumulate and the fear that this generated 
within governments and oppositions” (2012, p395).    
 
The politicians’ role  
 
However, not all researchers believe that the media have a bullish power to manipulate 
politicians according to owners’ interests.  Franklin (2004) examines the issue from 
the perspective of the government utilising the media and ‘packaging politics’ in such 
a way that the messages could be ‘sold’ to the audience.  Franklin focuses his work 
around three key concepts: “that politicians have revealed a growing commitment to 
using the media to market their policies and leaders to the public”; that “governments 
are increasingly adept at using media to package politics”; and that “this ambition to 
package politics poses a number of challenges to democracy” (2004, p5).    
 
Franklin describes the ‘packaging of politics’ as the extent to which politicians’ “set the 
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news agenda, to use media to inform, shape and manage public discourse about 
policy and politics” (2004, p3).  
 
Franklin’s approach offers an alternative view to the works discussed in this chapter 
so far.  His assertions are made on the basis that the politicians look to ‘package’ their 
messages in such a way that they can best be ‘sold’ via the media.  Therefore, while 
the message may be subject to influence and a measure of manipulation from both 
the politicians and the press, it packaged by the politicians in this way in the knowledge 
of the press’s considerable influence on public opinion.  Franklin also considers the 
difference between the types of newspapers available to the public, and the impact 
they have:  
 
“The influence of tabloids, with their clear partisanship, but spartan provision of political 
information, tends to be on readers’ practical attitudes… Conversely, the qualities tend 
to confine opinions to editorials with the bulk of reporting offering copious political 
information which readers can use to help make political choices...” (2004, p229).  
 
This view remains in keeping with the general nature of the types of newspaper in the 
UK.  The tabloids tend to report on both ‘softer’ and ‘harder’ news, and are typically 
sensationalist, whereas the broadsheets tend to only report on ‘hard news’ in the 
absence of ‘gossip’.  Should there be an adequate number of both types of newspaper 
available to the public, there should be little concern about the ‘range’ of information 
available for them to consume.  However, Franklin’s view does not take into account 
the number of people reading each type of newspaper.  If the majority of the public 
refer to a tabloid for all of their news, be it political or other, they risk being unknowingly 
exposed to a limited subset of information that is sensationalist by nature.   
 
Franklin refers to the 1997 general election, leading up to which the Sun switched its 
support from the Conservative Party to the Labour Party only six weeks before the day 
of the election.  Franklin states that “these changes in press partisanship combined 
with Labour’s landslide victories in 1997 and 2001 offer further and considerable 
evidence, albeit prima facia, in support [of press influence]” (2004, p219).   
 
It can be argued that the media have particular sway with the government in this regard 
 19 
 
as they influence the way in which the public perceive the government, as well as 
influencing the political agenda followed by other, less partisan broadcasters.  A 
newspaper’s political allegiance determines how its chosen political party will be 
portrayed in the media and how the party’s policies will be presented, with the potential 
for significant influence over voters’ reactions to and perceptions of that party, and of 
the sitting government itself.  For this reason alone, a dispersal of media ownership is 
imperative to a democratic society, and it could therefore be argued that a 
newspaper’s content can be manipulated to suit the political allegiance of the 
ownership.  Barendt claims that “the Sun itself claimed credit for the surprise victory 
of the Conservatives in the General Election of 1992” (1998, p108).  Barendt goes on 
to say that “Tony Blair in opposition assiduously courted Rupert Murdoch and the 
editors of his newspapers.  It is unlikely that the Labour majority in 1997 would have 
been so large, had the Sun not decided to support it six weeks before polling day” 
(1998, p.108).   
 
Corporate self-interest 
In evidence provided to the Leveson Inquiry, Barnett2 discusses the issue of plurality 
and how it is impacted by both corporate self-interest and editorial influence. Barnett 
explains that editorial influence can be achieved in a number of ways within a 
newspaper, by activity undertaken by editors who are “like-minded lieutenants who 
are trusted to pursue styles or news agenda which are consonant with their owners’ 
view of the world” (2012, p6).  If a media proprietor employs key staff who are like-
minded, or at the very least fully aware of the proprietor’s ideological and political 
opinions and willing to operate accordingly, those opinions are likely to be promoted 
via their news content.  Barnett explains that “the professional values which 
professional journalists claim to embrace - and to which the vast majority certainly 
aspire -will inevitably be influenced by, and sometimes subordinated to, the corporate 
world vision and editorial inclinations of the owner and editor” (op. cit.).   
Barnett continues in his evidence that this type of editorial influence can be heavily 
influenced by the commercial interests of the owner.  Barnett states that News 
 
2 
https://discoverleveson.com/evidence/Submission_by_Professor_Steven_Barnett_University_of_Westminster
/11489/media 
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International in particular has for a long time exhibited this type of behaviour, and uses 
its ‘huge editorial presence’ to cross-promote, or to “impede the progress of 
competitors by failing to publicise rival initiatives, or by distorting coverage against it” 
(op. cit.).   
 
Barnett cites a number of examples of Rupert Murdoch’s News International 
conglomerate undertaking such activity, including criticism of the BBC and using his 
newspapers to condemn the licence fee, the removal of the BBC’s news website from 
Murdoch’s Asian Star Satellite service (in pursuit of launching a cable TV network in 
China), and using his media outlets to promote his Fox studio movies while ensuring 
a lack of coverage about movies made by rival companies (Barnett, 2012, p8).   
 
Hardy (2010) undertook a study to examine editorial cross-promotion in Rupert 
Murdoch’s newspapers.  Via a comparative content analysis over a two-month period 
in 1998, it examines the material published in News International newspapers about 
BSkyB, the television network in which Murdoch had a controlling 40% interest.  Hardy 
asserted that Murdoch’s denial of newspaper cross-promotion is in “stark contrast to 
News Corp’s promotion of synergies and integration across digital media, in particular 
global satellite television and interactive services, and integrating online and offline 
media” (2010, p120).  Hardy’s study looked at the editorial content, advertisements, 
television listings, and reviews of programming within the News International 
newspapers compared with non-News International owned newspapers.  The study 
found that “NI newspapers used a range of promotional resources to cross-promote 
Sky in ways that differ from comparable competitor papers” (Hardy, 2010, p148). 
 
As Barnett (2012) notes, these practices are not confined to News International, but 
they demonstrate the ability of a powerful media proprietor to use their media 
companies to exploit their dominance in media markets. They can turn this to their 
advantage by distorting coverage about rivals, which has the potential to affect public 
opinion, furthering their own position in the market.  As discussed earlier in this 
chapter, media proprietors who have considerable holdings – in excess of what is 
deemed to be a reasonable amount in the interest of plurality – have the ability to exert 
considerable influence over politicians and policymakers, undermining the democratic 
process.   
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Summary  
 
The works covered in this chapter have identified the clear need for consideration of 
the issue of the concentration of media ownership in a broader context, addressing 
how it does or does not serve democracy.  With the media becoming increasingly 
ubiquitous in the everyday life of the general public, the ideal situation is to have 
multiple sources of reliable and credible news information that inform the reader in 
such a way that they can properly engage in the democratic process.  However, the 
reality is that traditional news sources can be biased and present persuasive, agenda-
driven views; policies and politicians can be deceptive; citizens can be lazy when it 
comes to engaging with information and forming political opinions.   
 
A system of a free press can perhaps be considered to be as close to the ideal as is 
possible, primarily due to its ability to hold power to account, and to provide the public 
with unbiased, truthful information.  However, with a free press that is not appropriately 
governed, and does not adhere to guidelines on reliable and appropriate content, and 
rules about ownership, there is the risk that concentration in the media markets can 
become problematic and threaten the democratic process.   
 
A concentration of ownership means an increased number of newspapers of a 
particular political allegiance that would present information that offers only one view, 
with the potential to unduly influence public opinion.  It also creates the potential for 
powerful media conglomerates that have the ability to unduly influence politicians.  As 
it is subject to the decisions made by the same politicians, it may look to present 
information to appease the decision makers and serve particular commercial agendas.  
There is an argument that the media is the more powerful of the two parties in this 
scenario, as it has the most direct route to the masses, and the politicians are reliant 
on this vehicle to promote positive messages and information that will help place them, 
or keep them, in power.   
 
This argument can be contested in light of the ‘new digital environment’ which has 
seen a multitude of new types of ‘news’ and ways of consuming it, and which is 
explored in Chapter Two.  However, it remains to be seen whether anyone other but 
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the traditional providers can retain such power. As Barnett states:  
 
“despite the decline in circulation – the press in people’s lives has been remarkably 
resilient in light of huge technological changes that have taken place over the last 20 
years.  And while newspaper platforms may become more flexible – moving from 
newsprint to electronic forms – there remain at the moment powerful consumption and 
editorial reasons for applying structural limits rather than making assumptions about 
changing behaviour patterns which may materialise either very slowly or not at all” 
(2012, p13).   
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Chapter Two: The New Digital Environment 
 
“What is significant about the present moment… is that the question of technology has 
assumed cardinal importance for the very definition of media.  Many of the current 
debates about media – its characteristics, social functions, cultural meanings and 
futures – pivot on technology… There is a very intensive, widespread and far-reaching 
set of technological systems undergoing profound change, with media experiencing 
some of the most direct effects of any area of society.  Two words can suffice to 
indicate the magnitude of this shift: the internet” (Goggin, 2012, p8). 
 
Entertainment, information and news are no longer only delivered each morning via a 
hard copy of a newspaper, or on the television set.  The UK, the west, and much of 
the world have entered an era where all of the above are readily available 24 hours a 
day at the click of a button wherever an internet connection is available.  Furthermore, 
all the traditional routes via which a reader would consume the news are evolving with 
the development of mobile applications, social media and online interaction.  A major 
contributing factor has been digitalisation and the internet, which has in turn seen an 
overhaul of the ways in which news content is produced, delivered and consumed.  
Hachten and Scotton describe this change as the ‘information revolution’, noting that 
“the news media - newspapers, news services, radio stations, television, cable 
channels and networks, and news magazines - are being strikingly altered by the 
information revolution.  News communication is being dramatically affected by ongoing 
revolutionary changes in communication satellites, computers, digitalisation, 
miniaturisation, and the Internet” (2012, p59).   
 
In the context of this thesis, which examines the ability of a major media conglomerate 
to use the power of his popular press to attack competitors and regulators, the new 
digital environment and the plethora of new news sources it offers presents a valid 
challenge: is the issue still relevant where newspaper circulation is in decline? 
 
It is indeed a valid challenge, as it can be argued that the Murdoch owned press is 
becoming less powerful now that its prominence is diluted by the many new ways in 
which people source news.  However, in spite of this, the following chapter will explain 
how the established, traditional news content providers continue to dominate online 
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news just as they did and do in the traditional press and broadcast news.  Furthermore, 
this move to online news has seen the BBC establish itself as a popular and reliable 
online news source; the ‘online world’ has become yet another arena in which 
Murdoch’s media empire has to complete with its rival, the BBC. 
 
This chapter will consider the various elements of the news that have in some way 
been altered or impacted by the new digital environment, including the production and 
consumption of the news, audience participation in the news, and the overall impact 
on the news media industry.  It will conclude that, despite the many challenges the 
new digital environment presents, media organisations such as News International 
have continued to maintain their prominent, powerful position.  This mitigates the 
challenge that the move to online news removes the relevance of the subject of this 
thesis in current times, or indeed, in the foreseeable future.   
 
Production of news 
 
The news industry is facing adverse challenges in light of a revolutionary and 
constantly evolving digital environment.  Digitalisation and technological 
advancements offer improvements in the sourcing, production and distribution of 
news; new websites, forums and social media environments offer new platforms 
through which news can not only be distributed but debated and discussed by the 
audience themselves.  Tewksbury and Rittenberg discuss the conventional business 
model of news production and provision versus that of the modern day, noting the 
rapid changes seen since the advent and inception of the internet: 
 
“Changes in the news business are challenging the old definitions of press and 
audience. On the one hand, the dividing line between journalist and citizen is 
becoming particularly fuzzy, as more people become involved in the creation of news. 
On the other hand, the current technologies have facilitated a change in the meaning 
of an audience.  The dominant media of the 20th century operated within a system of 
centralised, largely one-way news dissemination.  To consume the news was to ingest 
a diet of information selected by news professionals.  What is more, the major media 
determined the flow of news.  Even a newspaper, always the most customisable news 
format, contains a structure that largely organizes news for audiences.  Today, the 
 25 
 
receivers of the news exert substantial control over their news diet.  They can choose 
among numerous outlets, preselect specific topics, and focus their time and attention 
on the messages they prefer” (2012, p3). 
 
The internet has seen increased availability of news, and digitalisation means 
increased flexibility in the way news is consumed; i.e. at any given moment a member 
of the public can use their mobile, tablet (handheld device) or computer to access 
online news regardless of their location, and when there is a breaking story, receive 
real-time updates.  Furthermore, they can view stories and ‘select’ which to read or 
watch.  This change means that news organisations need to be ready to publish 
information on a real-time basis, with a far more restricted time frame to source and 
investigate some stories.  However, the internet also provides far greater means and 
ability to reach audiences, and allows for a different type of news, i.e. news stories 
with embedded videos, links to related stories, an increased number of images 
included with the story etc.  Fenton explains that “more space equals more news.  The 
sheer space available online is said to open up new possibilities for news presentation 
that cannot be found in hard copy form…  Similarly, the ability to update regularly is 
vastly enhanced” (2010, p7).  
 
The increased abilities and availabilities Fenton refers to offer benefits beyond simply 
satisfying an audience more quickly. Fenton also notes the growing belief that the 
internet contributes to and offers the benefits of globalisation: “some theorists believe 
that the web is capable of linking communities of interest across the globe, thereby 
creating greater political participation.  Reach is further enhanced by speed” (2010, 
p7).  When information is so readily available, and on much larger and more easily 
accessible platforms, the opportunity for the public to participate in the political process 
is – at least in theory – increased; and increased further by the opportunity that online 
news formats present with regard to audience participation (i.e. the audience’s ability 
to comment on news stories and interact).  Van Der Wurff notes some examples of 
such features: “Several new innovative types of content and online communication 
have been introduced.  Examples include personalised web pages, weblogs, 
interactive advertising, online forums and social networking sites - new formats where 
the hyperlinking and interactive opportunities of the internet are deliberately put to use” 
(2008, p66). 
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While Van Der Wurff discusses similar themes with regard to the increased availability 
of news that the internet offers, he also asserts that such technological development 
has not led to improvements in the quality of the content over and above what is 
already available via traditional form of news:  
 
“By far the largest share of internet content - most text, audio and video files that we 
can access - is content that could, actually is, or previously was presented in similar 
ways in old media.  Online newspapers, for example, may provide individual articles 
rather than news pages, but these news articles tend to be identical to the ones 
published in the print paper.  New content, specifically, made for the internet - such as 
real time stories that are updated during the day - is scarcer and new content formats 
- such as interactive reporting - are even scarcer” (op. cit.).   
 
Van Der Wurff goes on to state that despite there being some examples of innovative 
and new ways to present the news online, as mentioned above, “for the time being 
and for the average user, these examples are easily lost in the flood of traditional 
content that dominates the web” (2008, op.cit).  Van Der Wurff also considers why and 
how online news has developed in such a way that it acts as a distribution tool for most 
traditional forms of content, as opposed to a medium in which an entirely different type 
of content, or at the very least content produced and presented in a different format, 
dominates the web:  
 
“By and large, internet technology reduces the costs of content reproduction and 
distribution, but not the costs of content production.  This basically means that 
organisations and individuals can easily use the internet to distribute existing content 
at trivial or no additional costs to large and small audiences - including audiences that 
could not be served cost-effectively before… if there has been any impact of the 
internet on content production, it is that it has become more difficult to recover 
production costs by selling content to audiences” (2008, p67).   
 
Despite further digital and social media developments in the ten years since this work 
was published, it is certainly arguable that traditional forms of content, and the 
traditional major media conglomerates producing it, still dominate the online news 
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market.  The barriers to entry in the form of the costs associated with the production 
of content have not changed as a result of the internet, only the costs associated with 
distribution.  Therefore, while it is entirely possible for a smaller, lower-budget 
organisation, or even an individual with no funding at all to publish news information, 
marketing their website would likely require the kind of funding and resources that are 
far more readily at the disposal of a larger, well established and profitable news 
organisation.  However, despite this view, Van Der Wurff does note one key change 
in the way that news is consumed that removes the traditional reliance on major news 
providers:  
 
“One major break from the past is that content is distributed via the internet in an 
unbundled way.  Instead of acquiring newspaper, magazines… combinations of 
content that are compiled by professionals - internet users access individual 
newspaper and magazine articles… this reduces the impact of editors and other 
professionals on user selection” (2008, p82).  
 
Van Der Wurff’s assertion about the reduction in the impact of editors implies a 
reduction in impact, and therefore risk, of the concentration of ownership in media 
markets.  The internet has moved the audience away from a reliance on the potentially 
biased view of a single newspaper.  This view is, of course, predicated on the 
assumption that the reader will consume online news in such a way that they read 
articles from several different sources and are cognisant of their choice.  How 
audiences arrive at a news article online is a topic worth much consideration within the 
context of online news and media ownership and will be discussed further on in this 
chapter.  Van Der Wurff concludes that online news does not offer the audience 
anything new, but rather more of it and with the flexibility to choose: “Online 
newspapers allow users to choose more directly and exclusively for the news that they 
are interested in.  Thus, the internet makes the same news better available, but it 
depends on the knowledge, experience and desires of each individual user whether 
and how the plethora of available news items is accessed and used” (2009, p82).   
 
The internet has seen one type of new ‘news’: the blog.  Blogs are typically discussion 
or informational websites that individuals create and maintain on any given topic.  
Blogs often address niche areas, and when a blog becomes popular, the creators are 
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able to profit via selling advertising space on the site.  As part of a study of journalism 
and democracy in the digital age, which included 160 interviews with a range of 
professionals across the industry, Couldry described bloggers as ‘writer-gatherers’, 
explaining the term as: 
 
“…source-actors - lying between individual web-posters and fully fledged news 
organisations - who through the web are expanding the news landscape, either directly 
or by altering the source from which mainstream news typically draws… a non-
evaluative term to capture those engaged in a regular practice of writing and/or 
information aggregation outside mainstream media institutions” (2010, p139).   
 
This type of new actor indicates a move away from the mainstream coverage that has 
long dominated the media in western society, and perhaps from the traditional 
standards of journalism.  Couldry describes bloggers not as journalists, but individuals 
offering opinion (this could be likened to the traditional format of editorial or opinion 
pieces that are published in newspapers).  The range of actors considered in this study 
covered a spectrum from high-profile bloggers, commenting on mainly entertainment 
and celebrity gossip, to individuals offering personal opinion.  However, despite their 
ability to expand the news landscape, Couldry described such actors as having limited 
chances of inclusion in or influence on mainstream news, with only a few that could 
be considered to be “partly institutionalised voices, some of them offering something 
new and potentially significant… professional blogs and armed service rumour sites 
are not news sites; they insert streams of individual opinion, often highly forceful in 
language, into the wider ambit of public debate” (2010, p145).    
 
Gillmor (2006) offers a different view of bloggers’ ability to affect mainstream news, 
noting an example where the Republican leader of the US Senate, Trent Lott, made 
reference to Storm Thurmond’s presidential campaign in 1948 that called for the 
‘preservation of segregation’ and claimed that the country would have been better off 
had Thurmond become president.  Although shocking, the story was not picked up by 
the mainstream media.  However, it was discussed and commented on in many online 
forums and by many bloggers.  Due to this persistent online coverage, the story was 
eventually covered in the mainstream press and gathered pace.   
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Gillmor describes the events as a ‘watershed’ moment, but one that would and could 
not have occurred had the mainstream media not eventually picked up on the 
discussions taking place online, prompted by bloggers.  Gillmor aptly denotes changes 
in news consumption and production, and how the internet has brought about a 
change to the transaction between the news provider and the audience, and that, in 
some cases, these two roles are interchangeable: 
 
“Call them newsmakers.  Call them sources.  Call them subjects… however we 
describe them, we must all recognise that the rules for newsmakers, not just 
journalists, have changed, thanks to everyone’s ability to make the news” (2006, pp44-
45).   
 
Gillmor goes on to assert that newsmakers need to recognise and harness the wealth 
of knowledge available via their audience, and that to ignore stories that the audience 
clearly want to read will result in loss of readership as “they will realise they don’t have 
to settle for half-baked coverage; they can come into the kitchen themselves” (2006, 
p111).       
 
Consumption of news 
 
While the internet and technology have had considerable impact on the business of 
producing the news, they have arguably had far greater impact on the audience’s 
consumption of news.  This reliance on technology and the internet, and their adoption 
into everyday life, has radically changed not only the way in which the news is 
distributed to the audience, but the way in which the audience consumes it.  Readers 
are able to ‘find the news’ in numerous locations online with a vast amount of choice 
at their fingertips; and many will ‘receive’ the news and/or headlines as a by-product 
of the consumption of various other forms of entertainment and social interaction that 
the internet now offers.   
 
Blank and Dutton (2013) undertook a study of internet access in which they found that, 
as at 2011, 44% of users were accessing the internet via ‘devices’; i.e. mobiles, tablets, 
handheld computers etc.  That figure has since almost doubled: Ofcom (2018) reports 
that 77% of UK adults use a smartphone to access the internet.  Blank and Dutton’s 
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focus was on this ‘next generation user’ (the phrase they assign to members of the 
public accessing the internet in such a ‘mobile’ fashion) and how they are both 
incorporating and taking advantage of technology and the internet in their day-to-day 
lives.  Blank and Dutton found that the internet “gives access to a variety of 
innovations, including web browsers, location and direction services, email, and social 
networking.  This presents a large menu of items to be incorporated into people’s day-
to-day lives.  It will not be done all at once; for many the internet is a continuing, 
multiyear exploration of possibilities” (2015, p126).   
 
This implies that the way the next generation user accesses content online today could 
very well change in years to come, making for a difficult and unpredictable market for 
those producing content they aim to profit from.  Blank and Dutton also note that “the 
internet is the only medium (with the exception of spending time with other people for 
entertainment) where next-generation and first-generation users differ.  These figures 
underline the disproportionate value that next-generation users place on the internet” 
(2015, p130).  It is a fair assumption that this trend is likely to continue.  Ofcom (2018) 
reports that people spend 24 hours per week online on their smartphone; a figure that 
has more than doubled in ten years.   
 
Social media have become a major part of most people’s lives.  The social media 
platform Facebook will feature news stories and headlines in a user’s daily feed; what 
the user sees is dependent on their choices, i.e. which news source page they chose 
to ‘like’, mixed in with some ‘sponsored stories’, the selection of which is controlled by 
algorithms.  Similarly, a Twitter user will see snapshot headlines as they scroll through 
their daily feed and have the option to ‘click through’ to read the full story or find more 
detail on the topic in question.  Where a member of the public may have once relied 
on picking up a free daily newspaper at the train station of a morning, it is now more 
likely that they will have already glanced at the day’s headlines on their mobile phone 
or tablet, and they will have personally selected which stories to consume.   
 
Bakker and Sadaba explain that “in contrast to the classic understanding of an 
audience, that is, a more or less passive group expecting information or entertainment, 
internet users are in many cases active, looking for those pieces of content to satisfy 
their particularly concrete needs” (2008, p87).  That being said, how news is selected 
 31 
 
and consumed is subject to complex, interlinked developments that have evolved 
online. As Goggin explains, “The internet had brought vast amounts of information and 
news into the purview of users.  With the advent of the web, the amount of material 
exponentially increased, but so too did the technologies for finding and distributing it.  
Search technologies such as Google, Yahoo! and Baidu have grown in importance 
because they have provided algorithmic methods of identifying and location 
information.  Apparently radical customisation of news became possible, with the 
interlocking of different internet technologies” (2012, p50).   
 
Such platforms have introduced an additional, user-based and controlled feature to 
news consumption: the ‘sharing’ of news.  The audience no longer ‘passively’ receive 
news content, but now have the opportunity to engage with it in an entirely new way; 
not only by being able to comment on stories, but by being able to ‘share’ a story by 
posting it to their own social network feed for others.  Effectively, the audience become 
part of the distribution process.  Jenkins, Ford and Green describe this as ‘spreadable 
media’: “Our use of ‘spreadable media’ avoids the metaphors of ‘infection’ and 
‘contamination,’ which over-estimate the power of media companies and 
underestimate the agency of audiences.  In this emerging model, audiences play an 
active role in ‘spreading’ content rather than serving as passive carriers of viral media: 
their choices, investments, agendas, and actions determine what gets valued” (2013, 
p21).   
 
The nature of this new model suggests that the audience have regained some or much 
of the power previously considered to be held by the media industry and 
conglomerates.  The audience are now able to shape their media environment in a 
way that was previously not possible, by choosing what to read and further distributing 
this.  This is harnessed by the algorithmic nature of the selection of news on social 
media and networking sites as the algorithms are built on and adapt to users’ choices, 
continuously suggesting content from certain sources, or relating to certain topics 
based on a user’s selections.  In a news environment that is becoming increasingly 
reliant on the ‘spreadability’ of news and ensuring that content appears at the top of a 
feed, or is noticeable to the point of it being ‘clickable’, digital intermediaries are 
becoming prominent features of the process of distribution.   
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An intermediary is often referred to as a ‘gatekeeper’ or a ‘news aggregator’.  Isbell 
offers a simple definition for an aggregator: “At its most basic, a news aggregator is a 
website that takes information from multiple sources and displays it in a single place” 
(2010, p2).  This ‘gatekeeper’ could be a search engine, a social media site or an app 
on a smartphone device that serves the purpose of “controlling information flows, 
selecting, sorting, and then distributing information” (op. cit.).  However, complex and 
evolving technologies such as aggregators and algorithms now being at play does not 
necessarily mitigate the risk of biased or concentrated flows of information from 
specific sources being presented to the audience.   
 
Jenkins, Ford and Green do not consider this new model to be as revolutionary as 
could perhaps be inferred, as the existing mass-media organisations continue to 
dominate content regardless of the format: “None of this supposes an end to the role 
of commercial mass media as perhaps the most powerful force in our collective cultural 
lives.  In many cases, producers and brand makers have decided to utilise more 
participatory means of communication and informal means of circulation, but their 
ultimate aim is still the propagation of mass-media content… Throughout, mass-media 
content remains that which spreads the furthest, the widest, and the fastest” (2013, 
p259).  
 
 Perhaps aligned with the previously considered issue of digitalisation and the internet 
reducing the costs of distribution, but not content creation, the traditional mass-media 
organisations are still able to push their content further across the net, and invest in 
popular websites and technologies that ensure their content features as the ‘top hit’ in 
a Google search, or in a user’s Facebook or Twitter feed.   
  
Participant/citizen journalism               
 
Sites such as Twitter, which began as a social media platform that allowed users to 
provide a status update in up to 140 characters (now 280), encouraged a type of 
participation from both the content producer and reader that have become increasingly 
interchangeable and, over time, evolved the purpose of the technology into something 
beyond simply an individual’s ‘status update’ into a real-time news feed.  Braun and 
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Gillespie report that Twitter amended its terms of reference to reflect this change in 
the nature of its service and user engagement: “The fundamentally open model of 
Twitter created a new kind of information network and it has long outgrown the concept 
of personal status updates.  Twitter helps you share and discover what’s happening 
now amongst all things, people, and events you care about” (2011, p8).  The 
information revolution has seen commenting on news stories, partaking in online 
dialogue regarding current events and ‘following’ news organisations, journalists and 
presenters, or even particular stories, all become common practice.   
 
In addition to this, Twitter is increasingly a platform for a type of ‘participant journalism’, 
whereby users are able to publish information in real time about an event, allowing a 
user without any journalistic ambition or ability to break a story ahead of any traditional 
news organisation. For example, “the capture of Osama bin Laden entered 
mainstream news by a local Pakistani in the small town of Abbottabad who saw a 
helicopter hovering overhead and then heard an explosion” (Veitch, 2016).  Tewksbury 
and Rittenberg recognise that users creating content online are challenging the 
existing nature of news and pose a threat to the conglomerates, even going as far as 
to assert that “citizen journalists implicitly and explicitly challenge the authority of the 
major news media” (2012, p11).   
 
That said, Veitch states that while journalists can often feel frustrated as Twitter users 
challenge their speed and skill, there is also the opportunity via Twitter to monitor 
audience reaction and amenability to a story: “journalists can quickly see how the 
Twittersphere is reacting to news and test the pulse of the populace” (2016).  Twitter 
allows journalists and news organisations to assess how readers react to material, 
and then tailor or refine future pieces according to feedback.  In effect, Twitter allows 
them to access a ‘smart sample’ of the general public that gives them an insight into 
what the audience want to read about, and which stories are likely to prove particularly 
popular. 
 
Participant journalism has proven to be both a challenge and an opportunity for the 
media conglomerates.  The challenge is that suddenly a news story is no longer 
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‘protected’ in the way it once was.  Previously, there was no available platform for a 
member of the public to ‘share’ information regarding a newsworthy event they had 
witnessed.  In the absence of a conveniently placed journalist, news was typically 
reported ‘after the fact’, or as the events unfolded and gathered traction (and often the 
newspapers relied on news agencies to provide information).  Therefore, the headline 
news story in the morning edition of a daily newspaper held a lot more value.   
 
Tworek explains “in 1873, Frederic Hudson, managing editor of the New York Herald, 
argued that the increased speed of newspaper production provided sufficient 
protection of news value” (2015, p96). This remained true until the adoption of the 
internet into everyday life, and the beginning of the new digital environment which saw 
a complete overhaul of this theory.  It can be a ‘double edged sword’: what challenges 
the traditional model of news gathering and distribution (and indeed poses a 
substantial challenge and threat to the profitability of the traditional business model) 
can also provide the very material that forms the basis of extraordinary news stories. 
  
The events linked to the website WikiLeaks aptly illustrate this point.  WikiLeaks is “an 
international non-profit organisation that publishes news leaks, and classified media 
provided by anonymous sources.  Its website, initiated in 2006 in Iceland by the 
organisation Sunshine Press, claimed in 2016 to have released online 10 million 
documents in its first 10 years” (Wikipedia, 2016).  In 2010, WikiLeaks published 
information it received from a whistle-blower within the US military; the information and 
the press coverage that ensued was considered damning.   
 
The founder of WikiLeaks, Julian Assange, remains wanted by the US government for 
compromising classified information and, at the time of writing, is fighting extradition 
to the US.  The leaked material, and the website itself, presented an entirely new form 
of journalism, though some would argue it followed all the same principles of traditional 
investigative reporting.  Either way, the website bypassed any established journalistic 
platform or newspaper and published the information, completely unedited, directly to 
its website, which was publicly available to anyone with access to a computer and the 
internet.  Meikle and Young explain: 
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“WikiLeaks is not a news organisation, stateless or otherwise.  Placing a quarter of a 
million raw documents on a website is not the same thing as producing news, which 
is an industrial process of creating and distributing non-fiction dramas, of giving shape 
and structure to raw information.  WikiLeaks does not produce news - rather, it is a 
source of raw material for news organisations which simultaneously makes that raw 
material available to anyone through its website.  Its role in channelling information to 
news media has more in common with the communication strategies of powerful 
sources like the Pentagon or the Metropolitan Police than with journalism” (2012, p8).   
 
This argument elicits an interesting debate with regard to what can be considered 
formal or traditional journalism, and how this issue is mired when it comes to the 
internet.  Typically, if a whistle-blower leaks documents to a newspaper, they would 
be held accountable for any related crime (not the newspaper).  However, in the case 
of WikiLeaks and its founder Julian Assange, he himself continues to be pursued by 
the US authorities for the leaks (the whistle-blower who passed the information to 
WikiLeaks was also pursued and has served time in prison).  In this case, WikiLeaks 
was not given the same consideration that perhaps would be afforded to a traditional 
news organisation, albeit it performed, to some extent, the same task of disseminating 
information.  Gillmor notes three key aspects of this type of ‘grass-roots’, non-
traditional journalism:  
 
“…firstly, outsiders of all kinds can probe more deeply into newsmakers’ businesses 
and affairs.  They can disseminate what they learn more widely and more quickly.  And 
it’s never been easier to organise like-minded people to support, or denounce, a 
person or cause.  The communications-enabled grassroots is a formidable truth 
squad.  Second, insiders are part of the conversation.  Information no longer leaks.  It 
gushes, through firewalls and other barriers, via instant messages, emails and phone 
calls.  Third, what gushes forth can take on a life of its own…” (2006, p46).   
 
However, despite leaking the ‘raw’ information directly via the WikiLeaks website, the 
organisation still had to work with the traditional forms of mass media to circulate the 
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information and ensure it was seen by the many.  Goggin explains that when 
WikiLeaks released a further set of classified documents – cables from 250 US 
embassies around the world – it had to repeat the previous activity of utilising the 
traditional mass media:  
 
“…WikiLeaks again struck agreements with the leading press outlets.  There were 
many advantages to this, including the ability to take advantage of the fact-checking, 
analysis and interpretation skills of leading journalists.  Also the newspapers were able 
to pick out the aspects of the cables most germane to their national publics, and zero 
in on the points of maximum embarrassment and outrage to their own governments” 
(2012, p55). 
  
This perhaps identifies the salient point with regard to a clear delineation between 
citizen and professional journalism, whereby skill and experience are required to 
ensure the content is of the quality and in the format likely to attract and hold the 
attention of an audience.  Without this, there is the risk that the information will serve 
little purpose, as well as reaching a much smaller audience.  Furthermore, without the 
marketing of such material, and lending to it the verification that comes with a trusted 
and known news source (i.e. an established and familiar news organisation), there is 
the risk that such extraordinary information, even with the power of social media and 
‘sharing’, could likely be dismissed as untrue.  As Meikle and Young state: 
 
“WikiLeaks was also a newspaper phenomenon.  All of the online sharing and 
argument, all of the social networking and collaborative chatter, were catalysed by the 
publication of material provided by WikiLeaks to The Guardian, The New York Times 
and other long-established news organisations.  The convergent media environment, 
then, is characterised by both contestation and continuity” (2012, p7).  
 
Implications for the industry 
 
Meikle and Young consider this idea of a ‘convergent media environment’, where the 
traditional media now exists alongside or interlinked with the newer and evolving 
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formats, explaining ‘contestation and continuity’ as “new actors and old industries, 
contending modes of distribution and visibility, complex assemblages of networked 
digital media” (2012, p9).  Like many of the views considered in this chapter thus far, 
there is a noticeable lack of suggestion that the new digital environment or the 
‘information revolution’ threatens to replace the existing, more traditional news 
producers and organisations.  Rather, it seems, the traditional industry is being forced 
to adapt and adopt the practices evolving out of new technologies and online platforms 
while contending with new and very different types of rival providers to retain its income 
in an already tumultuous economic environment in light of declining readership and 
advertising sales.  Thornburg explains:  
 
“among the 199 most popular news sites in the US, two-thirds are sites for news 
organisations that were in business before the internet existed.  And two-thirds of the 
traffic to the top 199 sites goes to legacy news-sites, or sites that are run by companies 
that produced the news before the arrival of the internet… According to a 2009 
analysis of outgoing links from social media sites done by the Project for Excellence 
in Journalism (PEJ), about 80 percent of the links go to traditional media sites.  The 
list of destinations to which bloggers send their readers is dominated by just three 
news sources: The New York Times, CNN, and the BBC” (2011, p64). 
 
Meikle and Young describe both News Corporation and Apple as examples of 
traditional media organisations that can now be considered ‘convergent’, as they 
navigate the ongoing and evolving process of consolidation to create larger, integrated 
media firms that are ‘more networked’:  
 
“Media industries develop by responding to the possibilities offered by the affordances 
of communications technologies… they incorporate into their existing business… they 
significantly change the scope and prevailing uses of the technology, and in doing so 
change the scope and scale of their own business.  The digitalisation and networking 
of production and distribution means that the overlap between previously distinct 
sectors is now very substantial” (2012, p40).   
 
Picard explains that the impact of the internet has been far greater on the 
communications industry than any other technological development, as “unlike 
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broadcasting or television, the Internet is a substitute for the printed world” (2015, 
p251).  That said, it has to be noted that consumers’ viewing and listening habits are 
seen to be increasingly changing as broadcasters adapt, i.e. streaming services such 
as Netflix are becoming increasingly popular, and people are no longer reliant on TV 
scheduling thanks to catch-up services available via the internet.  
 
Causes for concern 
 
There are a number of issues to consider within the context of the new digital 
environment and the impact on plurality: 
 
- Online news 
 
In considering the impact of new technologies and the internet on the production and 
provision of news, Phillips concludes that: 
 
“the availability of information is creating better opportunities for checking material, 
finding alternative sources and improving reliability, independence and therefore the 
democratic and cultural relevance of newspapers.  At the same time, the speeding up 
of news reporting and the need to be visible on the net is impacting directly on the 
quality of follow-up of routine news.  It would seem from the evidence here that, far 
from broadening and democratizing, the internet is actually narrowing the perspective 
of many reporters…  One is forced to conclude that the overall effect of the internet on 
journalism is to provide a diminishing range of the same old sources albeit in newer 
bottles” (2010, p95).   
 
This underlines the point that the internet has provided a vast, perhaps limitless 
platform upon which to publish, and yet for the most part, the audience is, knowingly 
or not, consuming much the same content (albeit through different distribution 
mechanisms) as before.  The impact is not only on the audience; the existing and new 
media organisations providing the news continue to contend with an unpredictable 
business model from which it is somewhat difficult to gain any profit and are arguably 
yet to land on a viable model.  Goggin explains: 
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“newspaper apps are being eagerly watched to see if they will provide a viable revenue 
stream to prop up newspapers, as they suffer the near-mortal blow of loss of 
advertising.  Apps are part of a reinvigorated attempt to settle upon a business model 
that will finally see consumers pay for digital content” (2012, p55).   
 
Fortunately for them, the existing, well-established media conglomerates already have 
at their disposal significant funding from other areas of their business, along with the 
experience of operating in media markets, and the advantage of being trusted news 
brands.   
 
- Digital intermediaries 
 
Foster (2012) details the potential impact of digital intermediaries on news 
consumption.  Foster examines the premise that digital intermediaries have the 
potential to open up and/or further widen access to news content and therefore, 
potentially, further promote democracy.  However, where such possibilities do exist, 
there is the equal, and perhaps far more damaging, possibility that the provision of 
news content in this manner can be manipulated in favour of the few large media 
conglomerates operating in the UK market. Foster explains (using Yahoo as an 
example) that aggregators “are close to established news media in the way that they 
operate, providing carefully curated packages of news content for their users, and 
sometimes originating new content themselves” (2012, p6).   
 
On this basis, it is arguable that policymakers and government officials should 
consider such news aggregators to be the same as any traditional form of news 
publisher.  While it is arguable that such enterprises do not actually produce content 
and therefore have more limited power to exercise political bias, this is not to say that 
some form of agenda cannot still be served.  If such an enterprise as Summly, an 
algorithm-based app that summarises news content into 1000, 500 or 140 words, was 
to be bought by one of the large media owners, the media owner then has the 
opportunity to filter the news that reaches the consumer according to their own 
commercial interests.  (Summly was purchased by Yahoo in 2013).   
 
Furthermore, as long as no policy exists in regard to the acquisition of digital media 
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space, the media owner is effectively able to increase their market share and audience 
reach indefinitely.  On the other hand, Thornburg argues that “on-demand delivery 
offers the online audience much more control over which stories it sees via social 
media as well as news aggregators such as Google News.  Because they are reading 
headlines on social networking sites, many people may be getting as much news as 
they want without ever actually visiting a news site… the use of search and social 
filtering means that for many people their news diet is becoming more balanced - 68 
percent of online news audience regularly relies on more than one source of news 
everyday, and 11 percent regularly uses at least six sites” (2011, pp65-66).  This 
represents an ‘ideal’ approach to plurality – where audiences are drawing information 
from a number of sources – but, as discussed, it ignores the power of media 
conglomerates in the production (rather than distribution) of news according to pre-set 
agendas.   
 
- Democracy 
 
In the context of news and democracy, it is difficult to truly define the impact of the 
new digital environment.  Hachten and Scotton explain that “concerned persons are 
pondering the implications of all of this.  Society, in short, faces the danger of 
computer/communications technologies advancing faster than our ability to develop 
methods of controlling and using them for the general welfare of humankind.  This has 
always been true of technologies, but today that gap is becoming ominously wide” 
(2012, p75).  It is fair to say that the impact of the internet has been felt most when it 
comes to the business of news.  Other areas of the media industry, such as music and 
entertainment, are slowly finding ways to grow and profit (albeit continuing to 
experience challenges along the way).  The special nature of news means that the 
issue goes beyond profitability and new business models to ensuring that the quality 
of the product is not corroded, and that it can serve democracy as well as its audience.  
 
The press, an area of the media industry that has for a long time enjoyed oligopolistic 
control and successful and loyal readership, now faces new types of competition as a 
result of the additional, potentially limitless space online.  Stories are easily copied, 
the public are able to engage and create content, and while it can be argued that 
investment remains key (and therefore the barriers to entry remain in place), the 
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internet has provided a viable platform for smaller competitors who might previously 
have been deterred.  It has also changed the nature of the way we, the general public, 
consume the news.  Picard explains “circulation, listeners, viewers, and unique visitors 
are still critical to success, but the instantaneous distribution of news via the Internet 
and social media makes it difficult to retain control of one’s news product and 
audiences” (2015, p224). 
 
The news conglomerates now face the real challenge of maintaining their momentum 
and presence in a constantly evolving market that, to some extent, is unpredictable 
when trying to scan the horizon for potential competitors or emerging popular trends.  
From a governmental and policy perspective, the issue becomes even more complex.  
There are two key factors to consider: the conglomerates’ reaction to the emergence 
of new media and the potential acquisitions that further increase their reach and power 
(further amplifying the issue of ownership); and the far-ranging debate about how, or 
indeed whether, to regulate the provision of online news content.   
 
Summary  
 
Issues of media plurality no longer relate to just newspapers and broadcasters in the 
traditional newspaper and television format.  The digital age, or ‘new digital 
environment’, has revolutionised the ways in which people consume news and 
information, and as such the implementation of adequate policy to address issues of 
plurality becomes more complex.  Furthermore, the shift in the consumption of news 
online has had a significant impact on journalism and the newspaper industry and has 
seen a wealth of new actors operating in this space.   
 
A prominent example of a new type of actor that has the potential to further complicate 
matters of regulation are the ‘news aggregators’, or ‘gatekeepers’.  The aggregator 
has the potential to exercise significant influence over the news agenda, and even 
what information the public is or isn’t exposed to.  For example, Facebook has the 
ability to select which news stories will appear on an individual’s feed, or ‘push’ stories 
that derive from a certain news source.  As discussed in this chapter, research to date 
indicates that the public largely participate in the consumption of news online in a 
passive manner, and so may not be cognisant of the bias, credibility or reliability of the 
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information they are engaging with.   
 
At the time of writing, there is no policy in place in Britain that addresses media 
ownership and plurality within the context of online media space.  Thus, as it stands, 
the traditional news providers and major media conglomerates have the potential to 
make significant acquisitions, expanding their market share and audience reach.   
 
This chapter speaks to some broader themes within the media ownership and 
dominance debate. However, these themes are relevant to the central subject of this 
thesis: Murdoch’s ability to attack and undermine his competitors and regulators in 
pursuit of his corporate agenda and expansion plans.  This chapter confirms that the 
risks of a media moguls’ ability to exert undue influence and power is not denigrated 
by the new digital environment.  
 
Chapter one explored issues with regards to the role of the news in a democratic 
society and how major media players, such as Rupert Murdoch, can interfere with the 
democratic process by using his popular press to sway opinion and set agendas.  As 
this thesis will assert, this can be done with the aim of pursuing personal and corporate 
agendas, and to the benefit of the media mogul’s expansion plans.   
 
This chapter has sought to build on that broader theme, and to mitigate any challenge 
that the new digital environment reduces the risks associated with the concentration 
of media ownership allowing such influence.  By exploring the technical developments 
that have brought about changes in the production and consumption of news, it has 
allowed for consideration of the new and emerging sources of news now available to 
audiences that may allay concerns regarding Murdoch’s ability to influence reader 
opinion, and therefore policy decisions.   
 
Via the analysis of the relevant literature and studies on these topics, this chapter 
concludes that traditional press owners continue to dominate press content and the 
news agenda.  Therefore, the issue of Murdoch’s ability to use his popular press to 
attack competing media organisations, or regulators imposing potential restrictions on 
his business, whether it be for ideological or business reasons, or both, remains a 
prevalent one in the current day and foreseeable future.   
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Chapter Three: Rupert Murdoch and News Corporation 
 
This chapter will undertake a chronological examination of the history of both 
Murdoch’s business practices in the UK, and the important political relationships he 
maintained.  It will begin with an overview of Murdoch’s various acquisitions since he 
began business in the UK in 1968 to the present day (at the time of writing – 2019).  
This will be followed by analysis of a number of acquisitions, events and relationships 
with various prime ministers during this time period.   
 
This analysis is done so in an attempt to understand how and why Murdoch has used 
the power of his media holdings, notably his UK press holdings, to undermine and 
attack competitors and (in this case the BBC) and a number of regulators, and to what 
end.   
 
This chapter will assert that Murdoch had two core motivations for undertaking such 
practices: firstly, so as to make room in the UK broadcasting market to allow for his 
entrance and subsequent expansion; and secondly, because of his deep-rooted, 
ideological opposition to the ‘establishment’, and therefore to the BBC as Britain’s 
Public Service Broadcaster (PSB) and to the premise of regulation of the commercial 
markets in which he wanted to operate.   
 
It will also be argued that Murdoch has continued over time to use his powerful UK 
press to criticise such organisations as the BBC and Ofcom because of this ideological 
opposition, and so as to maintain his dominant position in the UK media markets.    
 
Timeline of Business in the UK 
The profile of News Corp’s assets has changed over time.  The timeline below details 
the history of Murdoch’s acquisitions and other selected activities since he started 
doing business in the UK: 
 
• 1968 – Purchased News of the World 
• 1969 – Purchased the Sun; during the ’70s, the Sun became the highest-selling daily 
newspaper in the UK, and retains that position to this day  
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• 1981 – Purchased the Times Newspapers company, owner of the Times and Sunday 
Times 
• 1987 – Purchased the Today newspaper 
• 1989 – Launched Sky TV 
• 1990 – Merged Sky TV with British Satellite Broadcasting to form BSkyB 
• 1995 – Closed the Today newspaper 
• 2000 – Formed Sky Global Network 
• 2003 – Purchased DirecTV 
• 2005 – Purchased Myspace 
• 2011 – Attempted to purchase the remaining 61% of BSkyB shares that News Corp 
did not own, but withdrew the bid following the revelations of phone hacking 
• 2011 – Closed News of the World following phone-hacking revelations 
• 2012 – Launched $10 billion News Corp share buy-back 
• 2013 – Split News Corp into two entities, separating the more profitable entertainment 
arm to become the standalone entity 21st Century Fox 
• 2018 – Sold all of 21st Century Fox’s shares in BSkyB to US media company Comcast 
• 2019 – Closed 21st Century Fox, and formed Fox Corp. 
 
Watson and Hickman detail the history of Murdoch’s rise to power in Britain, explaining 
that by 2012: 
 
“Rupert Murdoch had entered his ninth decade running a global media empire like no 
other.  Every day, one billion people digested his newspapers, magazines, books, TV 
shows and feature films.  In Britain, News Corp, of which Murdoch was largest 
stakeholder, chairman and chief executive, owned a 39 per cent stake in Sky’s owner 
BSkyB, the Sun, News of the World, Times and Sunday Times; in Australia 70 per 
cent of the newspaper market and the only national title, The Australian; and in the 
US, the Wall Street Journal, 20th Century Fox studio and Fox TV.  Murdoch was, as 
the title of a recent biography put it, The Man Who Owns the News” (2012, p4). 
 
This profile has changed somewhat since 2012.   
 
The News of the World newspaper published its final issue in the summer of 2011 and 
subsequently closed; direct action taken by Murdoch in response to the phone-hacking 
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revelations.  Across 2018 and 2019, Murdoch agreed the sale of his shares in BSkyB 
to Comcast, and sold 21st Century Fox to Disney.  However, despite these sales, his 
media (and non-media) holdings remain vast, and his net worth is considered to be 
around $20 billion.     
 
The following provides an overview of News Corporation’s media holdings in the UK, 
US and Australia as at 20193: 
 
 
Fig 3.1 
 
Murdoch’s holdings in the US are included due to there being some overlap between 
the News Corp UK and US entities that will be discussed further in this chapter.  That 
said, it is worth noting that News Corp Australia has a significant number of media 
assets, including 22 newspapers and an online news publication, and “News Corp 
Australia titles account for 59% of the sales of all daily newspapers, with sales of 17.3 
million papers per week, making it Australia’s most influential newspaper publisher by 
a considerable margin” (Flew, 2013) 
 
Looking at the UK news market, a Media Reform Coalition (2019) report states that 
News UK’s the Sun and the Times account for a total of 35.42% of the average daily 
print circulation, and the Sun on Sunday and the Sunday Times account for 42.72% 
 
3 Information sourced from News UK and News Corp websites. 
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of the average weekly circulation figures for the Sunday newspapers.  Combined, 
News UK has a 36.35% market share of total circulation.  News UK does not only deal 
in newspapers; it owns the digital radio broadcaster Wireless; and part owns the Press 
Association (News UK is one of 26 shareholders), and the video advertising company 
Unruly.  The News-Corp-owned company Storyful also operates in the UK; Storyful’s 
business is concerned with “social media contextualisation and verification” (News 
Corp, no date).    
 
There is much narrative that accompanies the above timeline, particularly in relation 
to some of Murdoch’s more controversial acquisitions; it is this that best reveals 
Murdoch’s motivation and behaviours.  Analysis of these behaviours begins with 
Murdoch’s arrival in the UK markets, and his attitude towards Britain: in particular a 
considerable disdain for the British establishment which was or is often channelled 
through his newspapers.   
 
The News of the World and The Sun (1968-69) 
 
The News of the World was Murdoch’s first ‘media’ purchase in the UK and was 
perhaps a sign of the business practices the country could expect to see from him in 
the coming years.  Petley (2016, p252) describes the events that surrounded his 
eventual takeover of the ‘very British’ newspaper, noting that his involvement only 
came about as a result of the then then owner ‘William Carr’ looking to ensure the 
infamous Maxwell could not purchase a controlling number of shares.  A careful deal 
was agreed between Murdoch and Carr instead, which after some time, led to 
Murdoch taking full control of the newspaper.   
 
The controversy did not stop there.  Petley (2016, p252) explains that once in control, 
Murdoch became embroiled in the British scandal involving the Christine Keeley and 
John Profumo affair.  Murdoch purchased the rights to Keeley’s serialisation of the 
affair to publish in News of the World.  At the time, Murdoch was accused of selling 
‘sleaze’ and ‘muckraking’ by publishing details of an otherwise forgotten scandal.  
Despite Murdoch’s assertions to the contrary, he was said to be ‘surprised’ by the 
angry reaction to the News of the World’s publication of the scandal.   
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“Murdoch had anticipated this might happen, but was taken aback by the sheer 
amount of criticism and, in particular was concerned that this episode might jeopardise 
his plans to buy the Sun.  The Independent television Authority (ITA) banned all 
television advertisements for the paper until the serialisation had ended, the Press 
Council condemned the serialisation as a ‘disservice both to the public welfare and to 
the press’, and Cardinal Heenan, the Archbishop of Westminster and Britain’s most 
senior Roman Catholic, withdrew from a commitment to write an article on the 
’permissive society’ for the paper.   
 
It was perhaps Murdoch’s earliest ‘run in’ with the British regulators, and of course the 
‘establishment’, and his introduction to the British public as a controversial character 
unafraid to publish ‘sleazy’ material and ready and willing to ruthlessly pursue his 
business interests.  However, despite a frosty reception, Murdoch’s purchase of News 
of the World, and subsequent purchase of the Sun, proved to be particularly profitable 
and paved the way for Murdoch’s future interests in the UK.    
 
Wolff asserts that “the News of the World established Murdoch as a new and unnatural 
character in British public life… but it is the Sun that makes Murdoch a player in Britain, 
and whose success makes it possible for him to show little or no interest in submitting 
to, as it were, British rule” (2008, p131).  Wolff claims that Murdoch’s powerful 
influence on the political stage is enabled by the success of these two newspapers: 
“the Sun, with profit margins as high as 60 or 70 per cent, has become the most 
significant part of his business and will remain so for nearly twenty years.  It not only 
becomes the primary revenue source, supplying the cash flow for his other efforts, but 
it also gives him his extraordinary power base in the United Kingdom.  The Sun 
becomes one of the key levers to push the transformation of Britain itself.  It changes 
Murdoch too, giving him a sense of just how large his ambitions could be” (2008, p205) 
 
London Weekend Television (1971) 
Not long after the purchase of his soon to be very profitable News of the World and 
The Sun, Murdoch attempted to expand his media business by purchasing London 
Weekend Television.  George Munster (1985) explains that from early on in his career, 
Murdoch considered there to be a ‘direct road’ from newspapers to television.  
However, while his entry into Fleet Street in the UK was relatively easy, his attempt 
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into commercial television, a ‘licence to print money’, was not so.  In 1971, Murdoch 
wanted to purchase shares in the commercial broadcaster ‘London Weekend 
Television’.  The regulator concerned with commercial broadcasting at the time was 
the Independent Television Authority (ITA); the Independent Broadcasting Authority 
(IBA)  
 
The 1964 Broadcasting Act was in place at the time which stipulated restrictions in 
ownership of commercial broadcasters on a number of reasons, including where s 
person already owned newspapers, and the ITA could use its power to terminate 
contracts where they did not serve the publics best interest (Munster, 1985, p139).  
However, Munster (ibid) suggests that the 1964 Act was debated and eventually 
amended based on compromises to appease the then powerful newspaper proprietor 
Thomson.   
 
This provided Murdoch with a loophole to enter the commercial broadcasting world, 
and his request to invest in London Weekend Television (LWT) was approved.  
Munster (1985, p140) explains: “Murdoch was in, seemingly to stay, and he promptly 
used his well exercised muscle.  Two days later, he obtained the agreement of his 
fellow directors to the dismissal of Tom Margerison, the managing director of London 
Weekend Television”.  In a short amount of time Murdoch purchased non-voting 
shares in LWT and became a non-executive director.  Eventually, News of the World 
owned between 30 and 35 percent of the non-voting LWT stock.   
 
Thanks to his newfound position, Murdoch was able to assume the position of chair of 
the LWT Executive Committee, meaning he had a controlling say in the types of 
programmes that LWT would broadcast.  Petley (2016, p258) explains that the sacking 
of Tom Margerison and Murdoch’s assuming the position as the executive committee 
head contravened the Television Act. As Munster explains (1985, p 141) “…The ITA 
issued three demands which LWT was to meet within six weeks: programme plans 
were to be submitted for approval; a managing director and a programme controller 
were to be appointed, subject to ITA scrutiny; and the next managing director’s name 
would not be Rupert Murdoch” (Munster, G, 1985, p141).   
 
Murdoch was unimpressed with the ITA’s decision, and “ever suspicious of 
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machinations against him within the British establishment, personally accused the ITA 
of besmirching his reputation” (Petley, J, 2016, p258).  Bonner and Aston (1998) 
explain that “This became a very public matter and Murdoch was furious.  He accused 
the ITA of character assassination by what he saw as their portrayal of him as a man 
unfit to control a public television station… many believe Rupert Murdoch neither 
forgot nor forgave.” 
 
Following the ITA’s decision, a new chief executive and chairman of LWT was put in 
place: John freeman.  Freeman sought agreement with Murdoch that he would be able 
to run the company without Murdoch’s interference.  The ITA was said to be impressed 
with Freeman’s ability to take control of the company’s affairs, securing LWTs 
franchise once again.   
 
Petley (2016, p259) explains that “Murdoch did more or less leave him to his own 
devices, but Freeman left him in no doubt that he would resign if Murdoch interfered, 
which would undoubtedly spell the end of the franchise”.   By 1979 Murdoch had turned 
his attention elsewhere, predominantly to media opportunities in the USA, and by 
March 1980 had sold all of his shares in LWT.  
 
Docherty (1990, p75) explains that “The ITA could have turned a blind eye to Murdoch,  
It did not do so, however; instead it opted for the classis and, in the circumstances, 
sensible bureaucratic compromise: the authority invoked the Television Act, thus 
making Murdoch aware that this was more than a clash of personalities, and then 
allowed the company sufficient time to cast around for a solution which would save 
face and allow the ITA to confirm the contract.”   
 
It concluded Murdoch’s first foray into the British broadcasting market, and arguably 
the second of many unwelcomed interruptions from regulators.  Barnett, S and Curry, 
A, (1994, p22) explain: “… his first venture into broadcasting had brought him straight 
into a conflict with the British regulatory establishment when he tried to take over 
London Weekend Television in 1971.  The then Independent Television Authority had 
blocked him, and he had come away with an unaccustomed bloody nose and an 
abiding hatred for the British regulatory system.” 
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Docherty (1990, p75) adds that Murdoch’s fight became bigger than just that with the 
ITA: “In the short term, Murdoch simply had no way of taking on the combined weight 
of their Television Act, British broadcasting culture, the ITA and both ends of the British 
political establishment.”   
 
Petley (2016, p261-262) writes of the ‘significant parallels’ between Murdoch’s 
takeover of News of the World and his attempt to take over LWT, and outlined the type 
of business practices the UK could expect to see from Murdoch in the decades to 
come.  Petley writes that: 
 
“It is thus entirely possible that the endless propaganda campaign against public 
service broadcasting and in favour of ‘deregulation’… that has for so long been such 
a prominent feature in Murdoch’s newspapers had its genesis in the LWT episode.  
Similarly, the absolute ruthlessness of Murdoch’s dealings with the Carr family and his 
trouncing of Robert Maxwell foreshadow his brutal treatment of all those who would 
stand in his way in the future…” 
 
Sky TV (1989) 
It could be argued that Murdoch’s sustained criticism of the BBC was not only born out 
of his disdain for the British establishment, but also his early ambitions with regard to 
satellite television.  Murdoch’s earliest pursuit of such a venture was in 1989 when he 
launched Sky TV.  It was another example of Murdoch seeking ways to circumnavigate 
regulation and outrun his competitors.  A licence for satellite broadcasting had already 
been granted to the British-owned company British Satellite Broadcasting (BSB) in 
1986: a company backed by two existing, British-owned media organisations – 
Granada and Pearson.  Described by Wolff (2008) as always being open to 
technological developments, Murdoch quickly seized the opportunity to latch onto 
satellite technology that would allow him to control what people were watching on their 
TV set at home.  Wolff explains that Murdoch entered into a ‘race’ against Granada, 
Pearson, and Richard Branson (who had started BSB).   
 
Shawcross (1992) describes the events leading up to the launch of Sky TV as the ‘Star 
Wars’ that threatened the Murdoch empire, but also the opportunity for Murdoch to, 
once again, take on his enemy the ‘British establishment’.  As Shawcross (1992, p445-
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456) explains, in 1989 three of five ‘Direct Broadcast Satellite’ (DBS) channels were 
made available, and the ‘Independent Broadcasting Authority’ invited licence 
applications.  The remaining two channels were allocated to the BBC, but the project 
failed to materialise.  Seven applications were made, one of which came from Rupert 
Murdoch and his Sky channel service (which was already broadcasting to European 
cable systems).   
 
At the time, many of the other applicants for a licence “all seemed to have one thing 
in common- they wanted to keep Rupert Murdoch out of British television.  There was 
much talk about the danger of his putting the Sun on satellite and doing a Wapping of 
the air.  The risks to both morals and established television practices seemed over-
whelming” (ibid).   
 
The licences were granted to BSB (at the time made up of a franchise of companies 
that did not include Murdoch).  Shawcross (1992, p446) describes the winning 
applicant, BSB, as having a service that was ‘firmly entrenched’ in middle-class 
values.  “To Murdoch, it was uncompromisingly “Establishment-oriented”, in that it 
fitted easily into the mainstream of British television.  The Sun called it ‘toffs’ telly”.  
It’s one of the early examples of Murdoch’s attempt to enter the British broadcasting 
market, only to be restricted by the regulator, the IBA, and the ‘establishment’, the 
middle class ‘toffs’.   
 
Murdoch’s response was to circumnavigate the process, and broadcast via a different 
route: “Having had the front door closed against him, he decided to kick down the back 
door, and come into, or rather over, Britain on Astra, a private pan-European satellite 
operated from Luxembourg” (Shawcross, 1992, p447). 
 
Despite running at a considerable loss in its early life, Sky TV had the benefit of 
financial backing from Murdoch’s already established, other media interests.  Richard 
Branson was one of the major shareholders in BSB at the time and, from an early 
stage, saw that Sky would become a significant, dominating competitor:  
 
“Branson knew how resolute a competitor Murdoch was and he realised that Sky 
would be enormously boosted by support from all the News International papers.  That 
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plugging began at once.  In the months to come, Murdoch’s papers, in particular the 
Sun, the News of the World and Today all became shameless cheerleaders for Sky” 
(Shawcross, 1992, p450).   
 
BSB suffered delays to its launch, and was operating in a difficult market environment, 
competing with Sky for subscribers.  BSB deemed this not to be fair competition, given 
the ability of Sky’s parent company, News International, to promote Sky to the British 
public: 
 
“All the time, stories about Sky were vigorously promoted in Murdoch’s popular papers.  
BSB submitted a large dossier of complaints on such cross-media advertising to the 
Home Office, the Department of Trade and Industry and the Office of Fair Trading, and 
then conducted and released a poll of Members of Parliament.  Eighty per cent of 
those questioned thought it was undesirable for one proprietor to control newspapers, 
TV and radio.  BSB argued that Sky should be subject to the same provisions of the 
Broadcasting Bill as applied to the ITV stations” (Shawcross, 1992, p453).   
 
Murdoch did eventually win the race against BSB; Sky launched first and proved to be 
popular.  However, technological difficulties involving hardware and encryption had 
caused Murdoch a significant cash-flow problem.  In 1990, it was announced that BSB 
would merge with Sky, creating BSkyB; Murdoch took control of the company.  Many 
of the events leading up to the merger were considered symptomatic of Murdoch and 
News International’s rash, risk-taking approach to business.  Wolff notes that “were it 
not for his debt crisis, if he could just have eked out a few more months, the other guys 
would have collapsed, leaving him with 100 percent of what is now a $14 billion 
business, instead of 39 percent)” (2008, p310).  Of course, things have moved on 
since Wolff’s account; Murdoch mounted two bids for the remaining 61% of BSkyB, 
but both failed (discussed elsewhere in this chapter).   
 
 
Thatcher (1979 – 1990) 
 
Following the acquisitions of the News of the World and the Sun, Murdoch moved on 
to his purchases of the Times and the Sunday Times.  This purchase was 
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controversially nodded through by the then Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher without 
procedural reference to the Monopolies and Mergers Commission (MMC).  It was a 
move that was highly criticised at the time and showcased a strong alliance between 
the mogul and the country’s leader.  Murdoch and Thatcher had enjoyed a notoriously 
long and profitable friendship, based on their common ideological belief in free markets 
and commercialism.  The purchase of the Times was not only criticised for this prime 
ministerial support, but for Murdoch’s treatment of the paper once he had taken 
control.  The purchase was predicated on specifications about the editorial structure 
of the newspaper that Murdoch promised to adhere to, and then quickly abandoned:  
 
“The dramatic events at the Times and the Sunday Times that followed Rupert 
Murdoch’s takeover were more than simply a clash between editors and the 
domineering owner.  They resulted from Murdoch’s breaking his promises to allow his 
editors independence.  In the drama, the leading characters were Murdoch’s 
appointee editor of the Times, Harry Evans, and the editor of the Sunday Times, Frank 
Giles.  Both Evans and Giles later wrote books about the occurrences that caused the 
newspapers to sharply change course, describing Murdoch’s ever-present demands 
over news stories, headlines, editorials and columnists.  Interference was key” 
(McChesney, 2013, p89).   
 
Such practice further highlighted Murdoch’s approach to the management of his 
newspapers, and his intention to use them to promote his viewpoints. 
 
Page summarises the culmination of the relationship between Thatcher and Murdoch 
as follows:  
 
“By the middle of the 1980s, as Murdoch’s business operations moved towards the 
great Wapping turning point, Mrs Thatcher and her small but ascendant section within 
the government had gained a degree of influence over British news media… this 
influence they owed for the most part to the Murdoch alliance” (2003, l5966).  
 
The ‘great Wapping turning point’ that Page (2003) references relates to the union 
strike during the early ’80s that was brought on by the Murdoch-owned company, then 
called News International, building a new printing plant to house all of its titles.  The 
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strike led to some 6000 workers going unpaid for nearly a year.   
 
Murdoch was said to be heavily supported in his approach to the Wapping situation 
by the Thatcher government at the time, a part of the same dark era during which the 
miners’ strike had also taken place. As Page explains of Murdoch’s seemingly ruthless 
pursuit: “It was recognised as a ‘high risk’ course which would depend on 
unquestioning and almost unlimited support from London’s Metropolitan Police – a 
force, uniquely in Britain, then directly under central government control” (2003, l6346).  
Noting the unusually favourable and unwavering support Murdoch received, not only 
from Thatcher, but from the Metropolitan Police, Page continues that “if every firm in 
Britain were to treat its workers with the provocation Murdoch intended, there would 
be no cops available for any other duty” (2003, l6350).  The support of the government, 
and therefore the police, was indicative of the strong ties between Murdoch and 
Thatcher.  The road to success with regard to the overhaul of Murdoch’s newspaper 
production and the considerable profit he achieved thereafter may not have been so 
smooth in the absence of such a friendship.  Equally, Thatcher could have arguably 
received a much harsher reception from the British public had Murdoch’s newspapers 
not been so supportive.  
 
BBC (1980s – onwards) 
 
Murdoch and Thatcher were seen to have similar opinions on fundamental issues, 
such as their shared misgivings about the BBC and the very premise of a publicly 
funded broadcaster.  While it would seem logical that Murdoch’s misgivings stemmed 
from his commercial perspective, it is often argued that they were actually deeply 
rooted in his ideological beliefs.  According to Wolff: 
 
“Murdoch in England is a never-ending fight with the establishment.  He uses the word 
establishment partly as the Brits do, to suggest toffs and Eton and plummy accents, 
but expands it to include any other owner centre that he’s against – for instance, and 
not incidentally, the BBC.  So there is the left establishment, and the journalistic 
establishment, and the banking establishment, and the royal establishment, and of 
course the trade union establishment” (2008, p121).    
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In a similar fashion, Page considers Murdoch’s attitude that the BBC is the 
personification of the left-wing, establishment view that he felt needed reform: 
 
“…like the Prime Minister and other of her advisors, he believed there was a vast, 
Augean task to be undertaken in cleansing the BBC of decadent leftism, before 
launching it as a grand vessel of private enterprise” (2003, p361).   
 
The BBC was a British institution that existed within the very market that Murdoch 
wished to dominate and represented the kind of left-wing political approach that 
Murdoch abhorred.  This whole attitude was indicative of Murdoch’s belief in and 
pursuit of a commercial, free market.  Murdoch viewed the BBC as ‘state-sponsored’, 
believing that it removed the fundamentals of audience choice.  According to Knee, 
Murdoch saw the BBC as: 
 
“a venerated but sleepy organisation whose objectives were defined in terms of what 
the public should see rather than what they wanted to see.  Although the government 
had allowed the establishment of two new privately-owned terrestrial channels, the 
variety of available programming was a fraction of what was available elsewhere” 
(2009, l4125). 
 
Shawcross had earlier made similar comments, claiming that “Murdoch agreed there 
was still a place for ‘public service television’ in Britain, but it should be the subservient 
not the dominant factor… If the market, rather than the public service, dominated 
television, freedom, he argued, would be safer” (1992, p457).  
 
In the 1980s, the BBC made a bid for a licence fee increase.  This came at a time 
when Thatcher was in power, and her Conservative government was looking at the 
television system in the UK to see what reforms could be made.   
 
An already hostile press responded to the BBC’s bid for more funding with negative 
coverage of the broadcaster.  In a survey of the coverage, O’Malley (1994) found that 
the native coverage was particularly strong in the newspapers owned by Rupert 
Murdoch.  O’Malley argues that this was driven not just by Murdoch’s ideological 
objections to the BBC, but also Murdoch’s desire to expand into the television market 
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at the time.   
 
This attitude to public service broadcasting is perhaps what first inspired a seemingly 
long-standing resentment towards the BBC and its prominent position within the UK.  
It would appear that these opinions have not only remained but inspired similar bad 
feeling amongst the next generation of News Corporation leaders.  Building on his 
father’s sentiments, Rupert Murdoch’s son James Murdoch, the then Chairman and 
Chief Executive of News Corporation in Europe and Asia, echoed his father’s 
comments in a speech about the ‘British broadcasting establishment’ at the 2009 
Edinburgh International Television Festival.  In this, he described the BBC as 
‘throttling’ the market, stating that “the scope of its activities and ambitions is chilling” 
(Murdoch, 2009).   
 
The speech was a lengthy disquisition on all that the Murdochs considered to be wrong 
with British institutions such as the BBC and Ofcom, and how the government should 
scale back any kind of regulatory activity and allow for a free, commercially driven 
market.  It was confirmation of the Murdochs’ antipathy towards the BBC and Ofcom, 
which had already been consistently channelled to the British public via the Murdoch-
owned newspapers for some time.  As Belfield, Hird and Kelly note, “since 1985 the 
Times papers, in concert with the Sun and the News of the World have maintained a 
relentless attack on the BBC” (1991, p83).   
 
This ideological opposition to the BBC went hand in hand with Murdoch’s own 
commercial and business interests.  Firstly, his then interest in Sky TV (explored 
further later in this chapter) meant the BBC was obvious competition due to its strong 
and credible position in the market.  Secondly, as the internet became a more and 
more popular part of everyday life and news consumption, the BBC’s online presence 
as a free news site posed a threat to Murdoch’s newspapers, such as the Times, which 
was attempting to monetise its site via an online paywall.   
 
Petley (2015) considers one of the issues crucial to this research when examining the 
‘relentless campaign’ Rupert Murdoch has waged against the BBC, and how it has 
achieved its goal of persuading the government of the need to ‘slim down’ the BBC 
and slow any growth in its funding.  Petley states: 
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“Ever since Rupert Murdoch decided to enter the television game in the early 1980s, 
his newspapers have waged continuous war on public service broadcasters, and on 
The BBC in particular.  These he sees purely as rivals in the broadcasting marketplace, 
and when Murdoch spots rivals his instinct is to exterminate them” (2015).  
 
Petley notes examples of the negative headlines found in Murdoch-owned 
newspapers about the BBC (in particular its size and power) from 1985 up until 2015.  
Furthermore, as is discussed in this chapter, Petley highlights the obvious links 
between the headlines in Murdoch-owned newspapers and the actions and/or 
decisions taken by those in power, suggesting the persuasive headlines and leaked 
information were designed to force the government’s hand.  Petley asserts that it was 
this behaviour (on the part of the Murdoch-owned newspapers) and the many 
meetings held between Murdoch himself and then Chancellor George Osborne that 
led to the 2015 announcement that the BBC was to fund licence fees for the over-75s, 
costing the BBC around £250 million (BBC, 2019). 
 
Major (1990-97) 
 
Price writes of the prime ministers who followed Thatcher and believed it to be 
Murdoch and his newspapers’ influence over the public that was key to Thatcher’s 
success:  
 
“John Major, Tony Blair and Gordon Brown all believed that her success in winning so 
much support, not to say adulation, in the press was the key to her electoral success.  
As a result they exaggerated the power of the media and paid a heavy price for it.  The 
election of 1992 had a profound effect on them, too.  That contest, in which John Major 
triumphed against the odds, was followed by the claim that ‘It’s The Sun Wot Won It’” 
(2011, l384). 
 
What has become clear over the years and many elections is that there is a tendency 
for political parties to pursue the support of Murdoch’s newspapers to help them win, 
but also that that support can switch between political parties – at Murdoch’s command 
– depending on who could offer him amenable regulatory or policy change, and/or who 
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was most likely to win.  As McChesney explains: “Murdoch observers have argued 
that the key to Murdoch’s politics is that he likes winners.  Which explains his support 
for Blair in the 1997, 2001 and 2005 elections” (2013, p151).  However, despite 
Murdoch’s preference for the Labour Party in those elections, a preference confirmed 
by the headlines featured in his newspapers, prior to Labour taking power in 1997, the 
Conservatives had enjoyed the full support of the Murdoch press.   
 
This explains the Sun’s particularly fierce campaign against Labour leader Neil 
Kinnock in 1992, which many commentators believe was the key to his Conservative 
opponent, John Major, winning that year’s election.  McChesney explains that “The 
Sun’s campaign revealed Rupert Murdoch’s preparedness to use his newspapers 
mercilessly to destroy Labour’s chances of victory…  Later, some academic studies 
minimized the influence of the Sun on voters who might otherwise have voted Labour, 
but they failed to note that its hysterical last weeks of coverage formed the culmination 
of years of hostile vilification” (2013, p154).  
 
Though the result was as Murdoch had hoped, with John Major winning the election, 
a mutually beneficial relationship between the two men did not ensue.  In providing a 
witness statement to the Leveson Inquiry into phone hacking, Major stated of Rupert 
Murdoch: 
 
“he wished me to change our European policies.  If we couldn’t change our European 
policies his papers could not, would not support our Conservative Government.  As I 
recall he used the word ‘we’ when referring to his newspapers.  He didn’t make the 
usual nod to editorial independence” (2012, p8). 
 
This evidence supports the assertion that Murdoch was prepared to use the full force 
of his newspapers to persuade the government to change policy to suit his agenda 
and confirms the influence he has over the content of his newspapers to ensure his 
success.  Furthermore, Murdoch was quoted at the same inquiry as saying that he 
had never asked a prime minister for anything, and “if any politician wanted my 
opinions on major matters, they only had to read the editorials in The Sun” (2012, 
p88).   
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Blair (1997 – 2007) 
 
Following his advantageous relationship with Thatcher, and his contribution to Major’s 
electoral win, Murdoch formed another strong alliance, this time with the Labour leader 
and winner of the 1997 election Tony Blair.  McChesney discusses the relationship, 
stating: 
 
“Throughout the three terms of Tony Blair’s UK Labour prime ministership… his 
influence was exercised through personal contact with Blair and his chancellor, 
Gordon Brown, and through the Sun newspaper” (2013, p150).   
 
McChesney alluded to the closeness of his relationship with Blair going beyond that 
of his relationship with Thatcher: “Murdoch’s relationship with the Labour leadership 
was even closer than that with Thatcher…  Blair and Brown had made efforts to be 
sociable, often inviting him to Downing Street when he was in London” (McChesney, 
2013, p151).   
 
The closeness of the relationship was amplified by Murdoch’s choice of Tony Blair as 
godfather to one of his daughters.  This type of personal, familial relationship made it 
difficult to believe that Murdoch would not in some way benefit when it came to his 
business practices.  Price maintains that between the two men “A deal had been done, 
although with nothing in writing. If Murdoch were left to pursue his business interests 
in peace he would give Labour a fair wind” (2011, l5837).  This allowance for 
Murdoch’s business pursuits is supported by Watson and Hickman: 
 
“Murdoch’s newspapers endorsed Tony Blair at three general elections, and Blair 
scrapped or softened attempts to limit the proprietor’s power.  In 1996 Blair’s Labour 
Party opposed plans to impose tougher cross-media ownership rules, in 1998 rejected 
calls for a ban on the predatory pricing of newspapers and lobbied the Italian Prime 
Minister Romano Prodi over a TV network Murdoch was interested in acquiring – and 
frequently gave interviews and important announcements to his papers, such as the 
date of the 2001 general election” (2012, p7).   
 
These assertions echo those made about the Murdoch/Thatcher relationship, which 
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allowed for transactions and the relaxing of regulations that would otherwise hamper 
the commercial expansion of News Corporation.  There was also a suggestion that the 
relationship between Murdoch and Blair went beyond profitable business favours.  
Journalist Matthew Holehouse (2012) wrote of the relationship between the two men 
for the Telegraph, stating that “The News International titles supported the war in Iraq, 
and former Number 10 staff credit Murdoch for discouraging Blair from holding a 
referendum on euro entry”4.  This suggests that Murdoch was instrumental in 
influencing Blair’s decision making on political issues that went well beyond his 
immediate business interests. 
 
Ofcom (2003 onwards) 
 
In a similar way to the BBC, the Murdochs are understood to hold considerable disdain 
for Ofcom.  Fundamentally, this is because it is a regulatory body that imposes 
stipulations on what the Murdochs believe should be a free market.  However, Ofcom 
has been known to create very real obstacles for the Murdochs when they have 
attempted to expand their media business.  Davies (2014) writes of two prominent, 
fairly recent examples of this.  The first case was in 2006 when James Murdoch, as 
the then Chief Executive of BSkyB, purchased 17.9% of the ITV commercial network.  
At the time, the rival cable operator NTL was looking at a potential merger with ITV; 
this posed a significant threat to BSkyB’s dominant position in the UK broadcast 
market, and so James Murdoch purchased the shares in order to prevent the merger.  
This prompted attention from Ofcom: 
 
“Ofcom investigated and reported that the share grab had given BSkyB too much 
influence over broadcast news bulletins in the UK.  That triggered an inquiry by the 
Competition Commission, who told BSkyB that they must sell most of their ITV shares.  
BSkyB became embroiled in years of legal appeals, and the value of their ITV holding 
fell through the floor” (Davies, 2014, p227).   
 
Not long after this, Ofcom launched its 2007 investigation into the pay-TV market.  
Feedback was gathered from a multitude of sources, including smaller, rival 
 
4 https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/phone-hacking/9098653/The-Blairs-and-the-Murdochs-a-special-
relationship.html 
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companies of BSkyB that complained it exercised a ‘vicious circle of control’.  Davies 
(2014) reports that the Murdochs, and James in particular, used the full financial force 
at their disposal to fight back and challenge Ofcom’s findings from a legal (and any 
other) perspective.  Davies explains: 
 
“In the background, the Murdochs used political lobbyists and their own direct access 
to ministers to complain bitterly about Ofcom’s role.  As with their campaign against 
the BBC, there were some indications that they may have been tempted to fouler 
means. Ofcom’s chief executive, Ed Richards, told colleagues he suspected he was 
the object of some surveillance” (2014, p227).   
 
As with the BBC, James Murdoch used the MacTaggart Lecture he gave in 2009 to 
speak of his disdain for both the BBC and Ofcom: 
 
“Tonight I will argue that while creationism may provide a comfortable illusion of 
certainty in the short-term, its harmful effects are real and they are significant.  
Creationism penalises the poorest in our society with regressive taxes and policies – 
like the licence fee and digital switchover; it promotes inefficient infrastructure in the 
shape of digital terrestrial television; it creates unaccountable institutions - like the BBC 
Trust, Channel 4 and Ofcom” (2009). 
The extent of this long-standing and deep-seated hostility towards both the country’s 
public broadcaster and to regulation forms the crux of this thesis.  If confirmed through 
empirical evidence, it will demonstrate how a media mogul attempts to exercise self-
serving power and influence through his media outlets – despite his own denials at the 
Leveson Inquiry that he would ever do so. 
 
DirecTV and the Wall Street Journal (2003 – 2007) 
 
 
It was perhaps the eventual success of BSkyB that inspired Murdoch to consider a 
similar venture in the USA, and in the early 2000s, he purchased the satellite 
broadcaster DirecTV from General Motors.  Murdoch had originally made a bid for the 
satellite broadcaster in 2001, but lost out to EchoStar Communications Corp.  
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However, EchoStar’s acquisition was rejected by the US federal regulators on the 
grounds that it would create a monopoly and the potential for a rise in subscription 
prices.  Once that bid was rejected, Murdoch was again able to pursue the purchase 
himself.  Despite a lengthy period of federal review from an antitrust perspective, no 
monopolistic concerns were found, and the deal was allowed.  That said, there were 
concerns at the time with regard to vertical integration given that News Corp would 
own several channels of content, as well as the distribution channel – DirecTV.   
 
In 2003, Murdoch was successful and secured a controlling interest in DirecTV for 
$6.6 billion. Wolff discusses Murdoch’s aggressive ambitions with regard to the deal:  
 
“He has staked his reputation and much of News Corps’ reason for being on his 
satellite vision.  He has pursued DirecTV so assiduously, so single-mindedly, that, at 
one point, he even considered buying General Motors to get it.  He has invented some 
of the media business’s most baroque and far-fetched financing strategies to do the 
deal… he finally succeeds after waging a fifteen-month antitrust battle.  It’s the 
pinnacle of all his aspirations… it’s his most megalomedia dream come true” (2008, 
p119).    
 
This type of assiduous pursuit of corporate ambition was typical Murdoch behaviour; 
conversely, so was his next move.  Less than three years after the purchase of 
DirecTV, Murdoch ‘swapped’ the prize asset in order to secure the Wall Street Journal, 
a well-established, powerful voice in the US newspaper market that Murdoch had long 
yearned for.  Murdoch traded his 34% stake in DirecTV with John Malone, a media 
rival and owner of Liberty Media, who at the time held a significant interest in News 
Corp shares.  In trading the stake in DirecTV for Malone’s shares in News Corp, 
Murdoch was able to take down two rivals at once.  The deal not only removed 
Malone’s interest in Murdoch’s company, but also the potential for Malone to cause 
problems in Murdoch’s pursuit of the Wall Street Journal.   
 
Perhaps due to his sudden abandonment of DirecTV, the purchase of the Wall Street 
Journal was considered by many to be one of Murdoch’s more sentimental pursuits, 
driven by more than just business acumen and strategy.  Knee describes it as a “clear-
eyed willingness to abandon a twenty-year quest by selling DirecTV… quickly followed 
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by an inexplicably sentimental obsession with owning the Wall Street Journal at almost 
any price” (2009, l4282).  The price Knee references was not only the $5 billion 
Murdoch paid for the publication’s parent company, Dow Jones, but the lengthy pursuit 
of the deal that was subject to much criticism focusing on Murdoch’s suitability to be 
owner of the prestigious Wall Street Journal. It was not the first time Murdoch had 
faced such criticism and regulatory challenge.  As Lisners explains, “In 2007 it was 
thought that Murdoch had achieved his ultimate ambition with the successful takeover 
of the Wall Street Journal (WSJ).  It was the jewel in his crown, and he had fought hard 
against his detractors to win.  Once again, as with his battle for the UK Times, there 
were those who loudly voiced opposition, declaring that he was unfit to run such a 
prestigious and influential newspaper and that he was bound to take it down-market” 
(2012, p10).   
 
One of Murdoch’s motivations for the purchase is considered to be his desire to 
undermine his rival and competitor the New York Times.  Wolff discusses this 
motivation, stating: “Murdoch’s intention, which he began to announce everywhere 
with something like a sadistic glint, was to use the Wall Street Journal to go to war 
against The New York Times, not least of all because the Times was ground zero for 
the journalists who held him in contempt.  He’d acquired one of the two best papers in 
the world – which every journalist who didn’t work for him assumed he would ruin – in 
order to destroy the other.  It was a kind of personal revenge as well as, possibly, a 
viable business strategy” (2008, p7).    
 
Cameron (2010 -16) 
 
Much like those before him, Prime Minister David Cameron is considered to have 
courted the Murdochs by appealing to their commercial desires and making 
announcements with regard to the need for a licence fee freeze, or even to abolish the 
fee all together if the BBC didn’t change its ways (Davies, 2014).  In keeping with 
previous Murdoch/News International behaviours, they responded with reporting in 
their popular red-top newspapers: 
 
“The message was well received by the Murdoch camp, who flashed back a response, 
through the Sun, with a news story which said nothing about the impact which a frozen 
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licence fee might have on the BBC’s ability to produce quality programmes but 
reported that ‘Mr Cameron wants to curb the BBC’s bloated bureaucracy and waste of 
cash.  He plans to choke off the taxpayer funding that gives it an advantage over rivals 
such as Sky’” (Davies, 2014, p229).   
 
It is exactly this type of reporting about the BBC that this research proves was 
maintained consistently throughout the extended period examined.  Such reporting 
sought to undermine the BBC, and promote negative messages about its existence, 
operations, behaviour and funding to both the audience and those in power.   
 
Cameron and Murdoch’s dealings spanned a shorter time period than that of 
Cameron’s predecessors, but had all the markers of a relationship that would prove to 
be similarly advantageous for both.  Having supported the Labour Party, and in 
particular Tony Blair, previously, the Murdoch-owned newspapers suddenly switched 
their support to the Conservatives for the 2010 general election.  It was reported at the 
time that Cameron was thought to have done a ‘deal’ with Murdoch to secure the 
support of his newspaper the Sun.  While details of any such deal went unreported, 
the previous editor of the Murdoch-owned News of the World was appointed as 
Cameron’s Director of Communications shortly after he came to power.  This 
appointment was considered to be particularly favourable to Murdoch at the time.   
 
Davies describes a number of instances in 2009 when the Conservative Party made 
announcements that were suspiciously aligned with the needs and wants of the 
Murdochs: 
 
“On 26 June 2009, two years after it started its inquiry into pay TV, Ofcom announced 
that BSkyB should be forced to cut as much as 30% off the price of the material it sold 
to rival platforms.  BSkyB said it would appeal… Ten days later, on 6 July 2009, David 
Cameron announced that, if elected, he would abolish Ofcom” (2014, p230).   
 
Davies’ description of the relationship between the Murdochs and the Conservative 
Party (in particular David Cameron and Jeremy Hunt) reveals perhaps some of the 
most obvious examples of the direct link between Murdoch’s commercially driven 
agenda and subsequent reporting, on the part of News International, and the decisions 
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taken by Cameron the electoral candidate.  By 2010 the country knew it was heading 
for an election which could see David Cameron become Prime Minister.  This would 
prove crucial for Murdoch; in 2010 it was revealed that Murdoch was planning a bid 
for the remaining 61% of BSkyB: 
 
“That would make them the dominant players not only in British newspapers but also 
in British television, significantly boosting their power as well as their profit - but only if 
the government and Ofcom would let them do it” (Davies, 2014, p238).  It was a 
strategy that might have had significant ramifications if the revelations relating to the 
phone-hacking scandal had not come to light.  
 
BSkyB bids (2010) 
 
Murdoch made the first of his two bids for the remaining 61% of shares in BSkyB in 
2010.  It followed two years of the Murdoch’s and News International strategizing, 
building funds and waiting for the ‘right political moment’ (Davies, 2014).  Had the deal 
gone through, it would have seen Rupert Murdoch achieve even greater levels of 
power, wealth and dominance of the media sector: 
 
“For Rupert Murdoch, this was a chance to take complete control of the richest 
broadcaster in Britain, with an annual income of £5.9 billion, compared to The BBC’s 
£4.8 billion, with all that that meant for his commercial power.  It was a chance, too, 
for him to become not only the biggest newspaper player in the country but also the 
dominant broadcaster, one of only three TV news providers (along with The BBC and 
ITN), one of only two radio news providers (along with The BBC) and the giant of pay 
TV with 67% of viewers, with all that that meant for his political power” (Davies, 2014, 
272).   
 
Murdoch’s bid was approved by the European Commission but was still subject to an 
investigation by Ofcom on the grounds that it needed to be subjected to the ‘public 
interest plurality test’.  Ofcom found that the deal would not be in the public’s interest.  
In spite of this, the Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport was not expected 
to pass the decision to the Competition Commission, but rather would accept a number 
of undertakings from News International in lieu of the referral.  However, the entire 
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deal was eventually dropped once the revelations pertaining to phone hacking came 
to light, as discussed further in the next section.  The BSkyB bid and the subsequent 
regulatory reviews are discussed in full in the next chapter.   
 
Phone hacking (2011) 
 
In 2011, following an investigation by the Guardian newspaper, it was revealed that 
the News of the World had hacked into the voicemail of murdered teenager Millie 
Dowler.  There had been speculation for some time about illegal activities at the 
newspaper (predominantly phone hacking, but also police bribery), and there had even 
been an investigation by the Press Complaints Commission (PCC) some five years 
earlier.  However, it was not until the story regarding Millie Dowler broke that public 
outcry against the newspaper, and its proprietor Rupert Murdoch, ensued.   
 
The revelations resulted in changes within News International, including Murdoch 
stepping down from a number of directorships controlling his newspapers.  It was 
considered by some at the time to be ‘corporate cleaning’ (BBC, 2012).  Former News 
of the World editor, and communications advisor to the then Prime Minister David 
Cameron, Andy Coulson resigned from his position in government shortly before the 
story was revealed, and thereafter was arrested and charged with conspiracy to 
intercept voicemails.  After his conviction, Coulson served five months of an 18-month 
prison sentence.  On 6 July 2011, it was announced that the PCC was to be closed 
down and replaced (it was eventually replaced by the Independent Press Standards 
Organisation – IPSO), and that an inquiry into phone hacking and police bribery was 
to be launched and led by Lord Justice Leveson.  On 10 July 2011, the News of the 
World printed its final edition.   
 
The scandal was perhaps the largest and most difficult hurdle the Murdochs and News 
Corporation had ever had to overcome.  As the inquiry began its proceedings, it came 
to light that the ‘bad behaviours’ at the News of the World amounted to more than just 
the interception of voicemails, and that this practice was more widespread across the 
Murdoch empire than anyone could have known (and subsequently, as it transpired, 
more widespread within the whole industry).  Watson and Hickman provide a detailed 
account of the phone-hacking scandal and of Murdoch’s behaviour, trying “to explain 
 67 
 
how a particular global media company works: how it came to exert a poisonous, 
secretive influence on public life in Britain, how it used its huge power to bully, 
intimidate and to cover up, and how its exposure has changed the way we look at our 
politicians, our police service and our press” (2012, pxvi).    
 
In some ways, the scandal confirmed there was an element of truth in the speculation 
about the practices of News Corp, which had long been discussed with reference to 
Murdoch: that the proprietor was ruthless and relentless in his pursuit of dominance, 
and that he had often used his considerable influence and power to ensure he 
achieved his goals.  Watson and Hickman explain “how the Australian-born tycoon had 
come to exert such a grip on Britain’s public life that his newspaper group had been 
able to cover up its misbehaviour for years.  Emboldened by powerful connections, 
News International’s executives had destroyed evidence, run smear campaigns, lied 
to Parliament and threatened and intimidated journalists, lawyers and politicians.  
Despite their efforts, campaigners had slowly uncovered the truth about the ‘dark arts’ 
of newsgathering inside the organisation’s headquarters in Wapping, east London” 
(2012, p2).  In one sense, it could be argued that phone hacking was the illegal 
embodiment of a long history of inappropriate behaviour that, until 2011, had gone on 
with little consequence due to Murdoch’s considerable power.   
 
The Murdochs’ insisted that they were not aware of the illegal practices that were 
ongoing. “The Murdochs’ insisted they had not known about the criminality at the News 
of the World and blamed staff.  They stressed what a small part of their global business 
the News of the World was.  ‘My company has 52,000 employees,’ Rupert explained.  
‘I have led it for fifty-seven years and I have made my share of mistakes.  I have lived 
in many countries, employed thousands of honest and hard-working journalists, 
owned nearly 200 newspapers” (Watson and Hickman, 2012, p3).   
 
However, despite potentially plausible claims that running a global organisation as 
large as News Corporation meant that Murdoch and his executive team were not 
aware of hacking practices at News of the World, Lisners explains that, in fact, the bad 
behaviours were far more widespread and, as such, threatened to topple the entire 
News Corp empire:  
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“In September 2010, it became apparent that activities at the News of the World over 
hacking and other serious forms of malfeasance were far wider than had originally 
been believed…  The fallout from News International’s UK holdings dramatically 
unfolded, each revelation building on the last.  A mountain of killer revelations was 
finally exposed to the world which now threatened a global organisation, built, 
controlled and powered by its central figure – Rupert Murdoch” (2012, pviii).   
 
The revelations to which Lisners refers were about such behaviour being deployed 
elsewhere, such as at the Times, the UK broadsheet owned by News Corp.  The Times 
published an article acknowledging the wrongdoing of its parent company in not being 
able to ‘police’ the behaviours at News of the World:  
 
“As the evidence of wrong doing came to light, News International, Rupert Murdoch’s 
company that also owns The Times, was unable or unwilling to police itself.  This was 
a disgrace.  It was, of course, the press that put Fleet Street in the dock.  The dogged 
investigative reporting that unearthed the phone hacking scandal deserves respect, 
even if the story was exaggerated and key details misrepresented”5 (2012).    
 
However, despite this admission of guilt on behalf of its corporate parent, it soon after 
came to light that a journalist for the Times, Patrick Foster, had engaged in phone 
hacking as well: “Over the coming weeks the truth was slowly dragged out of The 
Times.  Its legal director, Alastair Brett, and its managing editor, David Chappell, had 
known by 4 June 2009 that Foster had used hacking, but the paper had published the 
story days later regardless after seeing off a legal attempt by Horton to prevent its 
publication” (Watson and Hickman, 2012, p257).   
 
It was yet another example of the leadership within News Corporation choosing to 
allow stories sourced by illegal means to be published, and the revelations about such 
activity across the organisation continued: “Sky News was also forced to admit in April 
that it too had hacked email accounts – despite originally telling the Leveson Inquiry 
that it had never hacked – and had in fact done so twice” (Watson and Hickman, 2012, 
p258).   
 
5 https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/the-future-of-the-press-gvb6fw5swpb 
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The first part of the Leveson Inquiry took 12 months to complete, hearing from a vast 
number of witnesses, and resulted in a report (Leveson, 2012) that made several 
recommendations, including the need for an independent body to replace the PCC.  
The findings of the inquiry are discussed further in Chapter Six: Recent Policy and 
Regulatory Developments.  However, with regard to Murdoch and his empire, 
McKnight claims: 
 
“The biggest consequence of the hacking scandal has been the splitting of News 
Corporation into two, with most TV, cinema and entertainment grouped in one 
company, with newspapers and book publishing into another.  This separates the 
money spinners of TV and movies from the less profitable news and book-publishing 
enterprises.  It also means that the vehicles through which political and intellectual 
influences can be exercised must stand alone.  Among other things, this will spotlight 
the loss-making newspapers which Murdoch has previously subsidised in exchange 
for political influence.  These include the London Times (reliant for a long while on the 
Sunday Times), the New York Post (which has never made a profit in twenty years) 
and the Australian whose annual losses are estimated at $25 million a year” (2013, 
p213).   
 
As stated previously, since dividing the business in this way, Murdoch has also sold all 
of News Corp’s shares in BSkyB to media rival Comcast (in 2018), and the News Corp 
owned movie and television production company 21st Century Fox to Disney in 2019.   
 
Summary  
 
Analysis of Murdoch’s business strategies, political influence and typical behaviours 
illustrates the potential power that can be obtained by a proprietor whose media 
holdings are significant beyond reasonable levels.  Once Murdoch had established 
himself in the UK via his two popular and profitable daily newspapers, he was able to 
leverage the influence he had over public opinion to affect regulation and policy as he 
deemed necessary and expand into other areas, predominantly the more profitable 
broadcasting market.   
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Whether his motivations were purely business based, or also driven by his grievances 
with the establishment, the literature in this chapter has made clear that he pursues 
his aims by using his popular newspapers, and therefore the powerful influence he 
has over politicians.  Furthermore, Murdoch is both unafraid and unashamed to quickly 
change his political support to suit his business needs. 
 
“Murdoch was adroit at courting and cooling politicians, but he also used his 
newspapers to advance his own political views… hard-right-wing views common 
among the super-rich; supportive of strong leadership, low taxation and light regulation 
and hostile to trade unions, the European Union and global-warming science.  His 
newspapers strengthened his power by being politically promiscuous, periodically 
switching support from waning parties to challengers who, encumbered by gratitude, 
might advance his political and commercial agenda, particularly granting him favours 
in a heavily regulated TV industry” (Watson and Hickman, 2012, p6).   
 
Lisners aptly summarises the power Murdoch holds over prime ministers and, perhaps 
of more concern given the powerful influence of his media outlets, how easily he can 
be persuaded to switch his support:  
 
“A politician who might be sympathetic to his organization would be given a good press 
while otherwise he or she would be regarded as an enemy.  And a Prime Minister’s 
term in office was finite while Rupert Murdoch was there for life.  So, it was they who 
usually sought favour with the press mogul and not the other way round…  When it 
helped his business, Murdoch could be at ease with either political party or, if 
necessary, support a dictatorship” (2012, pvxi).   
 
 
However, it must be noted that, in spite of his influence, not all consider Murdoch’s 
dominance and success in media markets so negatively.  Knee describes Murdoch as 
“the most complex, creative, and contradictory of the moguls, both personally and in 
the conglomerate he has built” (2009, l4088), and goes on to say that “Murdoch values 
and knows how to achieve operating efficiency in assets that have no meaningful 
structural barriers to entry… and has shown exceptional creativity in managing 
competition in ways that reflect that environment” (2009, l4303).  
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Furthermore, some would argue that Murdoch has made considerable contributions 
to the continued provision of news in an ever-declining market by, for example, running 
such papers as the Times at a significant loss.  To date, the loss has been mitigated 
by the more profitable areas of his business, though this could be subject to change 
in the future following the splitting of the company and the sale of some of its most 
significant holdings.  The counterargument, of course, is that Murdoch has run such 
newspapers at a continual loss so as to be able to remain a powerful voice within the 
political arena, and leverage that power to aid the expansion of his media empire as 
well as propagate his own ideology and political views. 
 
The wealth of issues discussed in this chapter with regard to Murdoch and News 
International demonstrate the ability of a media proprietor to use the power of their 
media holdings to affect competition within the market, and the politics surrounding 
the market, so as to ensure their dominance and to serve his corporate agenda.  Above 
all, this chapter has sought to examine how Murdoch has manoeuvred in such ways 
so as to achieve his business goals.   
 
From his very early interactions in the UK when he was attempting to enter the 
broadcasting market, Murdoch was met with the resistance of the ‘British 
establishment’, be it via the regulators that looked to restrict his movements in the 
market, or the BBC, a strong competitor and very well respected part of said 
establishment.    Over time the regulators changed, and as such the criticism of them 
represents a less obvious trend.  However, in the case of the BBC, criticism from the 
Murdoch press has remained prevalent, and thus proven by the empirical evidence 
presented in this thesis   
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Chapter Four: Media Economy – The Economic Imperatives of Consolidation 
 
To fully understand the factors that drive the consolidation within media markets, those 
aside from a media moguls’ goals and ambitions and that are outside of their control 
must be considered.  To provide a fair analysis of Murdoch’s business practices and 
motivations for the criticism of the BBC and Ofcom, the external factors that may (or 
may not) have contributed to his practices must be explored.  
 
Such examples as the widely studied and debated ‘digital revolution’ has undoubtedly 
impacted the business model of the British newspaper industry as the average 
consumer can now access news, information and entertainment from multiple sources 
via a variety of methods, i.e. computer, TV and mobile phone.  The public are no longer 
solely reliant on the daily newspaper to understand what is happening in the world.   
 
Furthermore, the traditional funding model for the newspaper industry has seen 
significant change and is ever more reliant on advertising for revenue.  The widely 
debated issue of globalisation is also a major contributor to consolidation in the media 
markets, and as such the marketplace is no longer localised or subject to the 
considerations of one nation alone, but operates on a much larger, almost global scale.   
 
Such arguments are relative to the central theme of this thesis, regarding how 
Murdoch has used his press interests to undermine and attack his competitors and the 
regulators, as the market conditions and any potential constraints and opportunities 
will have had an effect on the decisions taken by Murdoch, and may have contributed 
to the drivers of the criticism.  It also provides insight into the motives behind Murdoch’s 
business practices, and how he has manoeuvred within the various media markets 
(and others) so as to maintain his dominant position.   
 
Chapter 2: The New Digital Environment examined the new forms of media platform 
via which news stories are disseminated.  This chapter does not repeat that analysis, 
but rather looks at the ‘digital revolution’ in the broader context within which media 
companies in the UK, and around the globe, have attempted to consolidate and 
converge so as to be able to continue to compete.   
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Meier and Trappel explain the trend of media mergers moving from the newspaper to 
television market, predominantly “supported by the accelerated speed of technological 
innovation, in particular as regards broadcasting distribution technology and digitalised 
online technology” (1998, p43).  They then offer a number of plausible arguments for 
the convergence of the media in favour of monopolistic or oligopolistic media markets, 
most notably that “the consolidation of production in the hands of large corporations is 
one of the basic facts of modern economic life, taking advantage of economies of scale 
and scope and reducing the cost of goods and services to consumers” (op. cit.).  
 
Technological developments have seen the inception of digital TV in the UK, as well 
as satellite TV (currently with only one domestic satellite TV provider serving the 
country: Sky, previously BSkyB).  While profits have been reaped from the 
development of the TV sector, its expansion has arguably had the opposite effect on 
newspapers.  In order to understand the key drivers that lead to consolidation within 
the media industry, the traditional business models that exist must first be understood 
and assessed.  There are a vast number of corporate entities operating within the UK 
media market; for the purpose of this chapter, a ‘media firm’ is considered to be any 
entity that is in the business of producing, packaging or distributing media content.   
 
This chapter will consider the typical structure of a media market, and how this 
correlates with the UK media market (in particular press and broadcast).   It goes on 
to look at mergers and acquisitions, the types of integration that can take place, and 
how Murdoch has looked to implement such integration to expand his business into 
other areas; notably, examples where Murdoch has attempted to acquire assets wholly 
outside of the media market but with the same aim of expanding his empire are 
explored.     
 
‘Digital convergence’ will then be explored, which provides examples of the types of 
change within the media market that can drive existing, established media 
organisations to look to consolidate.  Furthermore, the BBC is noted as a proven 
example of a ‘successfully convergent’ firm, securing its position as a direct competitor 
for both of Murdoch’s media entities: News International and Sky Television.  Finally, 
this chapter will consider what all of this means for the future of the media market and 
how the existing media players will need to adapt so as to be able to continue to 
 74 
 
compete.   
 
Media Market Structures 
 
Market structures tend to fall into three categories: a free market, where price is driven 
by unrestricted competition between privately owned entities; an oligopoly, where a 
market is shared by a small number of entities producing and/or selling goods or 
services; and a monopoly, where one entity has exclusive control of the provision of 
goods or services.   
 
Alternative descriptions offered by Doyle (2013) are ‘perfect’, ‘imperfect’ and 
‘monopoly’.  The distinction between them lies in the number of rival producers or 
sellers in a given market, which also provides an indication of the market power an 
individual firm may have.  The more market power, the greater the ability the firm may 
have to “control and influence operations in the market… the less market power that 
individual firms have, the more competitive the market structure in which they operate” 
(Doyle, 2013, pp8-9).   
 
The media market in the UK is often described as oligopolistic, or imperfect by nature, 
because a small number of conglomerates dominate the production and provision of 
media products.  While Doyle (2013) discusses the economic benefit of operating in 
this environment, considering the oligopolistic nature of the media markets, 
Cunningham, Flew and Smith explain that it is difficult to apply traditional economic 
theory to oligopolies: 
 
“…they have a wide range of behavioural choices not dictated by market pressures.  
Individual firms in an oligopoly possess incentives both to cooperate and to compete 
with one another…  They also have incentives to maintain barriers to entry for potential 
new competitors into their industry, whether through acting to slow the development 
of technologies that may threaten their business models or by lobbying politicians to 
create or maintain restrictions on market entry” (2015, p22).   
 
This consideration implies, contrary to common assumptions, that it may be preferable 
for a media firm to operate in an oligopoly, where it can use the small and controlled 
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measure of competition to its advantage, particularly where political leverage is 
sought.   
 
Albarran offers a similar consideration, stating that “many media markets have evolved 
to represent a more common structure, especially in those countries where the media 
industries have become concentrated.  A hybrid type of market structure now exists, 
combining elements of an oligopoly market with a monopolistic competitive structure” 
(2010, p56).  Albarran explains that, with this type of structure, there is typically a small 
group of leading firms that control up to 80% of the market, with smaller firms vying for 
the remainder.   
 
This type of market structure, oligopolistic with monopolistic tendancies, is how the UK 
newspaper market can be described.  The newspaper groups News UK (Murdoch 
owned), DMG and Reach make up for 83% of the market (MRC, 2019).  
 
Mergers and Acquisitions 
 
Mergers are a way for media companies to become more efficient in reaching viewers 
and turning a profit; to become more powerful, more profitable and to reach more 
audience members.  There are a number of ways in which a media firm will look to 
expand, but these will typically fall into one of two categories: vertical integration or 
horizontal integration (also described as diversification).   
 
“Vertical integration is identified as a firm’s effort to control all aspects of creation, 
production, distribution and exhibition, which form the media value chain.  By being in 
control of all of these areas, the company could theoretically leverage their assets in 
the widest possible way and engage in a number of cross-marketing and cross-
promotional efforts in order to capture more revenues at the various stages of the 
value chain and, ideally, increase market share” (Albarran, 2010, p46).  
 
Horizonal integration is where a media company enters into different markets; for 
example, where a media firm that once owned only a newspaper, or group of 
newspapers (a single-dimensional activity), then acquires a TV station: “When 
companies expand into other related or non-related markets, they are engaging in 
 76 
 
horizontal integration – meaning they draw revenues (and losses) across business 
segments.  Some segments may perform well, while others may not.  A horizontal 
strategy is widely believed to help ride out fluctuations in the business cycle” (Albarran, 
2010, p45).  In some studies, this is also referred to as ‘horizontal diversification’.   
 
There are numerous examples of horizontal integration or diversification within 
Murdoch’s News Corporation.  Over the years, News Corporation has moved from the 
newspaper business into broadcasting and cable/satellite TV, movie production and 
distribution, publishing, multimedia, and a number of other non-media-related 
businesses.  However, it is often argued that Murdoch’s non-media-related interests 
were purchased in pursuit of creating efficiencies and increasing profits across his 
media holdings.   
 
News Corporation is a prime example of a company that has deployed the horizontal 
diversification strategy in such a way that it has been able to accommodate losses in 
some areas of the business.  It is often noted in studies and texts that Murdoch runs 
a number of his newspapers at a loss (for example the Times), but the losses are 
mitigated by his other, more profitable business interests.  Running at such a loss calls 
into question Murdoch’s typically shrewd business practices, but it is widely considered 
that retaining such an asset as the Times, albeit it at a loss, allows Murdoch to continue 
as a powerful voice within the UK.  The losses of the newspaper are likely made up 
for elsewhere in his business, and ensures that he is able to maintain the political 
persuasion owning such a popular newspaper carries.   
 
Flew and Gilmour (2003) discuss the practice of ‘conglomeration’, which provides 
scope for reductions in cost and risk.  Perhaps the most notable of Flew and Gilmour’s 
assertions is that it provides the opportunity for ‘cross-promotion’, where the media 
firm can utilise any number of its different media holdings to promote the others.  As 
has been discussed in Chapter Three, there are a number of examples where 
Murdoch has been seen to use the practice of cross-promotion to his businesses’ 
advantage.   
 
In Hardy’s work (2010) that examines examples of cross-promotion across diverging 
media he states, “…Murdoch-owned newspapers have been used as vehicles to 
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promote News Corporation’s other media and corporate interests is a largely accepted 
charge and commonplace observation…” (2010, p119).  Previously discussed and 
briefly reiterated here, such examples include when Murdoch’s Sky TV entered into 
direct competition with BSB; Murdoch’s newspapers “became shameless 
cheerleaders for Sky” (Shawcross, 1992, p450).   
 
Flew and Gilmour (2003) explain that media firms are able to engage in these activities 
via one (or more) of the following five options: 
 
1. Horizontal expansion – as discussed, mergers and acquisitions and/or the 
development of the production of goods and services within the industry  
2. Vertical expansion – as discussed, mergers and acquisitions and/or the development 
of enterprises involved in the supply chain within the industry 
3. Diagonal expansion – also described as ‘conglomeration’ by Flew and Gilmour, 
whereby a media firm expands into complementary activities that enable productive 
synergies to be developed 
4. Diversification – where a media firm expands into non-media-related activities; Flew 
and Gilmour define this as being different from horizontal integration  
5. Globalisation – where a media firm expands its operations and/or provision of goods 
and services into other regional or national markets. 
 
Flew and Gilmour (2003) find in favour of arguments that News Corporation has 
pursued a successful strategy to become a ‘global enterprise’ via all of the above 
methods, though predominantly pursuing globalisation.   
 
An example of Murdoch’s shrewd attempt at diversification so as to further profit his 
media empire can be found when in 1998, he bid for the Premier League football team 
Manchester United.  The Guardian6 reported that at the time no one foresaw any 
regulatory issue or intervention. The political climate was considered to be ‘favourable’ 
given that Tony Blair was the Prime Minister; Murdoch’s newspaper the Sun had 
switched its support to Labour in the 1997 and infamously claimed that to be the 
reason for Blair’s electoral success.   
 
6 https://www.theguardian.com/uk/1999/apr/11/theobserver.uknews1  
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However, in a less favourable act by the Labour government, the bid was referred to 
the Monopolies and Mergers Commission (MMC), which undertook a review and 
concluded by blocking the bid.  It found that “As a wholesale supplier of sports premium 
channels offering a broad range of sports, BSkyB has no competitors” (MMC, 2007, 
p73).  The acquisition would have given BSkyB the potential to have some 
independence in setting its prices.  It also carried the risk that BSkyB would have 
access to privileged information with regard to the Premier League’s ‘rights-selling’ 
arrangements, which would be deemed to be an unfair advantage over its competitors.  
 
The MMC concluded that there were a number of areas of concern in relation to the 
potential acquisition, including a public interest concern given that the move would 
make BSkyB the controller of the TV rights to Manchester United matches.  
Furthermore, the MMC deemed that, given News International owned 39% of BSkyB, 
which resulted in News International having a ‘material influence’ over BSkyB, the 
acquisition would result in News International also having a material influence over 
Manchester United.  The MMC concluded that the acquisition should not go ahead as 
it would be against the public interest. 
 
Murdoch had come close to a brush with the MMC before; when he was in pursuit of 
his purchase of the Times and the Sunday Times, the purchase had the potential to 
be referred to the MMC as per procedure.  However as discussed, in a highly criticised 
move at the time, then Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher chose not to refer the matter 
to the MMC and waved it through.   
 
While the MMC is not the direct subject of this thesis (which focuses on Murdoch’s 
criticism of the BBC and the regulator Ofcom), Murdoch’s experience with the MMC in 
the case of Manchester United speaks to yet another example of a UK regulator that 
has stood in the way of his corporate agenda and expansions plans, and has done so 
for reasons of his attempt not being in the ‘public interest’.   
 
Murdoch’s attempt to purchase the football team was not one born out of hobby or his 
passion for football, but rather a potentially shrewd business move that, had it been 
allowed, would have seen him gain a measure of control in the setting of BskyB prices, 
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and therefore potentially further monopolising the subscription TV market. This 
example perhaps speaks to one of the many reasons behind his antipathy towards 
regulators.   
 
 
Digital convergence 
 
Doyle (2013) describes digital convergence as the coming together of different sectors 
of the media markets that were previously separate, commonly via the use of digital 
technologies.  One example is the combining of text and video, packaged together 
with interactive features, all of which would previously have existed as separate 
products produced for different sectors.  Furthermore, as mobile phones, laptops and 
tablets have become a common feature in everyday lives, media output can be 
repackaged and made available to be accessed across multiple devices.  Lawson-
Borders describes it as “the realm of possibilities when cooperation occurs between 
print and broadcast for the delivery of multimedia content through the use of computer 
and the internet” (2006, p4).  
 
This type of convergence in the media industry has lent itself well to the globalisation 
strategies often pursued by media conglomerates.  The internet in particular is a 
‘disruptive’ technology that has reformed the way in which media products are 
delivered and consumed, and expanded their potential audience share.  Albarran 
(2010) discusses the emerging markets within the media sector that have caused 
disruption, mostly where they interact with the activities of many traditional media 
companies, but do not perform the core functions of traditional media (i.e. content 
production), listing them as search engines, social networking, user-generated 
content, smartphones, and video-game consoles.  The emergence of such markets 
has caused disruption as they have added new layers to the value chain, i.e. they have 
impacted the traditional methods of distribution and changed the way in which the 
audience consumes media products.   
 
Furthermore, these new markets typically operate via the internet.  While the ability for 
a traditional media firm to horizontally or vertically integrate or diversify by acquiring a 
business that operates in such new markets exists, competition is arguably much 
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stronger on a platform such as the internet, given the number of actors able to publish 
there (as discussed in Chapter Two), and online consumer trends have a tendency to 
be fluid and less predictable.  Lawson-Borders explains that “Changing demographics 
and competing messages made the Internet particularly attractive to traditional print 
and broadcast media that sought to protect their brand and their historical speciality of 
gathering and disseminating news, information, and entertainment” (2006, p6).   
 
Lawson-Borders argues that the history of media development and ‘creative 
disruption’ dictates that one medium has never replaced another entirely, but rather 
built on and adapted the predecessor: “Radio was considered a threat to newspapers, 
TV was supposed to replace its predecessors, cable was predicted to unseat TV, and 
now satellite and the Internet loom as the latest replacement.  All of these media 
coexist in an intricate communication delivery system that has expanded choices for 
the public” (2006, p11).  However, since Lawson-Borders’ analysis, it is arguable that 
the internet has brought about a unique threat to existing media platforms in that not 
only does it bring something new to the experience via user-based selection and 
interactivity, but it also collects all of the experiences offered by its predecessors into 
a single platform.  
 
Meikle and Young explain that there are two ways in which a media firm can be 
considered to be or described as convergent.  “The first of these describes the ongoing 
processes of consolidation and expansion through which global media firms become 
larger, more integrated and more networked.  The second sense describes the ways 
in which media firms are adopting and adapting the potential of technological 
convergence” (2012, p35).   
 
Meikle and Young use the example of Rupert Murdoch’s attempt to launch the Daily in 
2011.  The Daily was a newspaper made available only on the Apple iPad device.  
Murdoch’s publicly stated target was one million subscriptions, at 99 cents per week.  
It was a questionable model at the time, given that everything that was to be published 
in the Daily – news, sport, games, celebrity news/gossip, opinion pieces etc – was 
available elsewhere, both in print and online.  The Daily was an attempt at media 
convergence and was a promising partnership with Apple, given the popularity of the 
iPad.   
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However, as Meikle and Young note, the iPad at that stage was a tethered device (it 
was not yet fully mobile as it was unable to provide a mobile data connection) and so 
the Daily still adhered to some of the traditional values of a newspaper.  However, the 
case “illustrates the central role of convergent media industries in driving the new 
media environment.  This collaboration between News Corporation and Apple, the 
shared attempt to create a new business model for online content, and their use of a 
particular convergent product (the iPad), all illustrate a second key dimension of 
convergence” (Meikle and Young, 2012, p35).   
 
Considering more successful attempts, Meikle and Young cite the BBC as one of the 
most ‘successfully convergent’ media firms, stating that “The BBC has been a major 
driver of digital television in the UK through its creation of the Freeview model, which 
broke the subscription monopoly on digital delivery.  And it has made very significant 
developments online.  Its websites are among the most-visited in the world, it is 
experimenting with initiatives to digitize and open up its entire archive, and it has made 
some of the most sophisticated responses to the rise in user generated content of any 
established media organisation” (2012, p43).  Convergence has not only prompted 
existing media firms to expand and diversify so as to adapt to disruptive technologies 
but has also allowed new players to enter the media market, albeit from less traditional 
and arguably less predictable angles.   
  
The BBC’s success in this area makes it an even stronger competitor for Murdoch’s 
organisation.   Not only has it had to compete with the BBC in the broadcast arena, 
but as Barnett7 (2002) explains, with the creation of Freeview came the threat of 
destabilising BskyB’ s ‘stranglehold’ on the digital television market.  Furthermore, as 
the BBC established its online presence it quickly became one of the most trusted and 
respected news sources, making it a competitor for Murdoch in the printed news 
market as well.  Murdoch’s criticism of the BBC began long before digital convergence 
came into existence, but the BBC establishing itself as a credible contender in this 
newly emerging market undoubtedly gave Murdoch yet more reason to resent the 
organisation and criticise it in his newspapers.   
 
7 https://www.theguardian.com/media/2002/oct/28/digitaltv.comment 
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The future 
 
The emergence of the internet and ‘disruptive’ digital convergence has had major 
implications for competition within the media markets, in that media firms are not only 
contending with decisions about which media products and distribution mechanisms 
to pursue, but also with the almost unprecedented speed of change in consumer 
behaviour.  Albarran explains: 
 
“a key trait of the media economy is that most products can be substituted for another, 
a concept know as cross elasticity of demand…  Cross elasticity of demand raises 
concern for media companies and advertisers vying for our attention.  Because there 
are so many choices available, this leads to increasing fragmentation of the audience 
into smaller and smaller sectors.  As we add new digital platforms and other 
technologies to reach consumers, the problem is further magnified, giving consumers 
more control over when, where and how to access media content” (2010, pp40-41).   
 
Lawson-Borders echoes this view, stating that the audience’s role in the new media 
environment is central to convergence: “The arguments regarding push-and-pull 
technology are transformed through use of the computer and the Internet.  Companies 
can no longer merely push the information they want audiences to receive; with the 
Internet, the customer is in charge and makes the choice to pull only the information 
he or she selects” (2006, pp17-18)  As a result of this, competition has to be 
approached in a different way, and the effects of digital convergence mean it lends 
itself to the ‘global enterprise’ structure that Flew and Gilmour (2003) associate with 
Rupert Murdoch and News Corporation’s success.  In this model, strategies to 
establish strong audiences across multiple platforms and diversified holdings can then 
be leveraged to create efficiencies and economies of scale.  Lawson-Borders states: 
 
“traditional media organisations have relied on their reputation as reliable sources of 
news and information, brand, and credibility.  However, new media organisations are 
making a drive to change the paradigm.  Media companies that are practicing 
convergence through different business subsidiaries must handle local competition 
both inside and outside the core market.  Organizations that do not own their media 
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outlets are seeking to develop partnerships and alliances to maximize their 
convergence potential” (2006, p17).  
 
This being the case, the implication is arguably that existing dominant actors within 
the industry will look to expand their market share further, increasing the potential for 
market consolidation.  There has been some indication of this in recent years: faced 
with popular software and streaming services such as Netflix, Amazon Prime and 
Apple, traditional players such as Disney and Comcast have begun to look at 
consolidating their production and distribution capabilities to survive and compete.   
 
Conclusion 
 
In considering the relevant factors that affect the media market, Murdoch’s media 
empire can be considered one that has implemented strategies in all of these areas, 
and for the most part, to his great advantage.  By undertaking both horizontal and 
vertical integration, and diversifying across a number of markets, Murdoch has 
acquired more and more of the media markets and become a dominant voice, 
particularly in the UK press.   
 
Digital convergence has undoubtedly had a significant effect on the industry, and has 
brought with it a wealth of new players into both the news and entertainment markets.  
Like many other traditional media players Murdoch faces an uncertain future when it 
comes to his press holdings, as newspaper circulation continues to fall and advertising 
revenue is harder to come by.  However, like many others, Murdoch has moved into 
online news and his established newspapers continue to set the news agenda both in 
hard copy and online.   
 
That being said, the BBC, traditionally a news broadcast company only, has brought a 
credible news website to the market that is available to the public for free (funded by 
the licence fee), while other news organisations, and Murdoch's News International in 
particular, are grappling with ways in which to continue to profit for their news content, 
exploring options such as pay walls and online advertising revenues.  It can be said 
that none are yet to establish funding models that they can be certain will have the 
necessary longevity to survive.   
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The BBC is in no way constrained by such concerns.  Its guaranteed funding model 
allows for it to publish news content for free, and without the need for advertising.  It 
also allows for it to provide a vast catalogue of its broadcast material via its online 
streaming service, ‘BBC iPlayer; again, this is provided for free thanks to the licence 
fee.  This is a continuation of the very principals Murdoch is ideologically opposed to, 
and it contravenes the ideals of a free, commercial market.  Additionally, given the 
BBC’s success as a digitally convergent media market player, it likely builds on 
Murdoch’s existing frustration with the Public Service Provider and its protected 
position as a credible competitor to Sky TV and News International.    
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Chapter Five: Current Framework 
 
To better understand the development of media business and ownership changes in 
the UK, both the historical and current frameworks of policy and regulation need to be 
explored.  While navigating the topic can be somewhat complex in light of the evolving 
landscape and changes of government over the last 40 years, all relevant Acts and 
provisions must be considered in order to gain a holistic view of how policy in this area 
has developed.   
 
This chapter first examines the legislation that applies to the relevant areas of the 
media industry, predominantly broadcasting and some provisions of competition law, 
and then moves on to consider the chronological development of press self-regulation 
in the UK. It will provide examples of the way in which Murdoch has been able to use 
both the power of his press holdings in the UK, and the advantageous relationships 
he has maintained with those in power to either pursue certain policies, or to 
circumnavigate them so as to continue to expand his business.   
 
Furthermore, this chapter will provide insight into the motivations behind some of the 
earliest examples of Murdoch's press attacks on the BBC; attacks that were 
undertaken so as to undermine the organisation’s prominent position in the markets in 
which Murdoch sought to operate as a result of both Murdoch’s ideological opposition 
to the BBC’s existence and funding model, and so as to make room within the markets 
in which the BBC operates for his own business.   
 
Legislation 
 
- 1973 Fair Trading Act 
 
The Fair-Trading Act was introduced in 1973 under a Conservative government.  The 
Act stated that the merger or acquisition of a newspaper must be referred to the 
Secretary of State for approval when the daily circulation (of either the currently owned 
or proposed newspaper) exceeds 25,000.  This figure was increased to 50,000 in 
1991.  In some cases, the Secretary of State would refer the issue to the MMC, but 
had the discretion not to do so if it was deemed not necessary for such reasons as 
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‘where the newspaper is not economic as a going concern’, or where the Secretary of 
State is ‘satisfied that the case is one of urgency if it is to continue as a separate 
newspaper’, among others.   
 
Feintuck and Varney (2013) consider the Fair-Trading Act to include a mixture of 
specifications that were subject to discretionary decision making on the part of the 
Secretary of State.  This reliance on the Minister was mitigated by the inclusion of the 
need to refer anything that was of ‘public interest’ to the MMC.  However, as Feintuck 
and Varney explain: 
 
“Unfortunately, the statutory definition of ‘the public interest’ in this context was so 
vague as to be virtually meaningless, requiring the consideration of ‘all matters which 
appear in the circumstances to be relevant and, in particular, the need for accurate 
presentation of news and free expression of opinion…  Within the permissive, 
discretionary structure of the FTA [Fair Trading Act] provisions and the application of 
the nebulous construct of the public interest, the statutory measures on newspaper 
acquisitions, in so far as they had any effect, operated simply to leave the power of 
determination essentially within the hands of the government of the day, a prime 
example of ritualistic regulation masking raw political power” (2013, pp130-4).  
 
A prime example of this was when, under Margaret Thatcher’s premiership, the then 
Secretary of State John Biffen waved through Murdoch’s purchase of the Times 
newspaper without referring it to the MMC, despite the circulation figures for both the 
papers Murdoch already owned and the Times far exceeding the threshold.  That this 
was a wholly political decision designed to placate a vital political ally of Mrs Thatcher’s 
became clear when it transpired that Murdoch had visited Thatcher for lunch in 
January 1981, as a decision was being considered.  This was put to Murdoch during 
the Leveson Inquiry, but he claimed to have no recollection of such an occasion.  
Commenting in his final report on Murdoch’s inability to remember the meeting – either 
in evidence to the inquiry or when interviewed for the official history of the Times – Sir 
Brian Leveson preferred not to draw any conclusion about whether an overt political 
deal was done but concluded drily: “It is perhaps a little surprising that he does not 
remember a visit to a place as memorable as Chequers, in the context of a bid as 
important as that which he made for Times Newspapers. However, perhaps that is all 
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I need to say” (Leveson Inquiry, Vol III, p1245). 
 
- 1985 Peacock Committee 
 
In 1985 then Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher formed a committee to assess the 
effects of advertising revenue or sponsorship on the BBC. The man selected to chair 
the Committee was professor and economist Alan Peacock.  The report produced by 
the committee found that advertising would not prove a suitable alternative funding 
model for the BBC, however it also delved much deeper into ideas for the future of 
funding for the BBC then its original remit.  Ho, E (2010, p35) states that “The Peacock 
Report went well beyond its original brief to consider the funding of the BBC.  Although 
it rejected immediate funding of the corporation by advertising, it envisaged an 
eventual “full market” for broadcasting based on direct payment.”   
 
It was said that Thatcher’s ideological opposition to the BBC, and a general view 
amongst the conservative government that the BBC should operate as part of a 
commercially driven market, was the driving force behind the setting up of the 
committee.  It was a view that was well known to be shared by Thatcher’s supporters 
within the media market, most notably Rupert Murdoch.  Similar considerations were 
being investigated for the NHS, however, the government and newspaper’s hostility 
towards the BBC was more obvious.   
 
Holland (2013, p142) writes that “the setting up of the committee was the culmination 
of the government’s aim to move the BBC to a more market-oriented position… but 
while the government and its supporters in the national press were cautious in their 
public pronouncements on the NHS, there had been no restraint in regard to the BBC”.   
 
Barnett and Curry (1994, p22) explain that “As an aggressive entrepreneur who had 
set his sights on the broadcasting business, Murdoch viewed the BBC as a complacent 
institution sheltered from the rigours of the real world by guaranteed funding.  More 
importantly, its size and share of the audience represented a real obstacle to his 
television ambitions.  One obvious answer was to try to destabilize it.  Nevertheless, it 
still came as a shock when in January 1985 The Times ran three consecutive editorials 
condemning the BBC’s request for a rise in the licence fee.”   
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The Times launched a particularly scathing attack on the BBC in support of the 
Peacock Committees anticipated outcome.  Holland (2013, p142) explains that “Its 
attack was uncompromising.  ‘Do we need the BBC’ a leader demanded.  On three 
successive days (14-16 January 1985) the paper ran editorials arguing that sections 
of the Corporation should be auctioned off and the rest financed by advertising.” 
 
The attack published in the Times was indicative of Murdoch’s attitude towards the 
BBC, and his use of his newspapers to disseminate negative messages about the 
BBC so as to undermine it was a tactic that would be deployed over the next several 
decades, as this thesis asserts. Barnett and Curry (1994, p22) explain that “although 
the editor, Charles Douglas-Home, angrily denied any proprietorial interference, it was 
scarcely credible that the correspondence with his boss’s interests as pure accident.  
These editorials set the tone for The Times, and Murdoch’s other British papers, for 
several years to come.”   
 
The Director General of the BBC at the time was Alasdair Milne.  Milne met the 
criticism of the Murdoch press by generating stories, interviews and speeches that 
aimed to demonstrate the importance of the licence fee.  Holland quotes Milne 
discussing the criticism published in the Times as stating that “… if acted upon would 
have the practical effect of enabling its owner Rupert Murdoch to acquire some of the 
most valuable broadcasting action in the UK” (Holland, 2013, p142-143).   
 
Both Thatcher and Murdoch’s approach to the BBC was born out of similar ideological 
misgivings about the BBC, and both the governments campaign and Murdoch’s press 
campaign could be considered to be intimately linked, with the latter helping to 
legitimise the former.  That being said, the outcome of the Peacock report did not 
culminate in any kind of material change to its funding model.  Seaton and McNicholas 
(2009, p125) explain that  
 
“…By far the most important thing about the report was that it, persuasively, in the 
most impeccably ‘dry’ terms dismissed advertising as a feasible alternative to the 
licence fee and depoliticised the argument about the licence fee by recommending 
that it be indexed on an annual basis to the general rate of inflation.  It came up with 
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a convincing argument for the short or middle-term economic rationality of public 
service broadcasting, based on the view that it compensated for market failure in the 
conditions of imperfect market competition that characterised the industry by delivering 
programmes that the market could not.” 
 
Despite the motivation behind the setting up of the Peacock Committee being to try 
and remove the BBC’s prominence and power, Seaton and McNicholas (2009, p125) 
conclude that “the Peacock Report marked a decisive moment in the Corporation’s 
survival and success for the next 20 years…”   
 
 
- 1990 Broadcasting Act 
 
The 1990 Broadcasting Act came into force following the recommendations of the 
Peacock Committee.  The Conservatives had intended to create a more open and 
competitive market (Goodwin, 1998), which would bode well for Rupert Murdoch’s 
plans to launch Sky TV and suit his ideological beliefs with regard to the BBC and free 
markets.  According to Curran and Seaton (2014), the Conservatives had originally 
sought to abolish the BBC.  When they realised that this was not possible, they looked 
to change expectations of it and ‘radically alter the ecology’ of the institutions within 
which it operated.  “There had been no doubt, among politicians on both sides and in 
pressure groups, that the object of the 1990 Broadcasting Act had intended to be the 
destruction of the BBC” (Curran and Seaton, 2014, p213-14). 
 
However, following the publication of the Peacock Report and the 1998 White Paper 
‘Broadcasting in the 90s’, the Act ended up taking what Seaton and Curran (2014) 
describe as a ‘gradualist approach’ to reforms in the TV market.  Its provisions included 
allowing ITV franchises to be put out to tender, and the relaxation of the public service 
requirements on satellite television and licensed commercial radio in comparison with 
the rest of the broadcasting system.  It also placed limits on cross-media ownership 
by restricting newspaper proprietors from holding more than a 20% stake in TV 
companies, as well as limiting cross-ownership across commercial TV, satellite TV 
and national radio stations.   
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The Act’s provision with regard to limiting cross-media ownership across satellite 
television would not have suited Murdoch’s plans.  The rival satellite television 
company at that time, BSB, was lobbying for the 1990 Act to ensure the restrictions 
on national newspaper proprietors (i.e. Murdoch) controlling more than 20% of a 
British television company would include broadcasts from “medium-power satellites 
such as Astra” (Shawcross, 1992, p500).  Thatcher and her government were reluctant 
to implement a policy that would hurt Murdoch in such a way.  To avoid doing so, the 
government asserted that: 
 
“Since Sky came from a Luxembourg satellite, using frequencies not allocated by the 
British government, and a technology which could provide essentially unlimited 
channels, it was not subject to the spectrum scarcity argument which had required the 
previous restrictions” (Shawcross, 1992, pp500-01).   
 
This was a controversial statement given the Sky headquarters and studio were based 
in Britain.  It was considered to be a loophole created to appease Murdoch and allow 
him to pursue his television expansion plans unhindered.  This was viewed as 
fundamental in the development of Sky TV, and the expansion of the Murdoch empire.  
Petley (2015) describes it as an act of ‘re-regulation’, whereby the government looked 
to replace regulation that sought to protect the public interest with regulation that 
looked to promote corporate self-interest.   
 
The Act was considered to be a step towards ‘de-regulation’ at the time, and a step 
towards a more commercially driven market.  Hobson (2013, p178) states that “the Act 
heralded a huge expansion of channels and changes in the broadcasting landscape, 
both in the number of channels and their blatant commercialism.”  In spite of its 
attempts to broaden the market and allow for commercially, competitive driven 
programming, Hobson explains that it in fact ended up damaging the existing players.   
 
While the BBC remained largely protected thanks to the findings of the 
recommendations of the Peacock Report being predicated on a technological 
revolution that had not quite arrived yet, other terrestrial players such as ITV were 
forced to begin competing in a commercially driven market where the competitors were 
satellite broadcasters, such as Sky TV.  “In order to compete with the unfettered 
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popular programming available across the range of satellite channels, it was 
necessary for terrestrial channels especially to adapt to their programming strategies 
to try to keep their audiences” (Hobson, 2013, p178-179).   
 
Overall, despite the somewhat failed attempts of the Murdoch Press campaign against 
the BBC that sought to legitimise the Peacock Committee’s investigation into its 
funding, and the anticipated change in the BBC’s funding model that did not 
materialise, the Broadcasting Act of 1990 offered a promising consolation prize to 
Murdoch.  The Broadcasting Act allowed for Murdoch’s Sky TV to enter the UK market, 
in spite of his newspaper holdings, and hurt the existing broadcast competitor with 
which he would be competing for audiences.   
 
- Broadcasting Act 1996 
 
The 1990 Broadcasting Act, which was introduced under a Conservative government 
(albeit passed in the same month that Margaret Thatcher resigned from her position 
as Prime Minister), was amended to form the 1996 Broadcasting Act under Labour 
leadership and remains in place to this day.  As discussed previously, the Act originally 
included provisions that limited the extent to which cross-media ownership could be 
pursued by proprietors, but also included a loophole for Murdoch’s Sky TV. However, 
in 1995, the government published its report ‘Media Ownership: The Government’s 
Proposals’, which looked to introduce legislation to allow greater cross-ownership. The 
revised 1996 Act brought these proposals into effect, introducing a more relaxed 
approach to the ownership of television and radio licences, and newspaper market 
share.   
 
The Department of National Heritage’s explanatory guide detailed that the “numerical 
limits on the holding of television licenses have been abolished,” and that the rules 
restricting some participants to a maximum 20% shareholding in certain licences were 
removed “except in the case of national newspapers having 20% or more of national 
circulation who remain restricted to no more than a 20% interest in a licence to provide 
a channel 3 service or channel 5, and certain disqualified persons who remain limited 
to a maximum 5% interest in any television licence.”  The rules appeared to be logical 
and had the potential to address what remains a concern about the reach and control 
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of a select few conglomerates, given the oligopolistic tendencies of the market 
structure.  The actual effect of this legislation was to allow any existing newspaper 
proprietors of the time to own TV stations, with the exception of Mirror Group and 
Murdoch’s News Corporation. 
 
While the provisions included in the Broadcasting Act 1996 can perhaps be considered 
to be somewhat limited in addressing reach and control, the amendments did not 
override the provisions regarding merger control stipulated in the Fair Trading Act of 
1973.  The Fair Trading Act was eventually superseded by the Enterprise Act of 2002, 
although at the time of the inception of the Broadcasting Act and its subsequent 
revision, the newspaper market was still bound by the original rules.  A merger was 
considered to be “unlawful and void, unless the transfer is made with written consent 
given (conditionally or unconditionally) by the Secretary of State” (Barendt and 
Hitchens, 2000 p243).  Again, while the premise is sound and can be seen to give 
consideration to both corporate arguments for mergers and public interest arguments, 
the wording is ambiguous enough to allow for subjective interpretation and 
interference by the Secretary of State.   
  
- Enterprise Act 2002 
 
The Enterprise Act of 2002 reformed UK merger law.  The Act removed Ministers from 
the decision-making process for the majority of merger cases, leaving them to be dealt 
with by the competition authorities (then the Office of Fair Trading and the Competition 
Commission, replaced by the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA), which is in 
place to date).  Graham examines the major change in competition law and policy that 
the Act represented and argues that it could be seen as “a further development of the 
‘regulatory state’, or new public management, through its removal of power from 
politicians and towards independent agencies” (2004, p276).  The Act created the 
Office of Fair Trading, which took over the functions of the DGFT [Director General of 
Fair Trading].  Graham states:  
 
“The most important change is that the Act provides for a much more restricted role 
for Ministers than under the previous regime.  The basic principle of the new Act is 
that the OFT will make the references to the CC (Competition Commission) and the 
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CC will decide on whether or not there is a competition problem and, if there is, what 
remedy would be appropriate.  This is a major change which removes important 
powers away from elected politicians towards two independent agencies” (2004, 
p277).     
 
Despite this major change, the Act continued with the provision from the Fair Trading 
Act of 1973 whereby a qualifying merger was referred to the competition authorities 
on a voluntary basis.  The Act did not prevent the Secretary of State from making 
referrals to the Competition Commission, and they could continue to do so where there 
was a public interest concern.  The Secretary of State can refer the case where it 
meets the requirements of the specifications of section 58 of the Act, or where it does 
not but the Secretary of State believes that it should: effectively cases the Secretary 
of State believes to be of importance or concern to the public interest.   
 
The Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) document providing guidance on the 
Enterprise Act and public interest intervention in media mergers explains that, despite 
Ministers being removed from the process and the competition test (otherwise referred 
to as the plurality test), “the Act allows Ministers to intervene in merger cases which 
raise public interest considerations specified in the Act”.  (DTI, 2004, p5).  However, 
the amendments to the Act detailed in the Communications Act 2003 specified the 
public interest considerations could be applied to mergers involving newspaper and 
broadcasting enterprises.  Graham explains: 
 
“the Communications Act 2003 inserted the accurate presentation of news, free 
expression of opinion and the need for a plurality of news in newspapers in this section 
as well as the need for plurality of media ownership, a wide range of broadcasting and 
a genuine commitment by those in control of media enterprises to the attainment set 
out in the Communications Act” (2004, p278).   
 
Where the Secretary of State refers a case, the Competition Commission (now the 
CMA) will report back with any findings from a competition perspective.  The Secretary 
of State is bound to accept the findings, but where public interest matters are 
concerned, the Secretary of State has the power to make the decision alone.  The 
Enterprise Act also renamed ‘monopoly investigations’, as prescribed in the Fair 
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Trading Act, to ‘market’ investigations.  Again, the test included in the Act allows for 
the Office of Fair Trading to refer a case to the competition authorities where there is 
concern about the restriction of competition in any market.   
 
- Prologue to the Communications Act 2003 
 
In  stark contrast to Margaret Thatcher’s ideological misgivings about the BBC and her 
tendency to favour the privatisation of markets and advancing commercially driven 
business models, Labour activists had for a long time lobbied against the 
concentration of power within private media business, and the national daily press that 
so clearly favoured the Conservative approach.  In 1995, Labour MP Chris Mullin 
sought to introduce a bill that prevented a media proprietor from owning more than 
one national newspaper.  Hesmondhalgh considers that “the bill was clearly aimed at 
countering not only the influence of Rupert Murdoch’s News International, but also the 
expansion of the empires of other members of the late twentieth-century press barons” 
(2006, p100)  However, having either sought, or attempted to seek, a friendlier 
relationship with Murdoch in light of its “fear of the hostile influence of the widely read 
newspapers he owned” (op.cit), Labour did not support their own MP’s bill.    
 
McKnight (2012, p160) writes of the growing suspicions during the years leading to 
Blair’s electoral success that an ‘understanding’ between him and Murdoch had 
mounted, as it became clear to Murdoch that Blair represented less of a threat to his 
newspaper and broadcast holdings and operations than the then Prime Minister John 
Major.  McKnight claims that this was “heavily underlined when at the end of 1995 … 
a Labour shadow minister supported an inquiry by the Monopolies and Mergers 
Commission into Murdoch’s dominance in cable and satellite television: he was 
immediately ordered to withdraw by Blair’s office.”   
 
Freedman (2008) notes similar misgivings, asserting that any suspicions with regard 
to Labour’s loyalty to media proprietors, in particular Rupert Murdoch, were confirmed 
when the draft communications bill was introduced in May 2002 under Tony Blair and 
the Labour government.  The draft bill, in the words of its authors, “involved ‘substantial 
liberalisation’ within individual media markets and a reduction of cross-media 
ownership rules… Culture Secretary Tessa Jowell boasted to Parliament that ‘these 
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changes are deregulatory…  Ownership regulations will disappear or be reduced.  
Self-regulation will be extended wherever possible’” (HoC Debates, 7 May 2002, 
col35).   
 
Freedman (2008) views two clauses within the resulting 2003 Act as particularly 
controversial.  The first is the removal of the restriction on national newspaper groups 
purchasing Channel 5, a move that would allow for the already powerful Rupert 
Murdoch to potentially move into terrestrial broadcasting; and the second was the 
removal of the ban on foreign ownership of UK broadcasters.   
 
Freedman refers to the government’s view only six months before the introduction of 
the 2003 Act that unless a foreign nation was to offer reciprocal arrangements to allow 
British companies to expand into its media markets, the UK would not look to 
implement any such policy, which then changed to a ‘determination’ to implement the 
exact opposite.  Freedman considers the argument that the relaxation of ownership 
policy was on economic grounds to be a flawed approach; surely any policy relating 
to the media, particularly broadcasting and the press, should include considerations 
relating to public interest and social policy. Freedman also notes that the government’s 
sudden change of mind with regard to ownership policy did little to quash the 
suspicions that it was heavily influenced by commercially motivated media proprietors, 
i.e. Rupert Murdoch.   
 
“This suspicion was strengthened by the publication of documents showing that BSkyB 
lobbyists met with Downing Street officials six times during the passage of the 
communications bill in 2003, seeking (and gaining) assurances, amongst other things, 
that plurality concerns could not be used to block mergers if they met existing 
ownership rules and that there was not going to be a u-turn in the new Channel Five 
ownership policy” (Freedman, 2008, p118)   
 
Much debate surrounded the proposed removal of existing media ownership 
restrictions.  Doyle and Vick (1999, p85) state that “some took the view that 
deregulatory measures which, for the first time, allow major newspaper proprietors to 
acquire Channel 5 or national radio broadcasting licences were unjustified and 
represented ‘appeasement’ of News International.”  Faced with major delays in 
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implementing the legislation as a result of the dissent, the Government looked to 
compromise with the most influential of the dissenters, Lord Puttnam, who had tabled 
a number of proposed amendments to the draft bill.   
 
Faced with considerable support for Puttnam’s proposed amendments, the 
government agreed to accept the principle of his plan, providing he agreed to drop the 
exact wording of his proposal; the inclusion of the plurality test was agreed.  However, 
even with such a test in place, many were sceptical about its robustness, particularly 
given the historic ability of proprietors such as Murdoch to persuade prime ministers 
to waive protocol in their favour.  Freedman explains: 
 
 “The problem is that such a test is unlikely to be robust enough to withstand pressure 
from either politicians or astute media barons.  The test requires the Secretary of State 
to judge whether there are sufficient public interest considerations arising from a 
particular merger to recommend further action” (2008, p119).   
 
As Feintuck and Varney summarise, “while the 2003 Act has changed the statutory 
basis on which intervention in relation to newspaper takeovers and mergers takes 
place, it does not seem to have had any significant impact on the problems revealed 
by [the] historical survey” (2013 p134). 
 
It can be argued that Feintuck and Varney were eventually proved wrong in respect of 
Murdoch’s attempts to acquire the remaining shares he did not already own in BSkyB.  
At his first attempt during 2010/11, the public interest plurality test introduced by the 
Puttnam amendment was invoked, and it took several months for an investigation to 
be undertaken; long enough for the phone-hacking revelations come to light and the 
deal to be dropped by Murdoch.  In 2018, Murdoch made a second attempt at the deal 
and, again, the plurality test was invoked and prevented a full takeover; Sky was 
subsequently purchased by Comcast 
 
- Communications Act 2003  
  
In July 2003, the New Labour government introduced the Communications Act 2003, 
superseding the 1984 Telecommunications Act and updating the preceding 
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Broadcasting Acts in a sweeping piece of legislation designed to acknowledge 
convergence across media.  The Act followed a number of years of consultations, 
Green and White Papers and drafts (as discussed), culminating in a piece of legislation 
that was expected to have far-reaching effects on the media and telecommunications 
sectors.  The Act brought about the following key changes for the media sector: 
 
Ofcom 
The new ’super-regulator’ Ofcom was created, assuming the powers of five existing 
regulatory bodies: the Office of Telecommunications (Oftel), the Independent 
Television Commission (ITC), the Broadcasting Standards Commission, the Radio 
Authority, and the Radio Communications Agency.  Ofcom was also given concurrent 
powers with the Office of Fair Trading for the entirety of the communications sector in 
relation to breaches of the Competition Act 1998 and investigations commissioned 
under the Enterprise Act 2002. 
 
Media ownership reform 
The Act brought in changes to help promote competition and investment in the media 
market, while also introducing a ‘plurality test’, whereby a public interest test would be 
carried out in the event of a ‘qualifying merger’ involving broadcasters.  The Secretary 
of State was given the power to intervene in a merger where it was deemed to impact 
plurality.  In the event of the test being applied, Ofcom was expected to report on the 
public interest considerations, and the matter could be referred to the competition 
authorities for a final decision. 
 
Foreign ownership   
The Act removed restrictions on foreign ownership of ITV, Channel 5 and all local and 
national AM and FM radio stations (note: digital radio stations did not have any such 
ownership restrictions in place). 
 
Cross-media ownership  
Under the Communications Act, a national newspaper group was allowed to purchase 
Channel 5 providing they passed the plurality test.  However, national newspaper 
groups remained prohibited from purchasing ITV.  A parallel rule was applied to local 
newspapers and their local ITV service.  
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Public service 
The Act required the BBC, Channels 3, 4 and 5, and teletext to fulfil a public service 
remit.  Ofcom was afforded the power to discipline the broadcasters should they be 
found to be failing in this remit.  
 
The 2003 Act followed a number of draft bills and debates, but it was the 2000 White 
Paper that saw the first real indication of the government’s intentions to implement 
changes to media ownership rules (Freedman, 2008).  This White Paper, titled ‘A New 
Future for Communications’, stated the need “to create a new system for the regulation 
of media ownership which is appropriate to fast-changing, modern market conditions” 
(DTI/DCS, 2000, p36).  The following year, the government launched a consultation 
into media ownership rules which “attempted to strike a balance between the need for 
continuing safeguards on ownership and concentration and a more liberalised 
environment for media mergers” (Freedman, 2013, p241).  Doyle and Vick (2005) 
assessed that the strategy deployed by the New Labour government at the time of the 
implementation of the 2003 Communications Act derived from three basic principles: 
that the commercial media in the UK needed new sources of investment; that the 
source of this investment was unimportant so long as effective content regulation that 
assured quality and diversity was in place; and that ownership rules should reflect the 
reality of a global market place. 
 
Feintuck and Varney (2013) consider the provisions of section 373 of the 2003 Act, 
which repealed the provisions of the Fair Trading Act and applied those of the 2002 
Enterprise Act in the context of newspapers.  The Act was deemed by many at the 
time to be a move towards ‘deregulation’ that was in favour of media proprietors.  The 
repeal of these rules under the 2003 Communications Act caused considerable debate 
as it potentially opened the door to major conglomerates, such as Rupert Murdoch’s, 
to operate a Channel 5 licence.  Doyle and Vick state “in doing so, the government 
ignored concerns about the potential anti-competitive implications of ‘cross-platform’ 
promotion (for example, the promotion of programming available on Murdoch-
controlled Channel 5 by Murdoch’s BSkyB or newspapers owned by Murdoch’s News 
International)” (2005, p12).  It was a clear shift in policy direction at the time, and in 
stark contrast to what had existed previously.   
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The government consultation on media ownership rules stated that “Whilst the need 
for a plurality of media sources remains clear, we are committed to a deregulatory 
approach to media markets” (2005, p7).  The approach was aimed at increasing 
efficiency and making the product cheaper for the consumer, as “further liberalisation 
would benefit existing companies and potential news investors, providing for further 
consolidation, more scope for investment, and a more significant international 
presence” (op.cit). The consideration of consolidation is often fraught with complexity 
in any industry as the nature of a market and economies of scale can often lend 
themselves to the argument for an oligopolistic structure.  However, as is explored in 
more detail within this thesis, it can be argued that the media cannot be considered in 
the same way as a typical product, and so there is a need for special provisions within 
legislation to ensure plurality.   
 
Hesmondhalgh describes the 2003 Communications Act as “without doubt the most 
important piece of British communications legislation since the 1990 Broadcasting Act” 
(2006, p96).  Both Acts are considered to have been greatly influenced by 
conglomerates and lobbyists, and both prime ministers Margaret Thatcher, of the 
Conservatives, and Tony Blair, of Labour, have been widely recorded as having 
enjoyed personal friendships with Rupert Murdoch that were suspected of having had 
an influence over the development of the legislation.  Hesmondhalgh writes that 
“Labour media policy had traditionally been pro-public service broadcasting, and in 
favour of significant controls over media ownership and behaviour” (2006, p100)   Such 
an approach was not apparent in the 2003 Act. 
   
- Ofcom (2003) 
In line with the deregulatory approach, following the 2003 Communications Act, the 
functions of five separate media related regulatory bodies were combined to form the 
Office of Communications (Ofcom).  Corner explains that the “body follows the broad 
model of ‘oversight’ bodies set up to monitor the performance of once publicly-owned 
services that have now been privatised” (2010, p146)  Collins (1997) explains that 
“Ofcom was also the institutional culmination of a significant shift in the focus of UK 
television regulation, away from the allocation of relatively scarce spectrum to achieve 
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public service objectives and towards the control of market power to facilitate free 
market competition” (cited in Smith, 2006, p929).   
 
Smith notes the extensive debate at the time of Ofcom’s proposed inception, with one 
side considering that a single regulator across all of the telecommunications markets 
would ensure consistency, and the other (including the BBC) concerned to make sure 
that “the need to ensure that any changes to the existing regulatory system would not 
prioritise narrow economic concerns over the wider public interest and that the main 
tenets of public service broadcasting would be preserved into the digital age” (2006, 
p929).  In light of the BBC being publicly funded, it was not within Ofcom’s mandate to 
enforce any form of governance over the PSB, and it was felt by many of the private 
media corporations that were ‘within scope’ of Ofcom’s regulatory oversight that “there 
was no direct competitor in size and reach to the BBC” (Corner, 2010, p142), given 
that commercial broadcasting was set up as a regional rather than national venture.  
Smith asserts that the establishment of Ofcom was not a mere ‘tidy up’, but rather a 
shift in focus shaped by the following: “(1) UK commercial media interests and their 
attempts to use convergence to justify deregulation; (2) New Labour’s commitment to 
free market principles and policy innovation; (3) a regulatory ‘turf war’ between the ITC 
and Oftel; and (4) bargaining between rival departments within the Labour 
government” (2006, p937). 
Self-regulation (press) 
 
- General Council of the Press (1953) 
 
O’Malley and Soley (2000) outline the history of press self-regulation, noting that it 
originally derived from the 1930s when the first instance of concern about the power 
of the press in the UK was recorded.  The Political and Economic Planning group 
(PEP) was set up, comprising a number of individuals from academic and industrial 
backgrounds, and produced a report that outlined concerns regarding considerable 
intrusion into private lives and personal affairs.  The recommendation was for self-
regulation rather than statutory regulation, and the report stated: “It should consist of 
a chairman commanding unqualified general confidence, for his judicia gifts, with two 
assessors drawn from representative panels of proprietors and of journalists.  The 
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tribunal would need no legislative authority and could be launched with a widely 
published appeal to the public from the Press that anyone feeling aggrieved by alleged 
journalistic intrusion should lay a complaint before it” (cited in O’Malley and Soley, 
2000, p52).   
 
Issues of press control and power continued to be considered by the government, and 
in 1946, a Press Commission was set up to look at “ownership and control, financing, 
the tendencies towards monopoly, and the influence of financial and advertising 
interests on the distortion and suppression of news” (O’Malley and Soley, 2000, pp52-
53).  By 1948, the Commission, while not making recommendations pertaining to 
ownership, did agree to a General Council of the Press.  The council was to comprise 
a number of people from the press industry (including proprietors, editors and 
journalists), and a small number of ‘lay’ members.  The objectives of the General 
Council, as outlined in 1948, were as follows: “The objects of the General Council 
should be to safeguard the freedom of the Press; to encourage the growth of a sense 
of public responsibility and public service amongst all engaged in the profession of 
journalism – that is, in the editorial production of newspapers – whether as directors, 
editors or other journalists; and to further the efficiency of the profession and the well-
being of those who practices it” (O’Malley and Bromley, 1997, p150).  The objectives 
included ten points that outlined specific actions or areas of work that the council 
should undertake.   
 
However, O’Malley and Soley (2000) note that the major points that featured heavily 
in subsequent debate related to the prescribed need for a layperson chair and 20% 
layperson membership.  Furthermore, the objectives called for the council to promote 
training, public responsibility and public service.  “To do this it would need to monitor 
developments on press freedom issues, censure undesirable practice, build up a code 
of conduct, consider complaints from the public and act as the public face of the press 
in dealings with the government and international agencies” (O’Malley and Soley, 
2000, p55).   
 
Despite the outline of these objectives, the newspaper proprietors were not keen to 
implement the recommendations; it was not until 1 July 1953 that the General Council 
of the Press met for the first time.  O’Malley and Soley state that “It was an essentially 
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negative response to a positive recommendation by the Royal Commission and the 
Labour Cabinet.  It was Labour and Liberal pressure during 1952 that pushed the 
government into bringing the proprietors around to a compromise.   
 
While the delay testified to the power of the proprietors, it also helped nurture the idea 
that in the end statutory means might be needed to impose standards” (2000, p58).  
When the council was set up in 1953, it had 25 members, all from the newspaper 
industry (including from unions), and no lay members at all, and included the following 
clause: “provided that in dealing with representations which it may receive about the 
conduct of the Press or of any persons towards the Press, the Council shall be required 
to consider only those from complainants actually affected, and shall deal with such in 
whatever manner may seem to it practical and appropriate” (O’Malley and Bromley, 
1997, p314).   
 
- Press Council (1963) 
 
In 1961, a Royal Commission on the Press was announced, chaired by Lord 
Shawcross, with the aim of investigating the General Council of the Press, and in 
particular concerns about witnesses and criminals being paid for stories.  The result 
was the implementation of a number of recommendations that were closely aligned to 
the original objectives proposed for the General Council of the Press.  These included 
the appointment of a lay chairperson, 20% of the council’s membership to be people 
from outside the industry, and an increase in its operating budget.  The Commission 
also found that the General Council of the Press had not been set up in such a way 
that it had sufficient power to monitor changes in newspaper ownership, and that 
overall, the recommendations from the first Commission had not been properly 
implemented.  “Nothing substantial had happened to stem disturbing practices by the 
newspapers.   
 
In February 1967 complaints about chequebook journalism reappeared in the House 
of Commons in a debate on the economic malaise of the industry… In March 1968 
Edwin Brooks MP asked for legislation to force the publication of details of payments 
to witnesses, and later another MP pressed for a law to curb invasions of privacy by 
long-range cameras and TV equipment.  Both requests were refused by the 
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government” (O’Malley and Soley, 2000, p67).   
 
The council had a reputation as a body that did not enforce its own rules.  For example, 
Murdoch (who had recently purchased the News of the World) refused to attend a 
hearing of the Press Council about stories that were believed to be in contravention of 
the council’s rules.  In 1970, a third Commission was set up, chaired by Kenneth 
Younger, prompted by continued concerns with regard to privacy and the press.  The 
committee produced a report in 1972 that was “highly critical of the Press Council and 
its seeming inability to command the confidence of the British public” (Leveson, 2012, 
p202).   
 
The report made a number of recommendations, including the repeated 
recommendation that the Council increase its percentage of lay membership so as to 
improve its credibility amongst the British public.  It also recommended that 
newspapers publish any adjudications and build up a body of case law that could be 
understood and referred to by the industry (Leveson, 2012).   
 
The General Council of the Press was reformed as the Press Council on 1 July 1963.  
It amended its constitution to remove reference to training and technological 
development, and to focus more on dealing with complaints about the press: “To 
consider complaints about the conduct of the Press or the conduct of persons and 
organisations towards the Press; to deal with these complaints in whatever manner 
might seem practical and appropriate and record resultant action” (O’Malley and Soley 
2000, p64).  The council increased its lay membership to ten (half the number of 
industry representatives) and made minor changes to include lay membership on its 
Complaints Committee.   
 
Leveson notes that the reforms of the council “did not encompass the most significant 
of the recommendations made in the Younger Report… the performance of the Press 
Council was regarded by the Government of the day as so inadequate that, within a 
year of publication of Sir Kenneth Younger’s report, not only was a third Royal 
Commission on the Press established, but it was given an express remit to examine 
in detail ‘the responsibilities, constitution and functioning of the Press Council’” (2012, 
p202).   
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In 1974, a further Royal Commission on the Press was established, chaired by 
Professor Oliver MacGregor (later Lord MacGregor).  The commission had a broad 
remit and was asked to “inquire into the factors affecting the maintenance of the 
independence, diversity and editorial standards of newspapers and periodicals and 
the public freedom of choice of newspapers and periodicals, nationally, regionally and 
locally” (Royal Commission on the Press, ppi-ii).  Its report was ultimately undecided 
on the best version of regulation of the press.   
 
However, it was “unequivocal in its criticism of the Press Council both as a regulator 
of press standards and as able to provide appropriate means of redress” (Leveson, 
2012, p203).  Aligned with recommendations made by previous commissions, the 
MacGregor Report recommended reforms to the Press Council, including proper 
adjudications to be published by the offending newspaper.  Furthermore, it was 
recommended that the Press Council should seek to ensure adjudications were 
published swiftly and, where appropriate, on the front page.  The report also suggested 
that, should the industry not respond and implement the recommendations in a timely 
manner, a statutory solution might need to be sought.   
 
- Press Complaints Commission (1991) 
 
O’Malley and Soley assert that the “mixture of recalcitrance and delay, public and 
official criticism meant that in its first 20 years the Press Council was unable to 
persuade enough people that, as a body, it was intended to, or could, deliver higher 
standards” (2000, p70).  The political events that took place between 1987 and 1993 
were particularly important for press regulation and included three attempts at a 
statutory right of reply, two attempts at a privacy bill, two government-initiated inquiries 
into press self-regulation, and ultimately the collapse of the Press Council.   
 
The first of the attempts at a statutory right of reply was launched by a Labour MP, 
aiming to give members of the public the right of reply against allegations made about 
them in the press.  The bill also looked to introduce a ‘Media Complaints Commission’ 
which would have the power to order the publication of a correction and could enforce 
this by a High Court order if necessary.  This came about at a time when a 
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Conservative MP had presented a ‘right to privacy’ bill, which led to debates in the 
House of Commons regarding unfair reporting in the press.  O’Malley and Soley state 
that while neither bill “received government support… they were important barometers 
of an intensifying dissatisfaction with self-regulation among MPs” (2000, p86).   
 
A further two bills were introduced on the same topics, albeit narrower in scope, and 
the bill pertaining to the right to privacy gained cross-party backbench support.  
O’Malley and Soley state that the bill posed an issue for the government, as it could 
not be seen to dismiss a further two bills, particularly when there was strong support, 
“but it was clearly unwilling to forge ahead, back the bills and thereby incur the wrath 
of the proprietors” (2000, p86).  Rather than progressing the bills, the government 
opted for another Committee, and so the Calcutt Inquiry was established in 1989.  
 
The Conservative government’s Calcutt Committee investigation into privacy and the 
behaviour of the press led to the creation of the PCC in 1991.  David Calcutt QC was 
asked to undertake a review of privacy in relation to the press, following which he 
recommended that the Press Council (the PCC’s predecessor) be disbanded and 
replaced by the PCC.  “Calcutt rehearsed the criticisms of the Press Council which 
were by now familiar to anyone who had an interest in the debates.  These included 
its ineffectiveness as an adjudicating body; its perceived lack of independence from 
the proprietors; its tendency to reject large numbers of complaints before adjudication; 
the lack of clarity in the way it classified complaints; the delay in getting adjudications 
in contested cases; and the lack of effective sanctions” (O’Malley and Soley, 2000, 
p88).   
The Calcutt Inquiry made a number of recommendations in its report, including the 
need for a code of practice to be published and monitored; the PCC would be smaller 
in size with an independent chair.  Calcutt also stipulated that, should the industry fail 
to comply with the recommendations in a timely manner or should there be ‘large-
scale flouting’ of the adjudications, the government should then establish a statutory 
body with statutory powers.  The inquiry suggested a 12-month time frame to 
implement the recommendations, which was backed by the government.   
 
The Board of the PCC was to consist of editors of the various UK press institutions 
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and was to be given 18 months before a review of its activities was undertaken.  
Unfortunately, the promise of the PCC’s mandate was not realised.  The Leveson 
Inquiry identified a number of failings that led to its recommendation for the PCC to 
cease practice and make way for a new body with a fit and proper framework 
stipulating its formation and structure.  The inquiry found that “too many stories in too 
many newspapers were the subject of complaints from too many people, with too little 
in the way of titles taking responsibility or considering the consequences for the 
individuals involved” (Leveson, 2012, p11).   
 
Furthermore, Leveson stated that “there is insufficient clarity about what is acceptable 
and what is not: that is also what the PCC was, or at least should have been, 
championing” (op.cit).  Leveson found that the PCC was not a regulator at all, but 
merely a complaint-handling body that lacked the independence to act or impose any 
kind of sanction or penalty that would act as sufficient deterrent to similar behaviour in 
future.  Ultimately, it was the Prime Minister who suggested the abolition of the body, 
with which Leveson agreed in his report (Leveson, 2012).   
 
- Independent Press Standards Organisation 
 
Following the disbandment of the PCC, a small number of the newspaper proprietors 
colluded to form IPSO.  IPSO gives its mission statement on its website as “We exist 
to promote and uphold the highest professional standards of journalism in the UK, and 
to support members of the public in seeking redress where they believe that the 
Editors' Code of Practice has been breached.8”  IPSO claims that it is able to consider 
concerns about editorial content in newspapers and magazines, and about the 
conduct of journalists: the core issue that came to light in the phone-hacking scandal, 
and what led to the widespread and in-depth review of the newspaper industry carried 
out by the Leveson Inquiry.   
 
To date, a vast number of local, regional and national publications have joined IPSO, 
 
8 www.ipso.co.uk  
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with the notable exceptions of the Guardian, the Financial Times and the Independent.  
IPSO operates an Editors’ Code of Practice Committee, though it has been criticised 
for not being independent of the publishers which run IPSO (one of the key 
recommendations of Leveson).  In its first incarnation, the committee installed Paul 
Dacre, previous editor of the Daily Mail, as its Chair.  This was somewhat ironic given 
that the Daily Mail provoked complaints for unethical behaviour three times more than 
any competing national title.   
 
In 2018 the campaign group Hacked Off published a document titled Thrown to the 
Wolves, which detailed much of the criticism of IPSO, including accounts of continued 
press abuse and harassment despite the revelations of bad and illegal practice 
unearthed by the Leveson Inquiry of 2012.  Referring to the Kerslake Report, published 
in 2017 as part of a review of the 2017 bombings at Manchester Arena, Hacked Off 
reported that, despite there being copious amounts of evidence of press intrusion and 
harassment of the victims and their families, “IPSO continued to turn a blind eye.  A 
serious regulator would have launched investigations, but IPSO has not launched a 
single one in its four years of operation” (Hacked Off, 2018, p18).  Hacked Off likened 
the criticism to earlier complaints about the General Council of the Press, the Press 
Council, and the PCC: “IPSO, like its predecessors, is dominated by the big press 
corporations that control it and wrote its rulebook” (2018, p18).    
 
Summary 
 
This potted history of press regulation demonstrates that, time and again, the UK’s 
newspaper proprietors have defied commissions and enquiries to escape proper 
scrutiny for breaches of their own codes.  This remains true to the present day despite 
decades of attempted reforms.  It also demonstrates that successive governments of 
all political persuasions have not been prepared to take on the power of press barons, 
even when the public interest has demanded some kind of political intervention.  The 
history of media policymaking in the UK is one of firm regulation of the broadcast 
industry but indulgence of the press, and this has been reflected in the history of media 
ownership policy too. 
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The Peacock Committee was one of the early examples of Murdoch's alleged collusion 
with a Prime Minister (then, Margaret thatcher), and of his attempts to undermine and 
destabilize the BBC.  It was not necessarily an example of Murdoch using the power 
of his press holdings to influence political opinion on the matter; Murdoch was 
fortunate in that thatcher shared his ideological misgivings about the BBC.  However, 
he did use the popularity of his press, notably The Times, to run a campaign attacking 
the BBC that helped to legitimise Thatcher’s own campaign, orchestrated via the 
setting up of the Peacock Committee.   
 
The 1990 Broadcasting Act, also introduced under the Thatcher government, provides 
yet another example of Murdoch’s relationship with a Prime Minister providing great 
advantages to his business.  The 1990 Act prevented Murdoch from broadcasting Sky 
Television in the UK based on scarcity; looking to appease Murdoch, Thatcher’s 
government allowed him to broadcast on the basis that SKY was broadcast from a 
Luxembourg owned satellite, and therefore the UK scarcity restrictions did not apply. 
This paved the way for Murdoch’s entry into the UK broadcast industry, and the 
significant expansion of his business in the UK.  These events also saw Murdoch use 
the power of his press for the purpose of cross-promotion. 
 
The history of the press ‘self-regulation’ points to multiple attempts to create a 
framework and code of practice according to which the press should operate, but that 
to date has proven unsuccessful.  Over the years and under the regulatory framework 
of the Press Council, PCC, and IPSO, Murdoch’s UK press has continued to be able 
to spread disinformation and heavily criticise the BBC and (to a lesser extent) Ofcom 
in such a way that is entirely at odds with the editorial codes such regulatory bodies 
are supposed to oversee.   
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Chapter Six: Recent Policy and Regulatory Developments 
 
This chapter examines more recent developments and events in policy and regulation 
that are relevant to the media markets in which Murdoch’s organisations and the BBC 
operate.  These events are important in the context of this thesis as they speak to the 
continuing issues surrounding policy and regulation that have had the potential to 
effect Murdoch’s business, and how he has responded.  Furthermore, and more 
importantly, a number of the select committees and inquiries highlight further 
examples of Murdoch’s attitude towards the BBC and regulators, and how even in 
recent years he has continued to see to de-stabilise and undermine the BBC.   
 
This chapter will consider a number of House of Lords Select Committees and Ofcom 
investigation into ownership of the news and media plurality, all of which Murdoc’s 
organisation has responded to, noting the ‘critical’ need for the BBC to be included in 
any such review.  It will also examine Murdoch’s bid for the remaining shares in BskyB 
that he did not already own and the resistance he met from the regulators in that 
process. It will then go on to look at the phone hacking scandal that brought the whole 
thing to a halt, and the subsequent evidence provided to the Leveson Inquiry into the 
phone hacking scandal, much of which dealt with Murdoch’s business practices and 
his relationships with politicians.   
 
2008 House of Lords Select Committee on Communications: Ownership of the News 
 
In June 2008, the House of Lords Select Committee on Communications published 
the report of its inquiry into media ownership, titled The Ownership of the News, its 
summary stating: “We have proposed changes to the regulation governing ownership, 
but do not believe that by themselves media ownership laws are sufficient to ensure 
our aim of a diversity of voices in the news.  We believe that public service 
broadcasting has a continuing and vital role to play” (2008, p6).  Thus, it signalled clear 
recognition of the principle that consolidation could constitute a threat to plurality, while 
also concluding that the BBC was a key institution with a vital role to play in ensuring 
diversity and providing informative and balanced information.   
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The Select Committee took a strong stance on the upkeep and continued investment 
in the BBC, stating that it “occupies a pivotal position in news and current affairs and 
it is vital that nothing be done to diminish that role” (2008 op. cit.).  The report also 
recognised the special consideration that needs to be given when examining the 
ownership of the news, given the ‘special’ nature of the product, and that media 
ownership is “regulated differently to ownership of most other business activities 
because of media’s place in a healthy democracy” (2008, op. cit.) 
 
The report also recognised that, in light of the then pending switch-off of analogue TV 
and the potential loss of a significant amount of the indirect subsidies for commercial 
PSBs, that the BBC should not remain as the only PSB, to ensure consistent plurality.  
It recommended that Ofcom should be given the power to “ensure the quality of the 
news provided by the commercial public service broadcasters is maintained” (2008, 
op. cit.).  It had never been within the remit of Ofcom to comment on or examine the 
conduct or business of the BBC, as it was then governed by the independent BBC 
Trust, as laid out in the broadcaster’s Royal Charter.  However, the Select Committee 
saw the need for the extensive provision of public-service-minded content that 
promoted and upheld democratic expression.  
 
The report considered the public interest plurality test that was included in the 
Communications Act 2003, which requires that the test be applied to any media 
merger that is proposed.  The Select Committee found that the plurality test does not 
account for whether a proposed merger would have an adverse effect on 
newsgathering: an area that the committee noted had seen a ‘worrying trend’ of lack 
of investment.  The Select Committee also stated that “The criteria to be considered 
during the Public Interest Test for newspaper mergers in particular are far from 
comprehensive and are in need of review” (2008, p6).  It noted concern that the 
decision to issue a ‘public interest intervention notice’ remains solely with government 
ministers and recommended that Ofcom should be afforded the same power.   
 
2010-11 News Corporation Bid for BSkyB 
 
In 2010, Rupert Murdoch’s News Corporation made a bid to take full control of BSkyB, 
the UK’s largest satellite broadcaster, by acquiring the 60.9% shares it did not already 
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own.  At the time, Rupert Murdoch owned 40% of the voting shares in News Corp.  
News Corp owned 39% of BSkyB, with other people/entities holding the rest; James 
Murdoch was the chairman of BSkyB.  Rupert Murdoch sought the approval of the 
European Competition Commission in November 2010, and it approved the deal.  The 
size of the merger meant that the European Commission would take the lead in 
determining whether the deal would impact competition; the commission ruled that the 
merger would not significantly impede competition (Seely, 2017).  Following the 
European Commission’s decision, the Secretary of State for Business, Vince Cable, 
requested that Ofcom undertake its own investigation with regard to the impact the 
deal would have on media plurality in the UK.   
 
The proposed deal attracted a lot of press attention at the time, as well as widespread 
criticism given the percentage of the media markets in the UK that Murdoch already 
owned.  The LSE Media Policy Project stated that “News Corporation is the UK’s 
largest newspaper publisher, printing more than one in three copies sold.  Sky is the 
largest broadcaster, with turnover of £5.9bn against the BBC’s £4.8bn.  The Murdoch 
family say a merger makes good financial sense, but critics say it would create a media 
group of unprecedented power, in which newspapers could be bundled with a Sky 
subscription, or Sky Sports content could be shown exclusively on Times and Sun 
websites”9 (2011).   
 
The BBC’s then Business Editor, Robert Peston, stated that “if the deal did go ahead, 
it would ‘erase any scintilla of doubt that Mr Murdoch’s News Corporation would be 
the most powerful of all the traditional media groups in the UK”’10 (2010).  He added 
that the deal created a problem for the coalition government at the time (Conservatives 
and Liberal Democrats), given that Murdoch’s newspapers had been supportive of the 
Conservatives, but particularly hostile towards the Lib Dems.  
 
This was highly pertinent because the minister required to make a decision on whether 
to refer the deal to Ofcom on public interest grounds was the Business Secretary Vince 
Cable (Liberal Democrat).  Vince Cable was unknowingly recorded stating that he had 
 
9 https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mediapolicyproject/resources/dossier-media-plurality/ 
10 https://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/thereporters/robertpeston/2010/06/murdochs_londonbased_global_ne.html 
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‘declared war on Rupert Murdoch’11 (Robinson, Halliday and Mulholland, 2010). Once 
the declaration was revealed in the press, Vince Cable was stripped of his duties with 
regard to assessing the deal, and it was passed to Secretary of State for Culture, 
Media and Sport Jeremy Hunt (Conservative).   
 
It is interesting to note that the Murdoch press had remained virtually silent on the 
matter of Ofcom’s investigation into the proposed acquisition; whereas under normal 
circumstances it could be expected to see a measure of criticism in the Murdoch 
reporting on Ofcom, there was none at all during this time period.  The only criticism 
to be found was focused on Mr Cable.  At a time when Murdoch need Ofcom to find in 
his favour, his newspapers fell suitably quiet on the matter.  While this does not 
necessarily support the hypothesis that his newspapers maintain a negative agenda 
in their reporting on Ofcom, it does support the assertions that Murdoch uses his press 
to report in such a way that suits his corporate agenda.   
 
On 31 December 2010, Ofcom published its Report on Public Interest Test on the 
Proposed Acquisition of British Sky Broadcasting Group plc by News Corporation, in 
which it stated: 
 
“Full control would allow News Corp to take decisions involving Sky which are in the 
exclusive commercial interests of News Corp… we consider it would result in a 
reduction in the number of persons with control of media enterprises and that Sky 
would cease to be a distinct media enterprise… News Corp’s potential ability to 
influence would increase with the addition of Sky News, increasing its share of 
references from 12% to 22%.  News Corp’s reach as a percentage of regular news 
consumers would increase from 32% to 51%” (2010, p10).  
 
In its application of the public interest plurality test, Ofcom also noted that while 
multisourcing of news is important, it did not feel it can be relied on to ensure sufficient 
plurality.  Ofcom concluded that “we consider it reasonable to believe that the 
proposed acquisition may be expected to operate against the public interest since 
there may not be a sufficient plurality of persons with control of media enterprises 
 
11 https://www.theguardian.com/media/2010/dec/21/vince-cable-rupert-murdoch 
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providing news and current affairs to UK-wide cross-media audiences” (2010, p13)  
 
The Ofcom assessment recognised a number of factors considered in Chapter One: 
Media and Democracy with regard to the dangers of concentration of media ownership 
and the threat it poses to plurality and informing public opinion and debate.  
Furthermore, the report considers the issues of news in the ‘new digital environment’ 
(as explored in Chapter Two) regarding the complex and changing nature of news 
consumption that appears to retain its roots in the traditional news providers.   
 
Perhaps more notable on publication of this report were the concerns raised by those 
who engaged with Ofcom and submitted evidence and/or expert information regarding 
plurality that did not relate to the potential News Corp/BSkyB transaction.  Ofcom 
stated “These concerns arise from the rapid and far reaching changes that are taking 
place within the media as a result of technological advances and new business 
models” (2010, p91)  Considering the provision of the contemporary framework within 
which a public interest test in relation to media plurality was only triggered by the 
potential merger of two media organisations, Ofcom made the suggestion that “the 
current statutory framework may no longer be fully equipped to achieve Parliament’s 
objective of ensuring sufficient plurality of media ownership” (2010, p116).  Again, 
while somewhat ambiguous in the recommendation of what action should be taken, 
there is the clear assertion that the regulatory framework was not sufficient to 
adequately address the trend of convergence and consolidation within an already 
oligopolistic market structure.     
 
It was speculated that Jeremy Hunt would choose not to refer the proposed News 
Corp/BSkyB deal to the Competition Commission.  He accepted a number of 
undertakings from News Corp in lieu of the referral, including Sky News being spun 
off as an independent public limited company.  The undertakings, proposed by News 
Corp in an attempt to allay fears and avoid further referral and delay, would also 
include “a board made up of a majority of independent directors, including an 
independent chair, and a corporate governance and editorial committee made up of 
independent directors (who would have no other News Corporation interests).  News 
Corporation would not be allowed to increase its shareholding in the new company 
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without permission from the Secretary of State for 10 years”12 (Department for Digital, 
Culture, Media and Sport, and Hunt, 2011). 
 
After several months of further consultations about ‘undertakings in lieu’, Hunt was on 
the verge of allowing the merger through and fulfilling Murdoch’s dream of full 
ownership of BSkyB.  With just days to go before the final decision was due, the details 
of the Murdoch-owned News of the World newspaper’s involvement in illegal phone 
hacking were revealed, and Prime Minister David Cameron announced a public inquiry 
to be led by Lord Justice Leveson (explored further in the next section).  In light of the 
public outcry that followed, and in an attempt to defuse the situation, Murdoch closed 
the News of the World and made a public apology.  Facing a motion in the House of 
Commons that the merger should be stopped, which was almost certain to pass, News 
Corp withdrew its bid for BSkyB.    
 
2011-12 Leveson Inquiry 
 
The Leveson Inquiry into the culture, practices and ethics of the press, set up in the 
light of revelations about phone hacking, was a wide-ranging investigation into 
allegations of illegality, inappropriate relationships between the press and the 
Metropolitan Police, and the adequacy of Britain’s framework for media plurality. 
Underlying it were serious questions about the concentration – and abuse – of power 
in the media. After a year of written evidence and oral statements from newspaper 
editors, proprietors (including Murdoch), victims of press abuse and other interested 
parties, Leveson produced a final report of four volumes covering, amongst much else, 
Rupert Murdoch’s business practices and relationships with politicians and those in 
power.   
 
As part of its terms of reference, the Leveson Inquiry was to make recommendations 
as follows: 
 
“a. for a new more effective policy and regulatory regime which supports the integrity 
and freedom of the press, the plurality of the media, and its independence, including 
 
12 https://www.gov.uk/government/news/news-corporation-bskyb-merger-3-march-2011 
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from government, the prosecuting authorities and the police; 
 
b. for how future concerns about press behaviour, media policy, regulation and cross-
media ownership should be dealt with by all the relevant authorities, including 
parliament, government, the prosecuting authorities and the police; 
 
c. the future conduct of relations between politicians and the press; and 
 
d. the future conduct of relations between the police and the press”13 (Leveson, 2012).  
 
Despite the inquiry being prompted by the phone-hacking revelations, Leveson’s remit 
went much wider than just unlawful press behaviour; it was recognised to be about 
press power, and more specifically about too much power being concentrated in the 
hands of Rupert Murdoch.    
 
In a very thorough approach to understanding the historical evidence around the 
exercise of power by the Murdoch empire, the inquiry looked as far back as the 1980s 
and included evidence about Murdoch’s purchase of the Times and Sunday Times in 
1981, and his relationship with Margaret Thatcher at the time.  It referred to previous 
inquiries on press behaviour and regulation, in particular the 1990 report by a 
committee chaired by Sir David Calcutt QC which called for improvements in press 
accountability, and Calcutt’s follow-up report concluding that there had been 
insufficient change.   
 
In the executive summary of the final report, Leveson states that “for the seventh time 
in less than 70 years, a report has been commissioned by the Government which has 
dealt with concerns about the press.  It was sparked by public revulsion about a single 
action” (2012, p3).  Leveson qualifies the inclusion of the relationship between the 
press and police given “public concern that the police had become too close to the 
press in general, and News International in particular, with the result that the 
investigation of phone hacking had not been conducted with the rigour that it deserved” 
(2012, p3).  Leveson notes the reasoning behind the inclusion of politicians as being 
 
13 https://www.discoverleveson.com/Resource/TermsOfReference 
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“notably because of the political consensus from the Government and Opposition 
parties that politicians had been too close to the press but also because of concerns 
about the bid by News Corporation for the remaining shares in BSkyB plc” (op.cit).  
 
The report makes a total of 92 recommendations, 47 of which related to a revised 
regulatory model for the British press.  Leveson (2012) states in his report that the 
principle of a free press operates as a cornerstone of UK democracy, and as such the 
press is afforded ‘significant and special rights’. However, the inquiry found that the 
press responsibilities “on which the public so heavily rely, have simply been ignored” 
(Leveson, 2012, p4).  It notes a similar finding to so many inquiries and reports on the 
media and the press the came before Leveson: that “there is a cultural tendency within 
parts of the press vigorously to resist or dismiss complainants almost as a matter of 
course.  Securing an apology, a correction or other appropriate redress, even when 
there can be no argument, becomes drawn out and difficult” (op. cit.).  Leveson 
recognised that the criticisms levied against the British press applied only to some 
newspapers, and only some of the time; however, where the failings did occur, they 
were serious.   
 
Barnett and Townsend (2014) explain that the Leveson Inquiry heard from leading 
figures from the past 25 years of government who all put forward arguments for the 
need for substantial change in media policy to address matters of ownership.  Barnett 
and Townsend cite former Prime Minister John Major as being “convinced that 
parliament needed to act”, and Cameron as admitting that the relationship between 
government and Rupert Murdoch had been “too close” for many years, and under both 
parties of government (Barnett and Townsend, 2014, p168).  Despite the extensive 
evidence with regard to the influence of Murdoch and his News International 
newspapers over a number of prime ministers, who provided said evidence directly, 
there is little to suggest that anything has changed since the inquiry: 
 
“The urgency and anger which defined debates in the summer of 2011, when senior 
politicians rushed to apologise for their proximity to media proprietors, have subsided.  
Meanwhile, News UK (originally News International) launched the Sun on Sunday in 
February 2012, thus restoring News Corp’s 36 per cent of national newspaper 
circulation in the UK” (Barnett and Townsend, 2014, p167).  
 117 
 
 
Despite Lord Justice Leveson and others urging the government to go ahead with part 
two of the inquiry, Culture Secretary Matt Hancock announced in February 2018 that 
it was cancelled.  An attempt to overturn this decision in the House of Commons was 
made in May 2018, but it failed by nine votes. 
 
2012 Ofcom report – Measuring Media Plurality   
 
In October 2011, Secretary of State Jeremy Hunt MP once again requested that 
Ofcom produce a report titled Media Plurality, specifically relating to five questions 
around the measurement and framework for ensuring plurality, what should trigger a 
public interest test, and whether the BBC should be considered within the scope of 
any form of review.  The methodology deployed included an invitation to comment, to 
which Ofcom received 50 responses, including from various media organisations and 
campaign groups.   
 
The report concerned itself only with news and current affairs, and asserted that it 
should not look at the differing areas of media in silo, but should take a holistic view of 
the market, including the provision of news online: “Online news, in a wide variety of 
forms, is used by a significant and rapidly growing proportion of the UK population.  It 
is a dynamic and diverse sector.  Online should be included in a plurality review” 
(Ofcom, 2012, p2).  While positive that the government wanted the regulator to 
recognise the need to include online provision of news in any kind of plurality review, 
the House of Lords Select Committee on Communications recognised the 
considerable challenge given that the “millions of access points around the world adds 
to the practical difficulties of regulating internet content, even if it was deemed 
desirable” (2014, p10).   
 
In building the report Ofcom invited comment from the industry and other interested 
parties.  The BBC responded, noting the challenges the news media sector faces in 
light of the ‘erosion of traditional business models’ and the fragmentation of audiences.  
In spite of that, the BBC stated that “On any metric the BBC is a leading provider of 
news in the UK, It delivers significant public benefits through the universal availability 
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of well-funded, high quality news” (BBC, 2012, p1-2)14.  While the BBC noted its 
funding model being one that means it is free of the commercial pressure other news 
organisations experience, the BBC maintained its position that it should not be a 
‘trigger’ for a or ‘subject’ of any new plurality regulation (Op Cit).   
 
News Corporation also provided a response to Ofcom’s invitation to comment.  It's 
core views on the matter were stated as:  
 
“Markets are working and the trend continues to be towards greater plurality rather 
than less plurality…The existing regulatory regime provides adequate protection for 
plurality… Considerable care should be taken when attempting to use quantitative 
metrics to assess the sufficiency of plurality… The role of the BBC and the availability 
of news on all platforms must be taken into account” (News Corp, 2012, p2)15.   
 
The Ofcom report made recommendations regarding the potential triggers for a review 
of plurality within the UK where there is not a proposed merger.  Ofcom ascertained 
that reviews should be undertaken every four to five years and should not be “triggered 
by metrics or complaints, nor do we believe there should be scope for discretion to 
trigger a review between the fixed period reviews” (2012, p2).  A regular and periodic 
review of plurality is logically sound, as it allows for continuous and refreshed 
monitoring of the media landscape.   
 
However, in the absence of ‘metrics or complaints’, significant acquisitions or 
developments could take place that are not subjected to proper consideration or a 
public interest test.  That said, at the time of writing, there is no measure in place to 
trigger the need for a plurality review unless there is a proposed merger.  Ofcom did 
recognise the impact on the market of overengineering review processes and that “the 
regulatory framework needs to be consistent and avoid a double jeopardy outcome” 
(op.cit).  
 
Perhaps more notable than Ofcom’s lack of any substantive recommendation for 
 
14 https://www.ofcom.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0024/51468/bbc.pdf 
15 https://www.ofcom.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0020/69311/news-corporation.pdf 
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plurality reviews in the absence of mergers were its suggestions in response to Jeremy 
Hunt’s question “Is it practical or advisable to set absolute limits on new market 
share?16” (cited by Ofcom, 2012).  Ofcom considered that limits could be set in the 
form of a ‘prohibited share’, whereby a simple, binary rule that is clear and definitive 
would be put in place.  However, having considered this, Ofcom in fact observed that 
“setting absolute limits leaves no room to take account of the broader context”17 
(Ofcom, 2012).  Ofcom did not consider setting such limits to be advisable as “this 
creates a risk that it is not possible to address issues of commercial sustainability and 
innovation in an appropriate manner” (op.cit).   
 
The lack of a recommendation on the setting of definitive limits does nothing to 
encourage the sitting government to seriously consider the issue.  The government is 
not obliged to act upon the recommendations of the regulator, but the pressure mounts 
where such independent bodies suggest legislation that is in the public interest.  
Ofcom’s subsequent report later in the same year, titled Report to Secretary of State 
on the Operation of the Media Ownership Rules Listed under Section 391 of the 
Communications Act 2003, again did nothing to push for regulatory change. In 
considering the 20/20 rule (whereby a newspaper group with more than 20% of a 
national newspaper share is prohibited from acquiring more than 20% of a Channel 3 
licence), it merely recommended that it was for “Parliament to decide if and when this 
rule should be modified or removed” (Ofcom, 2012b, p3).   
 
2012 House of Lords Select Committee commission report on The Future of 
Investigative Journalism’ 
 
In 2012, the House of Lords Select Committee on Communications published the 
report titled The Future of Investigative Journalism.  The report was written when the 
Leveson Inquiry was under way, and as such did not look to solutions around “the 
greatest political media scandal of a generation” (House of Lords Select Committee 
on Communications, 2012, p5).  What it did do was look to consider “the media 
landscape in which investigative journalism operated and argues that any changes 
 
16 https://www.ofcom.org.uk/about-ofcom/latest/media/media-releases/2012/ofcom-publishes-report-on-measuring-media-plurality 
17 https://www.ofcom.org.uk/about-ofcom/latest/media/media-releases/2012/ofcom-publishes-report-on-measuring-
media-plurality 
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should not be rooted in the past but should seek to enable responsible investigative 
journalism to flourish in the future” (op.cit). The report recognised the importance of 
investigative journalism in the context of a democracy and the vital role it plays in 
holding power to account.  However, it also recognised how poorly the press has 
behaved in the United Kingdom, and the failings of existing policy and lack of 
legislation to ensure appropriate behaviours and practices amongst the press.   
 
The report urged the “prosecuting authorities to publish their broad approach to 
determining which cases should be prosecuted or otherwise in cases where illegal 
activity undertaken by journalists in the course of an investigation might be considered 
to be in the public interest” (House of Lords Select Committee on Communications, 
2012, p68).  Additionally, it urged media organisations to implement processes to 
formally record their investigations of stories, and their decision to publish based on it 
being in the public interest.  It recommended that any fines imposed on a media 
organisation should be paid and placed into an ‘investigative journalism fund’ that 
would be used to fund investigations and/or training so as to ensure investigative 
journalism can continue.   
 
2014 House of Lords Select Committee on Communications report on Media Plurality 
 
In 2013, the Select Committee on Communications initiated an inquiry into media 
plurality in the UK.  This committee in particular recognised the growing feeling of 
discontent with the plurality framework in the UK, referencing the numerous 
committees and inquiries set up to look into the issues surrounding the media, and the 
ever-present need for reform: “The focus placed on plurality across these various fora 
might create the expectation that a consensus is forming and that momentum is now 
building behind reform.  However, plurality has been rather absent from recent 
debates” (House of Lords Select Committee on Communications, 2014, p5). 
 
The not-for-profit activism-based organisation Avaaz organised a petition that was 
signed by 52,000 members of the British public that called for a 20% cap on sector by 
sector ownership.  In its submission, Avaaz stated that “Regulation of how the media 
operates cannot is not sufficient [sic] to solve this problem.  Phone hacking, bribery, 
obtaining private medical records – the tales of press misconduct reported to Leveson 
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are all already illegal under British law.  What allowed these transgressions to take 
place was not a lack of rules against them, but a media empire that had grown so large 
as to feel immune from them”18 (Avaaz, 2014, p4).  Rather than approaching the issue 
from the typical perspective of a lack of policy and regulation to deal with unruly 
behaviour, Avaaz considered that the issue is actually that larger media 
conglomerates become so powerful, they no longer feel the need to adhere to the 
rules.   
 
The Leveson Inquiry and the Select Committee’s inquiry both revealed the 
fundamental issue to be concentration of media ownership.  While it has been the 
focus of many previous policy discussions, it was perhaps the notoriety of the events 
of the phone-hacking scandal and the Leveson Inquiry that acted as a catalyst and 
raised the profile of the issue.  Furthermore, as previously discussed, it is no longer 
enough to simply review the market share of any one conglomerate.  There now exists 
the need to examine cross-ownership, audience reach, and acquisitions of online 
spaces, aggregators and gatekeepers.   
 
The BBC argued this very point in its written evidence to the Select Committee: “The 
BBC has argued that measuring media plurality cannot be confined to any single 
measure, such as market share, but should reflect a ‘basket’ of measures.  These 
should include available voices, concentration of market (e.g. share of revenues and 
of news consumption including reach and share), ‘multisourcing’, and internal (as well 
as external) plurality” (2014, p70).  
 
Rupert Murdoch’s News Corporation also provided evidence to the enquiry (2014, 
p661)19.  In summarising its views, News Corporation stated: 
 
“Plurality is and can be delivered through market forces…. Any consideration of 
plurality must consider both all providers of news and current affairs, whatever their 
legal status, and all distribution channels used by them.  Otherwise, any conclusions 
 
18 https://www.parliament.uk/documents/lords-
committees/communications/Mediaplurality/MediaPluralityEvidence.pdf 
19 https://www.parliament.uk/documents/lords-committees/communications-and-
digital/Mediaplurality/MediaPluralityEvidence.pdf 
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on plurality will inevitably be distorted, being based on a partial analysis of the range 
and variety of voices available to consumers.”   
 
News Corporations comments were clearly aimed at the BBC, alluding to the fact that 
they must too be considered as part of a media plurality review.  This follows the 
longstanding position Rupert Murdoch has taken with regard to the BBC and the 
‘unfair’ advantages he deems them to have as Britain’s Public Service Broadcaster 
(PSB).  The News Corporation evidence (2014, 663) went on to say: 
 
“The role of the BBC cannot logically be excluded from any plurality assessment 
(whether qualitative or based on a market share limit).  A news provider is a news 
provider.  The BBC accepts that it is logical for any review of the sufficiency of plurality 
to take into account its share, voice and key role in audiences’ news diet.”   
 
News Corporation also concluded that “regulatory inquiries and court decisions have 
established a framework for a qualitative assessment of plurality.  What matters is the 
range and variety of voices available to consumers, including the range of voices 
within a single organisation” (Op Cit).   
 
Similar to its response to the Ofcom report on plurality, News Corporation made its 
opinions clear: it did not consider significant levels of ownership to be an issue where 
one organisation a number of media outlets (as News Corporation did and still does), 
and that the BBC should be subject to the same level of inquiry as commercial media 
firms.   
 
The Lords Select Committee report acknowledges the growing awareness of media 
plurality issues within the UK, noting all of the reports detailed in this chapter, and 
Murdoch’s proposed acquisition of BSkyB.  It establishes a clear set of principles for 
policy reform.  Firstly, the committee recommends that “there must be a way to assess 
the impact on plurality of organic market change as well as the impact of specific 
transactions… certain automatic interventions such as statutory caps are not the best 
option; they have to be set on a single scale and thus inherently impoverish the 
assessment that can be made about whether and how to intervene” (House of Lords 
Select Committee on Communications, 2014, p50).   
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This echoes Ofcom’s consideration that while a numerical measure provides the 
simplicity of a binary rule, it eliminates the ability to consider plurality within a broader 
context.  Both attribute significance to examining not just the percentage of ownership, 
which in itself needs revision, but the other aspects that affect the diversity of a media 
market, i.e. reach and influence.  Moreover, the House of Lords Select Committee on 
Communications is specific in its recommendation that Ofcom, the independent 
regulator, should be heavily involved: “there should be accountability for politicians 
where appropriate, but the onus should be on Ofcom to balance citizen and consumer 
interests” (2014, p5).   
 
The committee undertakes a holistic analysis of the media market in the UK and 
advises that while the BBC should continue to be publicly funded and satisfy its public 
service mandate, it should be considered ‘in-scope’ of any plurality review.  However, 
it should not be “subject to any control measures as a result of that assessment, at 
least from outwith its own regulatory framework” (House of Lords Select Committee 
on Communications, 2014, p17).  The committee goes as far as to agree with the 
Leveson report’s conclusion that “governance controls in place to ensure internal 
plurality within the BBC, and the effect of the impartiality requirements meant that its 
size gave rise to no plurality concerns” (House of Lords Select Committee on 
Communications, 2014, p17).   
 
Again, as with the reports produced by Ofcom, there is recognition of the changing 
nature of the market and the new digital environment, and the committee stipulates 
that a review of plurality should under no circumstances be limited by channel or 
medium: “print, broadcast and content delivered over the internet may all be relevant, 
as could be the influence of digital intermediaries on the consumption of this content” 
(House of Lords Select Committee on Communications, 2014, p19).     
 
The ‘centrepiece’ of the committee’s approach focuses on the need for government to 
“introduce a statutory periodic review of the plurality of the media markets to be 
undertaken by Ofcom on a 4-5 yearly basis, which will re-shape the role for 
government, parliament, regulator and competition authorities in protecting public 
interest” (House of Lords Select Committee on Communications, 2014, p54).  This 
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aligns with Ofcom’s recommendation that periodic reviews should be undertaken.  
However, the committee takes the more stringent view that any metric used to 
measure plurality should not be set in statute.  Instead, it suggests that there should 
be the “flexibility for Ofcom to interpret statutory guidance, design the assessment 
framework and select appropriate metrics according to the circumstances at the time 
of the review” (House of Lords Select Committee on Communications, 2014, p55).   
 
This implies a more reactive approach that properly addresses the changing nature of 
the market, and the need for a flexible and independent review that is not limited by 
specific metrics, but rather driven by public interest and/or mounting concern.  Perhaps 
the most controversial recommendation to come out of the report is that “where 
immediate and pressing concerns resulting from organic change are discovered in a 
periodic preview, it should be possible for Ofcom to order a media enterprise to divest” 
(House of Lords Select Committee on Communications, 2014, p57).  The committee 
of course stipulates specific provisions/measures by which such a decision should be 
taken, but it signals the recognition of the serious need for regulatory reform and would 
attribute far greater power to the regulator to properly tackle media ownership and 
ensure plurality.   
 
Summary  
 
This chapter has explored a number of recent inquiries, committee investigations and 
events that have had the potential to effect Murdoch’s business, whether directly or 
indirectly.  Across a number of select committee investigations and Ofcom reports, 
concern was noted with regards to plurality and the diversity of news voices in the UK.  
In almost all cases Murdoch (or his organisation) responded that plurality and diversity 
have already been achieved in the UK news market, and that the number of ‘voices’ 
owned by any one organisation should not matter.  Furthermore, the Murdoch 
responses all followed a similar pattern of asserting the critical need for the BBC to be 
considered in any plurality or diversity review, signalling his continued resentment of 
the BBC’s position in the market. 
 
It is noted in this chapter that when Murdoch’s bid for the controlling shares in BskyB 
was being reviewed by Ofcom, a crucial time for Murdoch and the anticipated 
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expansion of his business, his newspapers published hardly any content relating to 
Ofcom.  Whereas during other time periods a fairly significant amount of criticism of 
Ofcom can be found in the Murdoch press (as shown in the results of this work), at a 
time when Murdoch needed Ofcom to find in his favour, his newspapers chose not to 
criticise the regulator, and in fact to hardly write about it at all. 
 
The acquisition could have seen Murdoch own an even more significant percentage 
of the UK media market.  As discussed, Murdoch withdrew from the purchase when 
the phone hacking scandal came to light and began to dominate the UK headlines.  
As a result, the Leveson Inquiry took place and heard a substantial amount of witness 
evidence that spoke to Murdoch’s business practices and the close relationships he 
has held with Prime Ministers and politicians over the years.   
 
The number of recent investigations and inquiries into ownership, plurality and 
diversity speaks to the continuing and prevalent concerns with regards to those issues.  
In many cases Murdoch has continued his anti-BBC rhetoric in his responses to the 
various inquiries.  Ofcom itself was responsible for the 2012 review which took into 
consideration online news; an area in which the BBC has excelled while other news 
providers continue to grapple with a successful, profitable model.  The Ofcom review 
proposed regular, five yearly reviews of media plurality within the UK news market that 
were to include the provision of news online. 
 
In some way each investigation or inquiry has presented a potential threat to 
Murdoch’s media empire in the UK, either by challenging his significant percentage of 
holdings, by scrutinizing his business practices, or by introducing the potential for 
further regulation that could in some way restrict or hinder his business and any further 
expansions plans.  It is clear that throughout these inquiries and investigations, 
Murdoch continues to resent what he sees and the BBC’s ‘exemption’ from such 
restrictive regulation; possible motivation for the criticism that both the BBC and Ofcom 
receive in his newspapers.   
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Chapter Seven: The Research Questions 
 
 
1. To what extent does an agenda exist in News International’s publications that seeks 
to undermine organisations and competitors which in some way interfere with News 
International’s global expansion plans, specifically focusing on: 
1a. coverage of the BBC, its funding, structure, governance and ethos; 
1b. coverage relating to the notion of an independent regulator and Ofcom itself, 
focusing on coverage of Ofcom’s legitimacy, governance, structure and decision 
making? 
 
2. To what extent is this agenda manifested in News International’s publications, both 
through news stories and opinion, i.e. the selection of stories and the way they are 
reported? 
 
3. To what extent do these compare with equal-standing non-News International owned 
publications? 
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Chapter Eight: The Methodology 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter of the thesis outlines the chosen method for the research and the process 
by which it was undertaken.  It will provide a detailed overview of the rationale for the 
research (including the supporting theoretical framework) and the chosen method, the 
process for the data collection and analysis, the study’s validity and reliability, and any 
limitations.  The chosen method was a quantitative content analysis of the coverage 
of the BBC and Ofcom in News International owned newspapers compared with that 
of equivalent non-News International owned newspapers.  
 
Theoretical approach  
 
There are a number of theoretical approaches that exist in the field of media and 
communications research, though at the outset it can be considered that the 
researcher must adopt either a ‘deductive’ or ‘inductive’ approach to the research 
design.  Bryman describes Deductive Theory as “the commonest view of the nature of 
the relationship between theory and social research, whereby the researcher draws 
on what is known about in a particular domain and on relevant theoretical ideas in 
order to deduce a hypothesis (or hypotheses) that must then be subjected to empirical 
scrutiny” (2016, p8).   
 
Bryman describes how a researcher arrives at a hypothesis, which in turn can be 
tested via empirical evidence; ultimately the results (whether they confirm or reject the 
hypothesis) provide an original contribution to knowledge.  The hypothesis that this 
piece of work asserts and aims to prove, looking at media ownership and the 
exploitation of media power for corporate self-interest, follows that process.  The 
existing knowledge regarding the negative impacts of concentrated ownership of the 
press in a democratic society that is examined in the literature review, combined with 
the theoretical framework (discussed later in this chapter) relating to media and 
communications research, ensures the appropriateness of the hypothesis that can 
then be tested by the selected research method: content analysis.  Bryman (2016) 
cites the following as the ‘process of deduction’: 
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1. Theory 
2. Hypothesis 
3. Data collection 
4. Findings 
5. Hypothesis confirmed or rejected  
6. Revision of theory. 
 
This research has followed a deductive process, starting with a hypothesis about the 
harmful consequences of media concentration, followed by collection of empirical data 
from a carefully constructed content analysis to answer the research questions.  The 
subsequent findings allowed for specific conclusions and assertions to be made, and 
the hypothesis either confirmed or rejected.  Given the original nature of this research, 
it is likely that unknown, more general ‘premises’, or further hypotheses or conclusions, 
may be drawn from the specific data, lending itself to a more inductive approach.  An 
inductive approach follows the opposite of the process described above, with 
observations or findings leading to the definition, identification and defining of a theory.  
Bryman notes that “the last step, revision of theory, involves a movement that is in the 
opposite direction from deduction – it involves induction, as the researcher infers the 
implications of his or her findings for the theory that prompted the whole exercise”  
(2016, p8).  The scope of this research pertains specifically to the reporting of News 
International owned newspapers in comparison with non-News International owned 
newspapers on the BBC and Ofcom, which, as discussed in the previous chapters, 
are institutions standing in the way of News International’s expansion.  As such, the 
overall approach can be considered deductive.   
 
The process of reasoning aside, broader philosophies regarding the nature of the 
research and its framework should be considered and applied.  Typically, 
epistemological and ontological considerations will be given to a piece of research; 
epistemological being “what is (or should be) regarded as acceptable knowledge in a 
discipline”, and ontological being “concerned with the nature of social entities” 
(Bryman, 2016, p11).  Within the context of these theoretical frameworks, social 
research will often identify with one or more of the following theories: Positivism, 
Realism, Interpretivism, Objectivism or Constructivism.   
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In deploying a deductive, quantitative method, this research has adopted a positivist 
approach.  Bryman describes Positivism as “an epistemological position that 
advocates the application of the methods of the natural sciences to the study of social 
reality and beyond... knowledge is arrived at through the gathering of facts that provide 
the basis for laws” and states that “the purpose of theory is to generate hypotheses 
that can be tested and will thereby allow explanations of laws to be assessed” (op. 
cit.).  This work follows a structured approach by which the analysis of quantitative 
data aims to allow for hypotheses to be tested through the systematic gathering of 
empirical data, and assertions to be made which are rooted in empirical evidence.  In 
discussing Positivism, Gray states “Inquiry should be based upon scientific 
observation (as opposed to philosophical speculation), and therefore an empirical 
inquiry” (2018, p23).  This, and Bryman’s explanation, infers a purely fact-based nature 
of inquiry that stands alone from broader, more philosophical approaches and lends 
itself well to the methodical content analysis of historical, published data undertaken 
here.  Gray continues that “ideas only deserve their incorporation into knowledge if 
they can be put to the test of empirical experience” (op. cit.).  This piece of work aims 
to do exactly that: prove the hypothesis via valid and reliable empirical evidence such 
that it can be considered and incorporated into ‘knowledge’.   
 
Gray notes the challenges to Positivism, particularly where Popper (2005) asserts that 
theories cannot be proven to be true with complete certainty; they can only be proven 
to be false.  Gray offers a challenge to this argument by stating that “with the deductive 
approach, theories are tested through observation, leading either to the falsification 
and discarding of the theory, or to the creation of, as yet, unfalsified laws” (op. cit.).  
Crotty offers an alternative view, noting that respectable research needs “objective, 
valid and generalisable conclusions”, with results that “will be plausible, perhaps even 
convincing, ways of seeing things – and, to be sure, helpful ways of seeing things – 
but certainly not ‘one true way’ of seeing things” (1998, p10).  This research does not 
aim to establish an ‘unfalsified law’ per se, but rather a clear bias in reporting that, 
coupled with a concentration in media ownership has the potential to unduly influence 
public opinion, thus building on existing and established theories about media 
ownership and power.  While the term ‘unfalsified law’ seems too definite in relation to 
the results of social research, the data collected for this piece of work is (as previously 
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mentioned) both historical and already published.  It is ‘dead data’; its existence cannot 
be challenged, and with robust and appropriate categorisation, it should allow for a 
clear set of results that either confirm or reject the hypothesis.   
 
This research originates from existing knowledge of the Murdoch empire and its 
animosity towards the BBC and towards Ofcom as a regulatory body.  Existing 
knowledge of a Murdoch-directed agenda and the potential threat to democracy as a 
result of a concentration of ownership in the media and communications industry was 
established via the study of the existing theory and literature, as outlined in the 
literature review, and evidence of Murdoch’s criticism of the BBC and Ofcom in the 
press, both in his own publications and broadcasts, and in various interviews (as 
previously examined).  This work adopts more of a post-positivist approach because, 
while the results of the content analysis allow for the establishing of an obvious bias, 
it is relative to its context and cannot claim to speak to the intention of the publication 
of the material wholly without challenge.  While taking such an approach is fitting for a 
quantitative method such as content analysis, and provides validity to the empirical 
evidence, it is also supported by a secondary set of evidence via the analysis of the 
language used in the articles categorised as negative (the coding schedule is 
discussed further on) for inferred meaning, and the existing theory regarding 
Murdoch’s agenda and ownership of the press. 
 
Research method – content analysis (quantitative) 
 
A content analysis of News International owned newspapers’ coverage of the BBC 
and Ofcom compared with similar coverage by equal-standing non-News International 
owned newspapers offered the best possible method by which to ascertain whether 
the hypothesised systematic bias does exist.  As Riffe, Lacey and Fico state, 
“Communication content may be viewed as an end product, the assumed 
consequence or evidence of antecedent individual, organizational, social, and other 
contexts.  The validity of that assumption depends on how closely the content 
evidence can be linked empirically (through observation) or theoretically to that 
context” (2014, p11).  The assertions made with regard to News International’s and its 
owner’s view of the BBC and Ofcom (whether directly or in relation to regulation and 
public service broadcasting) via the works explored in the literature review form the 
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theoretical basis and context for the hypothesis.  This is then tested at a more granular 
level via an extensive analysis of the empirical evidence (the content) that can be 
found in the relevant publications.  The content analysis allows for clear, quantifiable 
results that either support or falsify the research questions.     
 
The method selected for this piece of work was content analysis of the material 
published by both News International owned newspapers, and appropriate 
comparators, relating to the BBC and Ofcom.  The selection of the sample is discussed 
further on in this chapter, as is the development of the coding schedule; this section 
aims to explain the reasoning behind the chosen method and its suitability in the 
context of the hypothesis and research questions.  It is imperative to the success and 
validity of the research that the research questions are both plausible and justified in 
relation to the original hypothesis, and the issues they aim to address.  The hypothesis 
asserts the overall premise that News International’s coverage of the BBC and Ofcom 
is an example of the exploitation of media power for corporate self-interest.  
Underpinning this are the research questions (as previously defined, but repeated here 
for reference): 
 
1. To what extent does an agenda exist in News International’s publications that 
seeks to undermine organisations and competitors which in some way interfere with 
News International’s global expansion plans, specifically focusing on: 
a. coverage of the BBC, its funding, structure, governance and ethos; 
b. coverage relating to the notion of an independent regulator and Ofcom itself, 
focusing on coverage of Ofcom’s legitimacy, governance, structure and decision 
making? 
2. To what extent is this agenda manifested in News International’s publications, 
both through news stories and opinion, i.e. selection of stories and the way they are 
reported? 
3. To what extent do these compare with equal-standing non-News International 
owned publications? 
 
The research questions are purposefully specific and finite in their remit.  The content 
analysis aims to provide definite answers to questions 1a and 1b, which in combination 
with the study of the existing theory and literature, and analysis of the content analysis 
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results, will answer questions 2 and 3.  Satisfying each research question will provide 
the necessary ‘empirical adequacy’ to validate the hypothesis.  As Hesmondhalgh 
states, “empirical adequacy refers to the success or otherwise of an account of the 
media in using evidence and theory in such a manner that it justifies its conclusions” 
(2006, p124).   
 
Bertrand and Hughes consider the advantages and disadvantages of content analysis, 
specifically when looking at news content; one of its major advantages is that “it can 
deal easily with current events or past events or both)… that is it does not depend 
upon fallible memory” (2018, p243).  This work has the luxury of focusing on published 
information that is readily available and is not subject to personal opinion or 
interpretation (notwithstanding the researcher’s subjective judgement with regard to 
the assessment of the material against the coding schedule; but with a solid framework 
and clearly defined categories and measures by which to make the assertion, there 
should be little room for challenge).  Denscombe states that “the main strength of 
content analysis is that it provides a means for quantifying the contents of a text, and 
it does so by using a method that is clear and, in principle, repeatable by other 
researchers” (2014, p284).  Bertrand and Hughes state that content analysis “is 
excellent for managing large amounts of data which can then be quantified and 
compared with statistics about the real world” (2018, p243).  This research will provide 
a unique body of data and analysis about the real world in relation to media 
concentration and the exploitation of media power.  
 
Bertrand and Hughes consider the disadvantages and problems that arise when 
undertaking content analysis, primarily noting issues with regard to sampling and 
measurement, all of which are considered further on in this chapter where the 
sampling and coding schedule is discussed.  Bertrand and Hughes also consider the 
broader considerations and challenges that should be taken into account when 
choosing content analysis as a method, as “content analysis results do not tell how 
the content came to be that way (that can only be answered out of an intellectual 
framework), or what the content ‘means’ (that can only be answered out of a theory of 
communication)” (op. cit.).  Seale also considers such challenges to the method: 
“Chiefly amongst these is the objections that such analysis is concerned simply with 
‘crass’ content: with what is said rather than how it is said; with the descriptions of 
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texts rather than their interpretations” (2018, p404).  Seale implies that content 
analysis applies a solely ontological approach to the research and is perhaps narrow 
in its scope and remit. However, the primary focus of this work is not on specific 
terminology and does not assume any form of discourse analysis that searches for 
textual meaning.   
 
However, the nature of this content analysis and the categorisation used constitute a 
more straightforward approach that does not delve into discourse analysis or 
examination of potential ‘inferred meaning’.  As Crotty explains, “the more the text 
relies on subtle and intricate meanings conveyed by the writer or inferred by the 
reader, the less valuable content analysis becomes in revealing the meaning of text” 
(1998, p285).  This study does include comparative analysis of the language used in 
the articles defined as negative, which allows for further understanding of the inferred 
(or direct) meaning of the texts and the potential impact on the audience. However, 
the chief aim is to identify the scale of negative reporting in comparison with equal-
standing newspapers.  As previously asserted, in isolation the results provide a clear 
view of the scale of negative reporting on the subject matters, but it is in the context of 
the intellectual framework and the theoretical work considered in the literature review 
that this will provide a consolidated view of the issue, which in turn will either confirm 
or reject the hypothesis.   
 
Research sample  
 
In order to ascertain if a bias exists, the News International owned newspapers need 
to be compared and contrasted with non-News International owned newspapers that 
can be considered of an ‘equal standing’.  Such a comparison will allow for a stronger, 
more valid set of results from which more obvious trends can be identified.  To analyse 
the News International publications alone would prove little without a suitable 
comparison; the comparative data provides the basis on which it can be ascertained 
whether there is indeed a bias.    
 
The following provides the detail of the publications selected, along with the details 
pertaining to ownership, type, age, political affiliation, and circulation: 
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Name Type Owner 
Year 
Establishe
d 
Political 
Affiliation (as 
at 2017 
election) 
Average 
Circulation
20 
 
The Sun Tabloid 
News 
International 
1964 
Right wing, 
Conservative 
3,269,658 
The Times 
Broadshee
t (compact 
since 
2004) 
News 
International 
1785 
Right wing, 
Conservative 
608,710.4 
The 
Sunday 
Times 
Broadshee
t 
News 
International 
1821 
Right wing, 
Conservative 
1,234,652.
8 
The Daily 
Mirror 
Tabloid Reach 1903 
Centre-left, 
Labour 
1,639,875.
6 
The 
Independe
nt 
Broadshee
t/compact 
Johnston 
Press/Alexander 
Lebedev 
1986 
Centre, no 
party affiliation 
206,421 
The 
Sunday 
Telegraph 
Broadshee
t 
Barclay Brothers 1961 
Centre-right, 
Conservative 
646,654.5 
 
Fig 8.1 
 
Clearly, there are many more UK newspapers than those listed in the table.  However, 
the non-News International owned publications were selected on the basis of them 
being considered of ‘equal standing’.  Temple (2008) describes the three types of 
newspaper in the UK: the ‘quality’ press, the ‘mid-market duo’, and the ‘red top’.  
Referring to the ‘quality press’, Temple advises that “today, not counting the specialist 
Financial Times, there are four ‘serious’ or ‘quality’ daily papers: The Independent, 
Guardian, Telegraph and Times” (2008, p87).  Temple cites the ‘mid-market duos’ as 
 
20 https://www.abc.org.uk/ 
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those papers that cater to the mid-market and offer a Sunday edition: these are the 
Daily Mail, the Mail on Sunday, the Express and the Sunday Express. The third 
category is the ‘red top’.  The term ‘red top’ is defined in the Oxford English dictionary 
as a tabloid newspaper characterised by sensationalism; Temple cites the Sun, Star 
and Daily Mirror as red tops (otherwise referred to as tabloids). 
 
The selection of News International owned newspapers was straightforward, in that 
the organisation owns a paper in each of the three categories described above: the 
Sun (red top), the Times (quality press) and the Sunday Times (mid-market duo 
weekend paper).  To ensure a fair comparison, non-News International owned 
newspapers within the same three categories were selected: the Daily Mirror (red top), 
the Independent (quality press) and the Sunday Telegraph (mid-market duo weekend 
paper).   
 
Date range 
 
Once the selection of appropriate publications was complete, the date range for the 
search of articles was established.  The aim was to look at material spanning a broad 
range of years so as to be able to establish whether there was indeed a systematic 
bias that was not localised to a single period of time (that could have been the result 
of a particular event).  For the material relating to the BBC, the following date ranges 
were selected: 
 
• 1 January 1990 – 31 December 1991 
• 1 January 2000 – 31 December 2001 
• 1 January 2010 – 31 December 2011. 
 
This date range was selected for a number of reasons.  Firstly, it provides six years’ 
worth of material: a suitable amount of data to be considered robust and reliable to 
establish bias.  Secondly, it spans three decades, allowing for any changes in editorial 
or other staff within the newspapers in question, or any political events that may have 
influenced reporting.  The dates were purposefully selected to avoid consideration of 
particular events relating to the BBC that may have inspired negative reporting, for 
example the renewal of the BBC Charter (in 2006 and 2016) or revisions to the BBC 
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funding model (aligned with the charter renewals).  Focusing on reporting around the 
time of such events would have potentially posed a challenge by returning an 
increased number of articles to be analysed.  The aim was to avoid ‘cherry-picking’ 
material that would inevitably lend itself to the hypothesis.  To focus on reporting on 
the BBC in News International owned newspapers in 2016 would have very likely 
included multiple articles reporting negatively on the BBC’s funding model.  Murdoch’s 
opinion on public service broadcasting and its funding is well known and extensively 
written about, as discussed in the literature review.  To make assertions on the basis 
of such evidence alone would not necessarily provide a substantive, original 
contribution to knowledge.  By focusing on the date ranges listed above, this research 
could aim to establish any systematic bias that exists even in the absence of events 
that may inspire negative reporting, and that may therefore have otherwise gone 
unnoticed.   
 
A slightly different approach was taken to selecting the date range for the material 
covering Ofcom.  As Ofcom was not established until 2003, the latter range of dates 
looked at for the BBC material was selected: 1 January 2010 until 31 December 2011.  
Consideration was given to extending the date range so as to collect six years’ worth 
of data (as was collected for the material pertaining to the BBC).  However, time 
constraints and concerns about the validity of the data if deviating from the date range 
used for the BBC resulted in this refined scope.  Nonetheless, having conducted the 
content analysis for the reporting on Ofcom between January 2010 and December 
2011, the results established an unexpected lack of extremities in the negative 
reporting.  Accepting that to test a hypothesis and achieve results not as expected 
does not invalidate the research per se, analysis and review of the results led to the 
consideration that they could have been informed by events that were ongoing in 
relation to News International and Ofcom at the time: Ofcom was due to publish its 
report regarding the News International bid to acquire the remainder of the shares it 
did not own in BSkyB.  Cognisant of the potential for this to have influenced reporting 
on Ofcom as a regulatory body at the time, the content analysis was revised to include 
the year preceding these events – 2009 – to test if levels of negative reporting were 
higher before it became clear that Ofcom would be participating in a decision that 
would directly affect News International corporate expansion plans.  While this does 
indeed deviate from the approach taken with regard to the BBC material, it supports 
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the very premise upon which the hypothesis was built: To what extent does an agenda 
exist in News International’s publications that seeks to undermine organisations and 
competitors which in some way interfere with News International’s global expansion 
plans?   
 
Sourcing of articles 
 
The articles selected for analysis were sourced via the Dow Jones Factiva database.  
For each publication selected, the same date range and search phrases were entered 
so as to ensure the reliability of the comparative data retrieved.  When searching for 
articles including reporting on the BBC, entering the phrase ‘BBC’ into the Factiva 
search function alone meant an excessive number of articles referring to programmes 
featured on the BBC (e.g. an article referring to the events that took place in 
EastEnders, quoting ‘shown on BBC1’).  While the content of such an article does 
technically refer to the BBC, the reporting is relevant to the TV show only, and not the 
BBC itself.  Therefore, the search terms had to be refined to avoid including an 
excessive number of surplus articles that would then need to be discounted once the 
content analysis began.  Accordingly, the following search terms were used: 
 
• BBC spending 
• BBC cuts 
• BBC bosses 
• BBC and public service broadcasting 
• Beeb 
• Auntie Beeb 
• BBC decision 
• BBC staff. 
 
The same approach was undertaken to source material that dealt with the topic of 
Ofcom.  However, searching ‘Ofcom’ alone did not return an excessive number of 
articles that could not be worked through in a timely manner, and as such the search 
phrase ‘Ofcom’ was used to identify all relevant material.  This resulted in a number of 
articles being discounted where they referred to, for example, ‘121 complaints were 
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made to Ofcom’.  While examples such as this do include reference to Ofcom within 
the article, Ofcom is not the subject of the reporting; the number of complaints made 
to Ofcom is the subject, and therefore the article could be discounted.   
 
The coding schedule  
 
There are a variety of units of analysis that can be applied via content research.  
However, for this piece of research, the primary measurement is whether the article 
(about either the BBC or Ofcom) is negative, positive or neutral in its reporting.  
Secondary to this, the type of article, article length, sources quoted and the focus of 
the article are vital units of analysis.  The coding schedule is appended to this thesis 
(Appendix N), but for ease of reference, the core measures for each article were as 
follows: 
 
1. Name of publication 
2. Date of publication 
3. Length of article (word count) 
4. Type of article: News, Feature, Editorial, Business, Other 
5. Tone of article: Negative, Positive, Neutral 
6. Sources directly quoted: BBC, Ofcom, Government, Independent voice 
campaign/pressure group, Other, None 
7. Focus of article: subject is either primary focus, secondary focus, or mentioned in 
passing. 
 
The selection of units of analysis for the content analysis was simple, given the specific 
nature of research questions 1a and 1b; the challenge was in the definitions of 
categories as detailed in the coding schedule (see appendix N).  For example, 
asserting whether an article can be considered ‘negative’, ‘positive’, or ‘neutral’ in its 
reporting is, to an extent, arguably subjective.  As Bertrand and Hughes (2018) note, 
it is difficult to establish watertight categories by which to measure the content; a 
researcher can only aim to establish the most suitable category that is justified by the 
overall framework supporting the research, and demonstrate the process by which the 
method is undertaken with clear rationale for the defined categories.  The coding 
schedule includes seven measures in total, only the last three of which require the 
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coder’s assessment to assign a category.  Measures 1 – 4 relate to detail such as the 
date the article was published, the word count and the type of story; these elements 
are not variables and are available directly from the Factiva database.  Measures 5 – 
7 require coder assessment.  Examples of how categories were assigned to these 
measures are as follows: 
 
- Measure 5 – Tone of article 
 
Each article was categorised as either negative, positive or neutral.  A conservative 
approach was taken; only if it was obvious that the article was asserting a clearly 
negative tone would it be coded as negative.  An example of an article that can be 
deemed to be negative is one that includes the following: 
 
• A headline that is obviously critical of the BBC or Ofcom (e.g. ‘BBC blasted for bias’) 
• Obvious critical text within the body of the article (e.g. ‘The bias at the BBC is now a 
national scandal’) 
• An article with a critical headline, even where the body of the text is less critical. 
 
There are, of course, exceptions to the above guidance where the coder must make 
a judgement.  For example, where an article was obviously critical in an assertion, but 
offered a counter-argument to the criticism, i.e. the BBC was quoted and its 
defence/justification for the actions or decision being criticised was prominent and 
obvious to the reader, and equal in its prominence in comparison to the criticism, the 
coder could assign a neutral category, as there is an equal balance of both negative 
and positive representations.  That said, where an article had an obviously critical 
headline, even if a measure of balance was offered in the body of the text, the coder 
could still assign the negative category to the tone of the article.  The tone of the article 
can be considered to be asserted on the basis of the headline, given its prominence 
and depending on the severity of its criticism.  The same applied when assessing the 
article as positive or neutral: an article with a positive or neutral headline that included 
some small amount of criticism could still be considered to be positive or neutral 
overall.  Where the coder was unsure as to whether the article could be considered 
negative or positive, it would be categorised as neutral.  
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- Measure 6 – Sources directly quoted  
 
The categories assigned to sources directly quoted are as follows: 
 
1. BBC 
2. Ofcom 
3. Government 
4. Independent voice campaign/pressure group 
5. Other 
6. None 
7. Vested interest. 
 
The assigning of the categories was straightforward in that the coder would only assign 
the appropriate category where the source was directly quoted in the article: 
references to sources that had spoken elsewhere and not directly to the newspaper 
itself (i.e. on television, or a quote repeated from another publication) would not be 
categorised.  Category 7 – ‘vested interest’ – is explained in the coding manual as any 
source that has a vested interest in the publication of the story, or the story itself, or is 
a direct competitor in the area of the subject matter at hand (the BBC or Ofcom), i.e. 
where Sky News is commenting on the actions of the BBC; as a competitor, Sky News 
can be considered to have a ‘vested interest’. Category 5 – ‘other’- would be assigned 
where a directly quoted source did not fit into any of the other six categories.    
 
- Measure 7 – Focus of article 
 
The categories that could be assigned to define the focus of the article were as follows: 
 
1. Primary focus 
2. Secondary focus 
3. Mentioned in passing. 
 
While somewhat self-explanatory, for the avoidance of doubt, the following explains 
how the categories were assigned.  Category 1 – ‘primary focus’ – would be assigned 
where the subject matter either featured in the headline, or ‘high up’ in the story, i.e. it 
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was made clear within the first few lines of the body of text that the article was primarily 
concerned with the relevant subject matter.  Where an article referred to the subject 
matter a significant amount, i.e. more than one or two lines of text, but the article was 
not primarily concerned with the subject matter, it would be categorised as the 
‘secondary focus’ (category 2).  Category 3 – ‘mentioned in passing’ – would be 
assigned where the subject matter was briefly mentioned, i.e. one or two lines within 
the text at most.  While this process can be deemed straightforward, the coder needed 
to be aware of exceptions or conflicting examples of the scenarios described, such as 
where the subject matter was mentioned in passing, but within a very short article, i.e. 
the article consisted of perhaps only four or five lines of text, and within that, the BBC 
was mentioned once.  While only mentioned once, the prominence of the mention in 
a short article needed to be considered, and where this occurred, the article would be 
assigned to category 2 – ‘secondary focus’.   
 
Reliability 
 
As previously discussed, it can be considered that one of the major advantages of 
undertaking a content analysis is that it follows a defined set of logics that, if 
undertaken properly, can produce reliable quantitative data.  The content analysed in 
this piece of research is historical and available to the public, and the coding manual 
prescribes very clearly defined measures by which to assign content to specific 
categories.  Riffe, Lacey and Fico explain that reliability in content analysis is defined 
as agreement among coders about categorizing content.  “Indeed, content analysis as 
a research tool is based on the assumption that explicitly defined and accepted 
concept definitions control assignment of content to particular categories by coders” 
(2014, p94).    
 
Given that the content analysis was undertaken by one coder alone, there is no 
concern with regard to any deviation from the defined concept definitions to which the 
content was assigned.  However, the single coder’s investment in the hypothesis and 
work overall does leave this research open to challenge on the grounds of potential 
bias or lack of impartiality.    
 
Ethical considerations 
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As this piece of research consisted of a content analysis undertaken by one coder, 
there were no ethical concerns or issues to be considered.  
 
Limitations 
 
The disadvantages, or limitations, of content analysis as a method in itself were 
discussed earlier in this chapter.  However, consideration needs to be given to the 
limitations of its use in the context of this piece of research with regard to proving the 
hypothesis.  A content analysis is undoubtedly the most appropriate method by which 
to ascertain if a systematic bias in reporting on the BBC and Ofcom in News 
International owned newspapers does exist.  Nevertheless, it was not undertaken in 
the absence of knowledge of potential challenge with regard to other secondary 
methods that could have been deployed to support the primary method. 
 
A suitable secondary method could have been to interview industry professionals who 
currently or previously worked for the News International owned newspapers analysed 
so as to ascertain if there was indeed editorial (or other) pressure to report on the BBC 
and Ofcom negatively.  Depending on the type of interview conducted, this could have 
also allowed for insight into the nature of any potential inherent bias against the BBC 
and Ofcom, i.e. culturally within the organisation.  There were two practical 
considerations that led to the decision not to pursue such interviews: time constraints 
and access to the relevant individuals.  Given that the study of the coverage in the 
News International owned newspapers is historical, dating as far back as 1990, it 
would be difficult (and in some cases likely to be impossible) to gain access to the 
individuals who worked at the Sun, the Times and the Sunday Times during the 
relevant periods.  Furthermore, to gain access to such individuals from all three 
newspapers was unlikely, and interviews with individuals who worked at only one or 
two of the newspapers would not allow for results that could be considered to be robust 
and valid.  Even with access to such individuals, strong consideration would need to 
be given to whether they would remember and be willing to speak about any inherent 
bias; the method would be reliant upon fallible memory and notably subjective.  Given 
the size of the content analysis and the time needed to complete it, pursuing interviews 
was deemed to be impractical. 
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Consideration was given to the concept of a ‘Qualitative Content Analysis’ (QCA), or 
another form of qualitative research such as discourse analysis, whereby the text and 
language of the coverage could be analysed for inferred meaning.  Schreier explains 
that “In most general terms, QCA will be an option if you have to engage in some 
degree of interpretation arrive at the meaning of your data… Data never ‘speaks for 
itself’, it does not ‘have’ a specific meaning.  Meaning is something that we, the 
recipients, attribute to the words that we hear or read” (2012, p2).  While this project 
does indeed look at the language used to demonstrate the extremities of some of the 
negative reporting, which could to some extent be considered a form of QCA, the 
meaning behind the language is not deemed to be ‘inferred’, but rather standardised.  
As Schreier explains:  
 
“Highly standardised meanings are also meanings by convention, and they also 
require some degree of interpretation.  But because the meaning is such a standard 
one, the process of meaning construction no longer requires any effort; it has become 
automatic, and pretty much everyone with the same cultural background will agree 
that this is what the material means.  When you are dealing with highly standardised 
meanings, there is really no need to apply a method like QCA (or any other qualitative 
method for data analysis)” (2012, p2).    
 
Summary 
   
In summary, a deductive approach via a content analysis was undertaken to ascertain 
to what extent an agenda exists in News International’s publications that seeks to 
undermine organisations and competitors which in some way interfere with News 
International’s global expansion plans.  The content analysis focused on six years of 
coverage of the BBC and three years of coverage of Ofcom within the Sun, the Times 
and the Sunday Times between 1990 and 2011, compared with the same coverage in 
equal-standing non-News International owned newspapers: the Daily Mirror, the 
Independent and the Sunday Telegraph.  A robust coding schedule of clearly defined 
categories was developed and used throughout the analysis.  Other research 
methods, including qualitative approaches such as interviews and/or discourse 
analysis, were considered and discounted due to practicality and time constraints.  The 
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content analysis was deemed to be the most appropriate method by which to identify 
and trend bias; the results of the content analysis are presented in the chapters that 
follow. 
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Chapter Nine: The Results for the BBC 
 
In order to assess whether and to what extent an agenda exists in News UK’s 
publications to undermine other organisations and competitors, a content analysis of 
News UK reporting on the BBC and Ofcom was undertaken and compared with the 
same analysis of non-News UK owned publications.  The theoretical assumption 
behind the hypothesis is that Murdoch uses his national newspapers to disseminate 
negative messages about the BBC and Ofcom to the public (and, particularly through 
his broadsheet newspapers, to opinion formers) so as to undermine and discredit 
these British institutions and further promote his own corporate agenda.   
 
In conducting the analysis, the aim was to determine whether the Murdoch press 
coverage of the BBC and Ofcom demonstrated fair and unbiased reporting, or if indeed 
it was overly negative or critical when compared to equivalent publications.  A 
significantly greater volume of negative reporting would support the hypothesis 
underlying this thesis.  
 
As detailed in the methodology chapter, three News UK newspapers were analysed 
and compared with three equivalent non-News UK newspapers.  The analysis 
considered the tone of the articles, word count, focus of the articles, type of article, 
and the sources quoted.  This chapter presents the results of the content analysis, 
followed by analysis and discussion of the results.   
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Total number of articles 
 
The total number of articles published about the BBC across all six newspapers was 
1648.  The News UK owned newspapers (the Sun, Times, and Sunday Times) 
published 61% of the total articles (998).  The graph below depicts the number of 
articles published by each newspaper analysed: 
 
 
Fig 9.1 
 
As shown above, News UK published a greater number of articles about the BBC than 
its counterparts (the Daily Mirror, Independent and Sunday Telegraph), however the 
ratio was much closer between the broadsheets, whereby the Times published 499, 
and The Independent published 450. However, overall News UK published 54% more 
articles than its non-News UK counterparts. 
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Fig 9.2 
 
As can be seen in Fig. 9.2, the number of articles published about the BBC followed a 
general upward trend, with peaks of increased reporting around the year 2000 and 
2010.  Data was unavailable for the years 1990 and 1991 for the Sun, Daily Mirror and 
Sunday Telegraph.  The lack of data for those years for the Sun and Daily Mirror does 
not pose an issue for the validity of the results, as they are the comparator papers.  
The lack of data for the Sunday Telegraph does mean that the data collected for the 
Sunday Times in that time period has no comparator in the same category.  However, 
this only effects a sum total of 25 articles, and with a substantial amount of data 
collected in the time periods thereafter, it should not impede the results or analysis.   
 
The word count for each newspaper in relation to its coverage of the BBC is relatively 
in keeping with the number of articles published, with the exception of the non-News 
UK broadsheet, the Independent, which published a marginally higher word count 
across marginally fewer articles.  The graph in Fig. 9.3 depicts the total word count for 
all articles about the BBC in each newspaper: 
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Fig 9.3 
In total, across all six newspapers, News UK papers published 34% more words 
relating to the BBC than their non-News UK counterparts; the word count correlates 
with the number of articles published in each newspaper.   However, again it is notable 
that the ratio between the broadsheets is very close, and in fact the Independent 
published  agreater number of words than that of  The Times, despite publishing 
slightly fewer articles.   
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Tone of coverage  
 
The tone of each article was recorded against one of three categories: negative, 
positive or neutral.  The graphs below display the number of articles and percentage 
weighting for each tonal category for the 1648 articles analysed. 
 
 
Fig 9.4 
In total, 39% of all articles about the BBC were categorised as negative.  This equates 
to 650 negative articles; 72% of these negative articles were published by News UK 
(467 articles).   
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The graphs below depict the percentage of negative, positive and neutral articles as 
printed by each of the six newspapers. 
 
  
  
  
 
Fig 9.5 
 
As can be seen from the charts above, the News International newspapers published 
at least twice the number of negative articles about the BBC in comparison with their 
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non-News UK counterparts, with the exception of the Sunday newspapers which 
published a similar amount (albeit the Sunday Telegraph only published a total of 37 
articles, whereas the Sunday Times published 212).     
 
The expectation was that News UK would have published a greater number of 
negative articles and fewer positive articles in comparison with its counterparts.  For 
the most part, this was the case: each News UK newspaper published a 
disproportionately greater number of negative articles than its counterpart in the same 
market category.   
 
The percentage of neutral articles compared with negative (almost equal for all News 
UK newspapers) was unexpected; it could be argued that this result might indicate a 
measure of balance in the reporting.  However, this study asserts that a greater 
number of neutral articles does not offer ‘balanced reporting’ as the number of positive 
articles published by News UK is so small.  An example of balanced reporting could 
either be an equal number of positive, negative and neutral articles, or at the least an 
equal number of negative and positive (with an increased or decreased number of 
neutral).  The chart in Fig 9.8 provides an overall view of the number and percentage 
of negative articles versus neutral or positive for the News UK newspapers, followed 
by the same in Fig 9.9 for the non-News UK papers: 
 
        
                         Fig. 9.6                        Fig. 9.7 
As can be seen in these two charts, the percentage of negative articles in the News 
UK newspapers is far greater than that in their counterparts; this result is further 
amplified by News UK having published 54% more articles about the BBC than its 
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counterparts.  Additionally, while News UK published an almost equal percentage of 
neutral articles as it did negative, the non-News UK newspapers published a greater 
percentage of neutral and positive articles, and a smaller percentage of negative, 
suggesting a more balanced approach to their reporting.   
 
Fig. 9.10 displays the timeline of the negative coverage across the six years analysed 
for the News International newspapers vs the non-News International owned 
newspapers: 
Fig. 9.8 
The timeline shows a consistently low level of negative reporting on the part of the 
non-News International newspapers, compared with the News International reporting, 
which saw extreme peaks in negative coverage of the BBC.  This offers a significant 
finding in that, at times when the non-News International newspapers found far less to 
cover in terms of criticism of the BBC, the News International papers found far more. 
 
Fig. 9.11 provides a timeline view of the negative reporting for the three News 
International owned newspapers: 
Fig. 9.9 
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As can be seen from the timeline, there is a strong correlation in the data for the three 
News International owned newspapers, i.e. when there has been a rise in the number 
of negative articles published, it has occurred across all three newspapers.  This 
supports the hypothesis that the reporting is biased in its agenda against the BBC, 
and that the newspapers are all operating according to a consistent approach.   
 
The charts on the following page display the percentage of articles by tone for the 
News International newspapers versus the non-News International newspapers for 
each time period (1990-91, 2000-01, 2010-11): 
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Fig 9.10 
 
Comparison of these charts shows that negative reporting in the News International 
owned newspapers consistently increased across the three time periods, whereas in 
the non-News International newspapers, it increased from 1990-91 to 2000-01, after 
which it remained consistent. The News International newspapers also published a 
significantly higher number of articles; in particular negative articles.     
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Focus of articles 
 
The chart in Fig 9.13 depicts the number of articles categorised by focus, i.e. if the 
BBC was the primary or secondary focus of the article, or if it was ‘mentioned in 
passing’.  For all six newspapers, the BBC featured as the primary focus of the majority 
of the relevant articles: 
 
 
Fig. 9.11 
Fig 9.13 shows that the News UK newspapers generally published a far greater 
number of articles where the BBC was the primary focus; the exception is the 
Independent, which published a similar number (245) to its News UK counterpart, the 
Times (which published 303).   
 
Of the 649 negative articles about the BBC, 66% featured the BBC as the primary 
focus (equalling 429 articles).  The next charts display the proportion of articles both 
categorised as both negative and where the BBC was the primary focus for the News 
International newspapers (Fig. 9.14) versus the non-News International newspapers 
(Fig 9.15). 
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Fig. 9.12                             Fig 9.13 
           
Fig. 9.14 and Fig. 9.15 identify an interesting result in that, while News UK is 
responsible for a significantly larger percentage of negative articles overall (regardless 
of focus), the majority occur in articles where the BBC is the primary focus, suggesting 
a greater tendency to criticise the BBC when it is the main focus of a story.  This was 
also the case for the non-News International newspapers.  However, these charts 
distort the view slightly, given that the difference in number of articles is significant.  In 
addition to this, the analysis identified that News UK published a significantly larger 
number of negative articles where the BBC was the secondary focus (67 articles 
versus 0).   
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Types of article 
 
The content analysis allowed the articles to be categorised into five types: news, 
feature, editorial, business or other.  Typically, ‘other’ accounted for articles in the 
sports or lifestyle sections.  As explained in the methodology section, data regarding 
the type of article was not available for 59 of the 163 articles published by the Daily 
Mirror.  However, given that the total number of articles across all newspapers 
analysed was 1648, the missing data for the 59 only equates to 4%, and it was 
therefore considered that this would have a negligible impact on the overall result.  
Furthermore, the missing data relates to the type of article only, and not any other 
category (i.e. tone, focus etc).  While assertions could be made as to whether an article 
was a piece of news or a piece of editorial, this could not be verified and therefore was 
not recorded.   
 
For all articles written about the BBC, Fig. 9.16 depicts the percentage that fall into 
each of the five ‘type’ categories: 
 
 
Fig. 9.14 
As Fig. 9.16 indicates, the majority of articles about the BBC were categorised as 
‘news’ pieces.  The second largest category was features. 
 
Fig 9.17 again categorises articles by type, but this time, specifically for those articles 
about the BBC that were categorised as negative: 
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Fig. 9.15 
 
Results for the two perspectives are similar, but with a marginally higher percentage 
of negative features and negative editorials.   
 
The following charts provide a comparison of the percentage of negative articles that 
fall into each category for the News UK newspapers (Fig. 9.18) versus the non-News 
UK papers (Fig. 9.19). 
 
 
              Fig. 9.16      Fig 9.17 
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as both negative and a feature article. Fig. 9.19 shows only 5% of the articles published 
by the non-News UK newspapers were categorised in the same way.  Similarly, 11% 
of the News UK articles were categorised as both negative and as editorial pieces; 
only 5% of the non-News UK articles were categorised as the same.      
 
Again, while these results show that a significant proportion of the negative stories 
published by both the News International and non-News International newspapers 
were categorised as news, considering this as a percentage can distort the view, given 
the significant different in the actual numbers of stories.  Furthermore, consideration 
should be given to how many negative news pieces each group of newspapers 
published as a percentage of their overall number of news pieces. A total of 42% of 
the News International ‘news’ stories about the BBC were negative, compared with 
23% in the comparative newspapers.  
 
When considering editorial pieces, 70% of the News International editorials about the 
BBC were negative, compared with 26% in the comparative newspapers. 
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Sources quoted  
 
There were seven categories under which the sources quoted in the articles about 
the BBC could be recorded: 
 
1. BBC 
2. Ofcom 
3. Government 
4. Independent voice/campaign 
5. Other 
6. Unsourced (no source quoted) 
7. Vested interest 
 
The chart in Fig. 9.20 depicts the percentage of each category in the 1648 articles 
about the BBC. 
 
 
Fig. 9.18 
As expected, the BBC featured as one of the most quoted sources in articles reporting 
on itself.  However, there was a significant number of articles that referenced no source 
at all: 39%. 
 
The charts in Fig 9.21 and Fig. 9.22 show that the percentage of articles that 
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referenced no source, referred to as ‘unsourced’, is greater across the News UK 
newspapers (albeit the non-News UK papers published a significant number of 
unsourced articles as well). 
       
   Fig. 9.19                Fig. 9.20 
 
Fig 9.23 provides a breakdown of the sources quoted in negative articles for the News 
UK papers, with Fig. 9.24 doing the same for the non-News UK papers. 
 
 
 
         Fig 9.21      Fig. 9.22 
 
Interestingly, this almost mirrors the percentage of sources for all articles about the 
BBC, regardless of tone (Fig. 9.5.1).  However, both charts show a slight increase in 
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number of negative articles that included the BBC as a source.    
 
As the results are almost identical regardless of tone, it implies that the tone of the 
reporting had little impact on a newspaper’s choice about whether to include a certain 
type of source or not.  In all cases, whether the articles were negative, and whether 
published by the News UK or non-News UK newspapers, almost half of the articles 
were unsourced, and the second largest category of source across the board was the 
BBC.  It could be argued that the inclusion of the BBC as a source in articles that are 
critical of it suggests a measure of balance in the reporting.  However, it could also be 
argued that a quote (that often sits at the very end of the piece) from the BBC is added 
to give the illusion of balance, but does not change the overall tone.   
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Chapter Ten: The Results for Ofcom 
 
Total number of articles 
 
The total number of articles published about Ofcom across all six newspapers was 
1688.  Of those articles, 61% were published by News International (a total of 1037).  
The graph in Fig. 10.1 shows the number of articles published by each newspaper. 
 
 
 
Fig. 10.1 
The graph shows News International newspapers published a significantly larger 
number of articles about Ofcom, with the exception of the tabloid newspapers the Sun 
and the Daily Mirror, which published a similar number.  The significant difference in 
the number of articles is primarily accounted for by the two broadsheet newspapers.   
 
The number of articles published in each time period considered is shown in Fig. 10.2. 
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Fig. 10.2 
 
This identifies a consistent trend of reporting, with only a slight peak between 2009 
and 2010.  Fig 10.3 provides an alternative view of the number of articles printed in 
each of the three years.  2009 was a particularly interesting year as it was the run-up 
to the 2010 general election, during which the Murdochs were making public 
statements about Ofcom and its overwhelming power; James Murdoch’s 2009 
MacTaggart Lecture at the Edinburgh International Television Festival speaks to this 
and is discussed in the next chapter.  2009 also saw David Cameron make a public 
promise to remove Ofcom should he be elected Prime Minister, which is also 
discussed in the next chapter.  
 
 
Fig. 10.3 
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The graph in Fig. 10.4 provides details of the word count of the coverage of Ofcom per 
newspaper analysed.  
 
 
Fig 10.4 
 
The word count correlates to some extent with the total number of articles printed.  
However, there is a noticeable difference in the number of articles published in the 
Sun versus the number of words belonging to those articles, indicating that the 
coverage was brief (as it was, to an extent, in the Daily Mirror).     
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Tone of coverage 
 
The tone of each article was placed in one of three categories: negative, positive or 
neutral.  The graph in Fig. 10.5 displays the number of articles and percentage for 
each tone category for the 1688 articles analysed: 
 
 
      Fig. 10.5 
 
Of the total number of articles about Ofcom published in all six newspapers, only 9% 
were categorised as negative, equating to 143 articles.  Of the total number of negative 
articles about Ofcom, 78% were published by News International (112 articles).  The 
charts below depict the proportion of each newspaper’s articles that were categorised 
as negative: 
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Fig 10.6 
  
 
As expected, and as with the results relating to the BBC, the News International 
newspapers published a greater number of negative articles; albeit the difference is 
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smaller.  However, in contrast to the results for coverage of the BBC, the number of 
positive articles published by the News International newspapers was almost exactly 
equal to their non-News International counterparts.  News International also published 
a greater number of neutral articles than its counterparts, with the exception of the 
tabloids.   
 
The graph in Fig. 10.7 shows the percentage of articles in each tonal category 
(negative, positive and neutral) published in the News International newspapers, while 
Fig. 10.8 shows this for the non-News International papers. 
 
  
                  
        Fig. 10.7      Fig. 10.8 
 
As can be seen in Fig. 10.7 and Fig. 10.8, the ratio of tonal reporting between the two 
categories is very similar, with the exception of News International having published 
over twice the number of negative articles.  However, unlike the results for the BBC, 
News International printed exactly the same percentage of positive articles about 
Ofcom as the comparator group of newspapers.  The majority of articles printed about 
Ofcom by both the News International and non-News International newspapers were 
neutral.  That said, notwithstanding the significance of the ratio view, it must be noted 
that this does not account for the vast difference in the number of articles printed, with 
News International publishing 386 more. 
 
The timeline in Fig. 10.9 provides a comparative view of the negative coverage for 
2009-11 across both groups of newspapers: 
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Fig. 10.9 
 
Fig. 10.9 identifies a consistently low level of negative reporting in the non-News 
International newspapers, whereas there are far more exaggerated peaks of negative 
coverage in the News International papers.  The peak that occurs for both groups of 
newspapers in Q2 2010 related to coverage on the Ofcom announcement that the 
rates people pay to terminate their mobile phone contracts should be cut.  This was 
highly criticised by the mobile operating firms at the time.   
 
The increase in negative reporting on News International’s part during this time period 
was further amplified by Ofcom having ordered BSkyB to reduce the price it charged 
rival TV companies to broadcast its premium sports channels.  The peak of negativity 
that occurred in Q3 2009 related to general criticism of Ofcom, not pertaining to any 
one particular topic, but it did coincide with James Murdoch’s speech at the Edinburgh 
International Television Festival that year, which was highly critical of the BBC and 
Ofcom, referring to both as “unaccountable institutions” (Murdoch, 2009).   
 
This timeline offers a significant finding in that, in periods when the non-News 
International newspapers found far less to cover in terms of criticism of Ofcom, the 
News International papers found far more. 
 
Fig. 10.10 provides a timeline view of the negative reporting in the three News 
International owned newspapers. 
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Fig. 10.10 
 
Fig. 10.10 shows extreme peaks in negative reporting for the Times, which speaks to 
the theoretical assumption that the broadsheet papers would look to influence opinion 
formers.  There are fewer extremities in the reporting in the Sun and Sunday Times.   
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Focus of articles 
 
The chart in Fig 10.11 depicts the number of articles categorised by focus, i.e. whether 
Ofcom was the primary or secondary focus of the article, or if it was ‘mentioned in 
passing’. 
 
 
Fig. 10.11 
An interesting finding identified in Fig. 10.11 is that, for all newspapers, the number of 
articles where Ofcom was only mentioned in passing far outweighs those where 
Ofcom was the primary or secondary focus; this is in stark contrast to the findings 
relating to the BBC.  To provide an alternative view, Fig. 10.12 displays the breakdown 
by focus for the News International newspapers, while Fig 10.13 give this information 
for the non-News International newspapers. 
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Ofcom features in less than a quarter of all articles as the primary focus; in both the 
News International and non-News International newspapers, virtually half of the 
coverage only mentions Ofcom in passing.  Furthermore, Ofcom features as the 
secondary focus for a significant percentage of the articles for both groups of 
newspapers.   
 
Of the 1688 articles written about Ofcom, only 329 featured Ofcom as the primary 
focus; 14% of these were categorised as negative.  The charts in Fig 10.3.4 break 
down the articles about Ofcom that were categorised as negative into those where 
Ofcom was the primary focus, secondary focus or mentioned in passing: 
 
  
   Fig 10.14      Fig 10.15 
 
Fig. 10.14 identifies that News International published a larger percentage of negative 
articles with Ofcom as the primary focus; it also published considerably more articles 
in total (327 versus 102).   
 
Fig. 10.16 provides an alternative view that presents the percentage of negative 
articles each newspaper published with Ofcom as the primary focus, while Fig. 10.17 
does the same for articles where Ofcom was ‘mentioned in passing’. 
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Fig. 10.16 
 
 
 
Fig. 10.17 
 
Fig 10.16 shows the News International newspapers published 79% of the total 
number of articles where Ofcom was the primary focus of a negative piece.  Where 
Ofcom was only mentioned in passing, Fig 10.17 shows News International published 
82% of the negative articles (equating to 40 articles), whereas the non-News 
International newspapers only published a total of nine.  The breakdown of the 
percentage of articles in each ‘focus’ and ‘tone’ category, per newspaper, can be found 
in the appendices.   
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It is notable that the Times was responsible for the largest proportion of negative 
articles in both cases; this differs from the results for the BBC, where the Sun was 
responsible for a larger proportion of the negative articles.  In the case of Ofcom, both 
the Times and Sunday Times are responsible for larger proportions of negative articles 
than the Sun.  Both papers can be considered to be more influential in terms of 
reaching ‘opinion formers’ and setting the agenda.   
 
If Murdoch and News UK were attempting to influence public opinion via the negative 
reporting identified in this research, it follows logically that they would ensure an 
increased number of negative stories about the BBC in their tabloid newspaper, the 
Sun, as its audience consist primarily of the ‘general public’ who have a direct 
connection with the BBC and will likely pay the licence fee.  When looking to influence 
opinion on Ofcom, sustained criticism has a higher chance of reaching an audience of 
‘opinion formers’ via its broadsheet and Sunday newspapers.   
 
Types of article 
 
The chart in Fig. 10.18 depicts the total number of articles about Ofcom categorised 
by ‘type’ (news, feature, editorial, business or other). 
 
 
Fig. 10.18 
Fig. 10.18 identifies another result that notably contrasts with the BBC results; while a 
significant proportion of the articles about Ofcom were categorised as ‘news’, a larger 
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proportion were categorised as ‘business’ stories.   
 
Fig. 10.19 focuses on the negative articles by category. 
 
 
Fig. 10.19  
 
The negative articles generally follow the same weighting pattern as that for all articles 
(regardless of tone).  However, there is a notable increase in the number of negative 
articles categorised as ‘feature’ pieces.   
 
Fig. 10.20 depicts the negative articles about Ofcom by type for the News 
International newspapers, while Fig. 10.21 does the same for the non-News 
International papers. 
 
 
   Fig. 10.20      Fig.10.21 
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Interestingly, Fig 10.21 identifies an increased number of negative editorials published 
by the non-News International newspapers compared with the News International 
papers in Fig. 10.20.  This was unexpected, given that this study’s hypothesis 
assumes negative reporting on the part of News International newspapers in light of 
their parent company’s owner, Rupert Murdoch, and his dislike of regulation of the 
media markets via quangos such as Ofcom.  However, the data reveals that the total 
number of negative editorials for the non-News International newspapers was four.  All 
four featured Ofcom as the primary focus of a negative editorial piece and were 
published by the Independent.  The News International newspapers published three 
negative editorials about Ofcom: one was published by the Sun, and two by the Times.    
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Sources quoted 
 
The chart in Fig. 10.22 depicts the percentages for each category of sources quoted 
in the 1688 articles about Ofcom. 
 
 
Fig. 10.22 
A number of notable findings can be drawn from Fig. 10.22.  Firstly, a significant 
number of the articles published about Ofcom across all six of the newspapers were 
unsourced.  Additionally, with the exception of the BBC as a source, the types of 
sources quoted in the articles are spread relatively evenly across all categories, 
though a larger number of articles do quote a ‘vested interest’.  As outlined in the 
coding schedule, the ‘vested interest’ category is used for any source quoted who in 
some way has a vested interest in the subject matter, be it commercial or otherwise.  
For example, if an article discussed a decision taken by Ofcom, any party that would 
be affected by that decision, be it directly or indirectly, would be considered to be a 
‘vested interest’.   
 
To establish how many articles the News International newspapers published that 
were unsourced, Fig. 10.23 depicts the percentage of articles that were sourced 
versus unsourced, while Fig. 10.24 presents the same information for the non-News 
International papers. 
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Fig. 10.23                              Fig. 10.24 
 
While the non-News International newspapers published a significant proportion of 
articles that were unsourced (a total of 270), News International published over twice 
as many (a total of 594).   
 
The chart in Fig. 10.25 provides percentages for each source quoted in the articles 
about Ofcom that were categorised as negative in the News International newspapers, 
with Fig. 10.26 presenting the same information for the non-News International papers. 
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      Fig 10.26     
Fig. 10.25 and Fig. 10.26 display similar patterns, though a greater percentage of the 
non-News International articles featured Ofcom and the government as sources.  
Again, the percentages of articles featuring no source at all are very similar, as are the 
percentages featuring a quote from a ‘vested interest’. 
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Chapter Eleven: Discussion and Conclusion 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter will discuss the findings of this work within the context of all of the 
information put forward thus far, calling upon the existing theories and relevant 
literature.  It will consider a number of broader themes within the context of which the 
results of the content analysis and the implications can be considered, including the 
following: the current status of the UK Newspaper market, online news and news 
aggregators, the empirical evidence that proves that the negative reporting does 
indeed exist, and its potential to influence the public and politicians.  The chapter will 
finish with a section summarising the key findings of this work and the concluding 
arguments.  
 
Current status of the UK Newspaper Market 
 
According to the Media Reform Coalition 2019 report ‘Who Owns the UK Media’, News 
UK’s newspapers have 35.4% of the market share for national daily newspapers; this 
is spread across the Sun and the Times.  The Sun enjoys the largest market share of 
all daily newspapers at 27.3%, followed closely by the Daily Mail at 23.8%.   News UK 
newspapers enjoy 42.7% of the market share for Sunday newspapers, spread across 
the Sun on Sunday and Sunday Times.  The Sun on Sunday has the largest market 
share for Sunday newspapers at 26.5%, followed by the Mail on Sunday at 22.95%.  
 
The Media Reform Coalition reported that as at November 2018, News UK had the 
highest ‘weekly combined market share of national newspaper circulation’ at 36.35%.  
News UK is one of three media groups that dominate the UK newspaper market: DMG 
Media, who own the Daily Mail and Mail on Sunday have 23.69%, and Reach Plc who 
own The Daily Mirror, Sunday Mirror and Sunday People and have 23.19% of the 
market share. All newspapers have seen a decline in circulation since 2015 (when the 
MRC first published this report), with the exception of The Times which saw a five per 
cent increase.   
 
The report also considers the market share for each newspaper in the context of both 
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printed and online news; this was measured according to the ‘reach’ of each 
newspaper.  Again, the Sun dominated, with a share of 20.20%, followed closely by 
the Daily Mail with a share of 18.22%.  By newspaper Group, the DMG Media have 
the largest share of reach at 28.36%, followed closely by News UK at 24.83%.   
 
The picture changes when considering the reach of news websites: The BBC has a 
74% reach, followed by The Sun at 71%, and The Daily Mail at 58%.  Sky News 
website has a 37% reach.  The Media Reform Coalition report also considered what 
percentage of the public follow news organisations on social media, focusing on 
Facebook, Twitter, Instagram and Snapchat.  The BBC has the highest percentage in 
all cases, with between 32 and 37%.  Sky News is the second highest on Twitter and 
Instagram, at between 17 and 19%.  It features as the third highest on Facebook at 
19%.   
 
Turning to the share of television audience, the Media Reform Coalition states “The 
BBC leads the way with 58 per cent, followed by ITV on 38 per cent.  Sky, despite 
considerably larger revenues than the BBC, accounts for under one-tenth of terrestrial 
television viewing in the UK” (2019, p18).  In the on-demand video subscription sector, 
Netflix dominates, reaching 9.1, million viewers, followed by Amazon Prime Video at 
4.8 million, and Now TV (owned by Sky) at 1.5 million.   
 
The Media Reform Coalition concluded its report by stating that the levels of 
concentration in the UK media market “demonstrate that we need action that will 
challenge blockbuster media and tech companies and the influence that flows from 
their dominance of infrastructure, content and distribution”.  The report asserts that 
any policy in the UK with regard to the public responsibilities attached to media have 
been assigned to broadcasting alone, however, in an era of increasingly converging 
media markets, a combined, holistic approach is now needed.  “The Media Reform 
Coalition believes that media plurality is not a luxury in the digital age but an essential 
part of a media system in which vested interests should not be allowed to dominate.  
We want to see independent media that are able to hold power to account and to serve 
their audiences and the public in general as opposed to shareholders, proprietors or 
politicians… we need a new system of regulation that addresses both the enduring 
(and in many ways intensifying) grip of legacy media on public debate; as well as the 
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control over news and information ‘flow’ wielded by tech giants” (2019, p22).   
 
This conclusion aligns with much of what is being asserted in this thesis; that major 
media corporations are more concerned with serving the needs of the shareholders, 
proprietors and politicians, or indeed the media owners themselves, than the needs of 
the public and democracy.  It cannot be an issue that policy makers consider from the 
perspective of the newspaper market alone, but must be considered holistically, taking 
into account the total media holdings of any one media corporation and the potential 
for the cross-promotion of information that may have the potential to undermine the 
democratic process.  
 
News UK application for Times & Sunday Times to share resources 
 
On 10 January 2019, News UK made an application to the government for the 
undertakings placed upon The Times and Sunday Times in 1981 so as to ensure they 
maintained editorially independent from one another.  News UK’s application asks for 
the two newspapers to share journalistic resources, so as to “mitigate the financial 
challenges that the two titles will face going forward21” (2019).  News UK reference 
two primary issues its newspaper face: a sharp decline in circulation due to news 
consumption moving online that has eroded newspaper revenue from copy sales and 
advertising; and that the digital advertising market is dominated by technical giants 
such as Google and Facebook.  Because of the latter, News UK claims not to be able 
to offset the revenue it has lost due to declining hard copy sales.   
 
The application was met with much criticism, primarily due to concerns regarding the 
threat it poses to the quality of the content contained within the two newspapers, and 
the threat to plurality. A number of high-profile organisations provided a response to 
the consultation, including the Media Reform Coalition (MRC), National Union of 
Journalists (NUJ) and Hacked Off. 
 
 The Hacked Off response to the public consultation on the matter states: 
 
 
21 https://www.gov.uk/government/news/the-times-sunday-times 
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“Subsection 58.2(b) of the Enterprise Act 2002, which sets out the considerations for 
proposed media mergers, specifies a need for “a sufficient plurality of views” in the 
newspaper market. The new clause proposed by News UK would actively undermine 
plurality in the newspaper market, by permitting increased journalistic and, effectively, 
editorial, exchange and convergence between the titles”22  (Hacked Off, 2019).   
 
This research has already proven that the News International titles take a similar 
editorial stance on issues of interest to Rupert Murdoch which has, in the case of The 
BBC and Ofcom, resulted in a disproportionate amount of negative reporting across 
all of his titles.  To merge the editorial departments of The Times and The Sunday 
Times would only increase the potential for this type of practice across a broader range 
of topics, and so removing one of the ‘independent views’ available to the public.   
 
The National Union of Journalists (NUJ) was understandably concerned with the 
impact such a merger would have on the journalists employed by the two newspapers, 
and the effect on their ability to produce quality content.  The MRC focused much of 
its response on the basis of News UK’s application; that there have been material 
changes since 1981, such as the decline in circulation figures and therefore revenue, 
that have negatively impacted its ability to operate the two newspapers cost effectively.  
The MRC responded to this by stating: 
 
“…we believe the request should be rejected on the basis that there have been no 
material changes in circumstances that would justify any diminution or revision of the 
agreed conditions. The print circulation of newspapers may be shrinking, but the 
prevailing evidence suggests that the audience reach of the largest titles – including 
those owned by News Corp – is increasing. What’s more, recent studies have shown 
the enduring influence that national newspapers have over the wider news agenda, 
including television news and the BBC23” (MRC,2019). 
The MRC’s statement highlights a crucial issue in the argument against News UKs 
 
22https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/794817/Hacked_Off_respo
nse_to_Times_undertaking_consultation.pdf  
23 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/794822/media
_reform_coalition_11_Feb.pdf  
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application, and in the arguments presented in this these: that there remains the 
prevalent threat that powerful media companies are able to use the plethora of 
resources at their disposal to influence the news agenda, and therefore public opinion; 
and that this threat is not seen to be diminishing (thus far) in the new digital 
environment.  The large players continue to dominate in setting the agenda and 
audience reach in spite of the very arguments put forth by News UK with regard to 
declining circulation.   
On 10 April 2019, the Secretary of State published that he was ‘minded to accept’ the 
application on the grounds that there has been material change in circumstance in 
1981, and that it would not operate against the public interest He did, however, ask 
that News UK look to provide the government with a revised set of undertakings to 
address his concerns with regards to the ‘lack of clarity’ in governance.  The revised 
undertakings include provisions that state the two newspapers shall continue to be 
published as separate publications and that the editors shall not be appointed or 
removed without the approval of the Independent National Directors (of which there 
are six).  It also retains the following undertaking with regard to the editors and 
proprietors working relationship: 
 
“The Editor of each Newspaper shall retain control over any political comment 
published in their newspaper and, in particular, shall not be subject to any restrain or 
inhibition in expressing opinion or in reporting news that might directly or indirectly 
conflict with the opinions or interests of any of the newspaper proprietors…”24 (News 
UK, 2019).   
 
The context for this piece of research as explored in the literature review chapters 
identifies much in the way of theory and evidence that Rupert Murdoch (the 
‘proprietor’) has influenced or instructed his editors with regards to the political stance 
of the newspaper, and even with regard to content.  The results of the content analysis 
for this piece of research provide a measure of tangible evidence to this effect: where 
Murdoch holds a particular ideological view, and/ or where there is commercial gain to 
be had, consistent messaging can be found in all of his newspapers.   
 
 
24 https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-final-version-of-the-revised-undertakings-from-news-uk 
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There is argument to be had that the two newspapers do not operate with editorial 
independence from their proprietor as it stands today, let alone should their editorial 
departments begin to operate on a ‘shared resource’ basis.  In 2012 the editor of The 
Times, James Harding, was said to be sacked by Murdoch; some of the reasons cited 
in the press reporting at the time was because Murdoch was unhappy with both how 
the newspaper reported on the phone hacking scandal, and that it was supporting 
Barack Obama in the upcoming US presidential election.  Murdoch is said to have 
sacked Harding without the permission of the Independent Directors, as is required by 
the 1981 undertakings.25   
 
Online news 
 
The new digital environment and online news is an important factor to consider in the 
context of this thesis, as it can be challenged that the issue of Murdoch using the 
power if his press to undermine competitors and regulators becomes less relevant as 
more and more people turn to online news sources.   It is a valid challenge where 
considering the new digital environment, but it very much depends on to what extent 
online news is really offering an increased, diversified range of ‘news voices’ for 
consumers to choose from.   
 
Furthermore, online news becomes even more relevant where the BBC has 
established itself as one of the most popular and trusted online news sources in the 
UK; where previously Murdoch’s media business was competing with the BBC in the 
broadcasting industry alone, it now faces yet another market in which it is competing 
with the Public Service Broadcaster.  The following section of the discussion chapter 
establishes that in spite of the rise of technology and the ‘new digital environment’, the 
traditional news providers continue to dominate the online news agenda.  As such, 
plurality concerns are not mitigated by the move to online news, and therefore the 
issue of Murdoch having the ability to undermine regulators and competitors so as to 
satisfy a corporate agenda and expand his business does not go away in the new 
digital environment.    
 
 
25 https://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/mediatechnologyandtelecoms/media/9740384/James-Harding-steps-down-
as-editor-of-The-Times.html 
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In 2019 Ofcom published its report on News Consumption (Ofcom, 2019).  The report 
identified that 66% of adults in the UK access news content online.  However, the 
research found that the frequency with which people were consuming news online 
could have been under-reported, as many associate ‘news’ with content that is 
published in newspapers and on TV.  Furthermore, through the growing use of smart 
phones and devices, and social media, news content is often ‘mixed in’ with other 
types of content, and so the reader doesn’t always recognise that they are consuming 
news content.  
 
The report states that “social media is the most popular type of online news, used by 
44% of UK adults, compared to 37% that use any other type of internet source” 
(Ofcom, 2018).  However, it also states that while this percentage of the survey 
respondents can recall the social media site through which they consume news (76% 
said they use Facebook), some cannot remember the news source itself.  “Qualitative 
research suggests that this may be partly because social media sites display news 
content from a wide range of different sources and alongside other types of content, 
making it harder to distinguish news from other kinds of content and to identify the 
original source” (2018, p9). 
 
A second report about the news in the UK was published by Ofcom in 2018, titled ‘The 
Changing World of the News’ (Ofcom, 2018). The research was undertaken with 96 
participants in a qualitative format.  The overall findings detail that participants 
consider the term ‘news’ to mean more than just content that derives from journalistic 
sources.  News could, therefore, be considered to include ‘status updates’ on social 
media informing the reader of something that is going on in the world that they consider 
themselves to be a part of. 
 
News was seen by the participants to be most important to them in the context of their 
personal and social lives, and for some, at a ‘societal level’ as well.  However, it would 
appear from the results that while the participants consider the news to have the 
important duty of holding power to account and alerting the general public to 
information that they would either want or need to know, the report states that “many 
participants took longer to realise this, and questioned how well the news was fulfilling 
its role in the democratic process…” (op cit).  
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An additional report published by Ofcom in 2018 was titled ‘Scrolling News: the 
changing face of online news consumption”.  The report (Ofcom, 2018) focused solely 
on news consumption online, and was undertaken with 22 respondents who were 
selected to be demographically representative of the country.  The respondents filled 
out a media diary for one week and took part in individual interviews in which they 
were asked about their news consumption, attitude towards online news, and the 
broader news landscape.  The high-level results identified three key findings: the 
primary device for news consumption is a smartphone; social media is the primary 
source for online news consumption; and the mindset with which participants consume 
the news is passive.   
 
Again, this report identified the potential for the ‘under-reporting’ of how much people 
consume news online, and states in its executive summary that “these findings – not 
just how and why people access the news, but also how much this differs from what 
they think they are doing – have potentially huge implications for how news 
consumption is understood, and how it is measured in future” (2018, p3).  A critical 
finding of the study is that news is typically delivered online in ’news feed’ style, I.e. A 
continuous provision of content that can be ‘scrolled’ through, clicked on, etc.  The 
report states that: “This style of delivery often made judging or evaluating news content 
difficult, and news was increasingly indistinguishable from purely social media and 
entertainment. Respondents were often unsure of the sources of news articles, 
whether a particular article was news at all (rather than an advert or promoted content), 
or how it had reached them” (2018, p6).  
   
The findings for both reports are in keeping with the literature examined and discussed 
in chapter two (The New Digital Environment); however, it presents a challenge to the 
argument that the availability of so many sources of news online means that the reader 
is no longer reliant on a single, or handful of newspapers.  As discussed in chapter 
two, Bakker and Sadaba (2009) claim that internet users are in many cases ‘active’ 
and seek out content to suit their clearly defined needs; however, the reports published 
by Ofcom in 2018 assert the opposite, that the majority of users consuming news 
online are doing so in a passive manner.  So much so that in many cases the amount 
of news consumed was not always easily identifiable by the respondent.   
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As so much of people’s lives are now centered around ‘online’, it can be asserted that 
for some people news is consumed actively, but for many it is done so passively. This 
raises considerable concern both in the context of this piece of research and in the 
broader context of the concentration of ownership and the impact on democracy.  The 
issue is two-fold: firstly, as social media evolves and becomes more and more 
engrained in everyday lives, the likelihood (based on the findings of Ofcom) is that 
news content will be consumed on an increasingly passive basis.  Secondly, at 
present, there is a distinct lack of regulation to address concerns with regards to online 
news aggregators. An increasingly passive audience receiving news content that 
derives from only a handful of sources controlled by major media corporations has the 
potential to do considerable harm to the democratic process.   
 
As considered in chapter two, ‘The New Digital Environment’, and six, ‘Growing 
Awareness’, to date, plurality concerns have not been mitigated by any additional 
sources of news that can be found online.  There are then two main concerns that 
remain with regard to plurality: that the traditional major news providers in the UK 
continue as the major providers online; and the lack of transparency to the ‘general’ 
reader with regard to the source of the news.  In the absence of an updated regulatory 
framework that takes a holistic approach to media ownership and plurality concerns, 
there is the potential for the issue to worsen.  As Feintuck and Varney state, the trend 
towards online news consumption is further compounding the existing issue of 
concentration of ownership in the British media market: “In Britain, with the pattern of 
concentration in the press and cross-media… there is a clear and present threat to 
diversity of views in circulation.  If, in addition, the leading market players were also to 
control technological gateways in distribution such as those present in the digital 
television markets (E. Varney, 2005) than a still more virulent form of the problem is 
presented” (2006, p59).   
 
In Ofcom’s 2018 report to the Secretary of State, titled ‘The operation of the media 
ownership rules listed under Section 391 of the Communications Act 2003’, it 
considered whether growth in online news and the subsequent increase in the number 
of news providers publishing content online has the potential to ‘strengthen plurality’ 
and reduce the influence of the major media providers/ owners.  However, Ofcom 
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states in the report’s executive summary that “At present, the evidence indicates that 
the rise of news online has not yet materially reduced the influence of traditional news 
providers.  These providers have established themselves online through their own 
websites and apps and the available evidence suggests that their content is widely 
consumed in third party platforms such as social media” (2018, p2). 
 
Ofcom’s findings echo much of what was discussed in chapter two with regard to the 
new digital environment; that despite there being a virtually limitless platform upon 
which a multitude of actors can publish, it remains the case that the traditional news 
providers dominate.  Furthermore, the issue is no longer confined to content providers.  
The Ofcom report states that “Other risks include popular online providers such as 
social media and search engines influencing public opinion by controlling what news 
stories people see (through algorithms that manage the prominence of items in a news 
feed or in response to a search query)” (2018, p2).  This should feature as a key issue 
for any future consideration of media ownership and plurality online.  Measuring the 
dominance of a media corporation in terms of influence is complex, particularly where 
considering issues of cross-media ownership; this becomes more complex where a 
media corporation enters into deals or partnerships with news aggregators or 
gatekeepers I.e. Social media sites and search engines that ensure their online 
content featured in the ‘news feed’ of the majority of the public.   
 
A House of Lords report (2019) titled ‘Regulating in a digital world’, argues that there 
is indeed a need for regulation to address such issues, and that as is the case in the 
traditional media market, the digital world is also dominated by a very small number of 
very large companies.  Despite the report considering the issue from a much broader 
perspective than just news provision, it directly acknowledges the potential for major 
corporations to take advantage of the major profits to be gained in what is a largely 
unregulated space.  The report (HoL, paper 299, p3) states: 
 
“The digital world has become dominated by a small number of very large companies.  
These companies enjoy a substantial advantage, operating with an unprecedented 
knowledge of users and other businesses.  Without intervention the largest tech 
companies are likely to gain more control of technologies which disseminate media 
content, extract data from the home and individuals or make decisions affecting 
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people’s lives…. Regulation of the digital environment is fragmented with overlaps and 
gaps.  Notably, there is no specific content regulator for the internet.  We recommend 
the development of a comprehensive and holistic strategy for regulation.”   
 
Much like the traditional press in the UK, the digital world is similarly dominated by a 
small number of large, well established and wealthy companies. While they are not 
the same companies as those dominating in the ‘offline’ media markets, it 
demonstrates that such oligopolistic, market structures can be achieved even on such 
a limitless platform as the internet.  The traditional media companies are already 
exploring new and innovative ways to provide their content online and establish 
themselves as mainstream providers.   
 
Given the issues that exist today with regard to media plurality in the traditional 
markets (in particular the press), even if regulation in the digital environment were to 
be developed on the basis of the same caps and thresholds, it may not be enough to 
mitigate the potential threat to plurality, and therefore democracy. There is no evidence 
to date that suggests Murdoch’s ability to use his news content to criticise the BBC or 
Ofcom and negatively influence the audience with regard to such institutions, is in any 
way under threat as a result of the move to online news.   
 
Social Media, News Aggregators 
 
As explored in chapter two and within this discussion chapter, it remains to be seen 
that the move to online news consumption has mitigated any concerns with regards to 
the plurality of original news sources; the traditional content providers continue to 
dominate the news agenda.  The issue of a sufficient plurality of original sources is 
complicated by online news where social media and news aggregators are involved.  
Using Facebook as an example, it uses algorithms to generate news content for an 
individual’s ‘feed’, and a team of ‘moderators’ to monitor the algorithm.   
 
In 2016, it was reported that the Facebook staff responsible for ‘trending topics’ had 
been routinely suppressing conservative news stories26.  Facebook does not create 
 
26 https://www.wired.com/story/inside-facebook-mark-zuckerberg-2-years-of-hell/ 
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content, and so is protected by the ‘Communications Decency Act 1996’, which means 
online platforms cannot be considered liable for the content published on their 
websites.  As long as Facebook continues to host and share news, it is not responsible 
for the messages being conveyed to the audience.   
 
In the summer of 2016, the Donald Trump presidential campaign began to use 
Facebook to its advantage;  it uploaded the details of its registered voters to Facebook 
and, using the ‘audience lookalike tool’ began sending targeted advertisements to a 
much wider group of people with similar traits to their registered voters. 
Simultaneously, unknown actors were using Facebook to share ‘fake news stories’, 
such as the Pope endorsing Donald Trump for president.  “By the end of the campaign, 
the top fake stories on the platform were generating more engagement than the top 
real ones”. 
 
In 2018, a whistleblower from the firm ‘Cambridge Analytica’ revealed that it had 
illegally harvested the Facebook data of some 50 million users and sold this to 
politicians in America to be used in their election campaigns 
(https://www.theguardian.com/news/series/cambridge-analytica-files).  The targeted 
messaging, combined with fake news stories that were being shared at an exponential 
rate thanks to the Facebook algorithm, is thought to be responsible for influencing 
voter opinion.  It has also been reported in the same year-long investigation by the 
Guardian that a data company associated with Cambridge Analytica undertook similar 
practices to influence the results of the ‘vote leave’ campaign in Britain, resulting in 
‘Brexit’.   
 
While this matter is not a direct consequence of a concentration of ownership, it is 
relevant to the arguments put forward with regards to the need for the plurality of 
original news sources.  The MRC work discussed earlier in this chapter clearly 
identifies the passive nature with which the audience consumes news via social media, 
and that there is often a lack of engagement with the news source.  This is supported 
by the Wired reporting that the fake news stories published during the Trump election 
campaign were generating more engagement than the real news stories; the audience 
is at risk of consuming information, unaware of its credibility.  Where this occurs, they 
are subject to undue influence and the potential to form political opinion based on 
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falsities.   
 
All of the above demonstrates that policy makers need to understand the insidious 
process by which overly powerful media and technical actors use their own outlets to 
further their own agendas and commercial self-interest.  Google and Facebook might 
do it through their own algorithms, but corporations involved in the production of news 
remain more potent in their ability to constrain or dictate what journalists do, what 
stories they pursue, and what editorial lines are taken. 
 
The Negative Reporting Exists 
 
The empirical evidence found in this study proves that a negative bias in the reporting 
of the Murdoch owned newspapers in the UK about the BBC exists, as does a less 
established but still obvious bias in the reporting about Ofcom.  There are a number 
of potential implications that will be explored in this chapter: the impact of such bias 
on News International’s competitors and regulators alike; the effect it has on their 
standing in the eye of the public; and the impact of such reporting in the eyes of the 
policy makers/ decision makers where they are considering issues relating to the 
regulation of the media markets, and in particular the BBC given its unique position as 
a public service broadcaster with a licence fee determined by the government.   
 
It is worth repeating evidence of the clear agenda which News International’s owners 
have themselves expressed in respect of the BBC and Ofcom, in order to dispel any 
consideration that evidence of editorial bias in their newspapers might be coincidental 
or separate from that of the Murdochs’ personal opinions. The following statements 
are taken from speeches by members of the Murdoch family (as previously referred to 
in chapter three).   
 
The first are comments taken from  the Mactaggart lecture delivered by Rupert 
Murdoch at the Edinburgh International Television Festival in 1989, in which he stated 
that the evolution of broadcasting in the UK had come about in a fashion that was “very 
appealing to the British Establishment, with its dislike of money-making and its notion 
that public service is the preserve of paternalists” (Murdoch, 1989).  Much of the 
speech focused on competition and regulation within the television market, often 
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referring to the press and its liberation from regulation.  Murdoch argued in favour of 
competition and against monopolies, asking why television should be exempt from the 
laws of supply and demand that the newspaper market operated in.  He asserted that 
“…a largely market-led television system, with viewers choosing from a wide variety 
of channels financed in various ways, will produce a better television system than 
todays” (op cit).   
 
The speech was timely given it came in the same year that Murdoch launched Sky 
Television, and that at the time the BBC was the most popular broadcaster in Britain 
with guaranteed funding from the licence fee.  Murdoch claimed to be “…suspicious 
of elites including the British broadcasting elite, which argue for special privileges and 
favours because they are supposed to be in the public interest as a whole”.  The elites 
he spoke of included the BBC, and its supporters in government, both of which had 
allowed for a system that he felt had “…debilitating effects on British society, by 
producing a TV output which is so often obsessed with class, dominated by anti-
commercial attitudes…”(op cit).   While not calling for the BBC to abolished, he was 
arguing for a system similar to PBS in the United States: a public sector that still had 
a place in British society, but in a scaled-down form.   
 
Perhaps one of Murdoch’s most interesting statements during this speech was when 
he referred to criticism of the amount of media he owned at that time.  Referring to his 
newspaper titles, he explained that News International held three daily and two 
Sunday national titles, and not all were profitable.  He rightly pointed out that News 
International’s readers were free to choose what to read, and to select newspapers 
from other newspaper groups aside from his own.  He also stated that with only 24% 
of the market he could hardly be accused of having a monopoly; he stated that “add 
to this the fact our newspapers have widely divergent views, and that our readers also 
buy magazines, watch television and listen to radio.  It is clear that we are but one of 
many competing voices.  This is as it should be in a democracy” (op cit).  The empirical 
evidence that derives from this study challenges Murdoch’s assertion that his 
newspapers have widely divergent views, when clearly, decades after this speech was 
given all of his newspapers were reporting similar views and a consistently negative 
editorial agenda that supports Murdoch’s disdain for the BBC.   
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Twenty years after Rupert Murdoch gave his speech, his son, James Murdoch, also 
delivered the Mactaggart lecture at the 2009 Edinburgh International Television 
Festival.  His speech was titled ‘The Absence of Trust’, and he opened with remarks 
regarding the British Establishment and being comforted in the knowledge that he 
would not be included following his speech.  His speech echoed much of his father’s 
that came twenty years before and opened with comment on the current status of the 
television market, the policy framework, and how “the result is lost opportunities for 
enterprise, free choice and commercial investment” (p3, 2009).    
 
James Murdoch re-visited much of the criticism his father previously offered with 
regard to regulation of the media industry, referring to Ofcom specifically and the 
supposedly large-scale activities it undertakes.  He stated that it is not rational for the 
authorities to manage the media industry in such a way.  He used the example of the 
decision of the European Commission to ban a single broadcaster form securing the 
rights to the Premier League Football (the EU had ordered that, for competition 
reasons, at least two of the broadcast packages had to be won by a broadcaster other 
than Sky). Murdoch stated that Ofcom’s assertion that it was not in the business of 
intervening was “…becoming impossible to believe in the face of so much evidence of 
the exact opposite” (2009,p7).  It was a clear statement of disdain for Ofcom in light of 
a decision that directly affected the business of Sky, that was part owned and 
effectively controlled by News International.   
 
Moving to the BBC, James Murdoch’s comments were arguably more pointed and 
critical.  He stated that “The BBC is dominant.  Other organisations might rise and fall 
but the BBC’s income Is guaranteed and growing.  In stark contrast, the other 
terrestrial networks are struggling” (2009, p8).  Interestingly, James Murdoch pointed 
out that “…we no longer have a TV market, a newspaper market, a publishing market.  
We have, indisputably, an all-media market” (2009, p3). p  It is for this very reason that 
this thesis asserts the need for a policy framework that looks to address ownership in 
a comprehensive manner; that takes into account not only how much of each media 
sector one media group owns, but to consider them in context of each other, and 
furthermore, the reach of such groups when it comes to online journalism and the 
availability of original news sources.  
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In the clearest statement of his overall approach, James Murdoch said “A heavily 
regulated environment with a large public sector crowds out the opportunity for profit, 
hinders the creation of new jobs, and dampens innovation in our sector” (2009, p9).  
Like his father, he was setting out a corporate and a personal political agenda that was 
hostile towards the BBC and regulators such as Ofcom, on both philosophical and self-
interested commercial grounds, thus setting the groundwork for this study on editorial 
bias.  
 
The potential to influence the public 
 
It is often quoted and discussed that to prove the effects of negative reporting on an 
audience is notoriously difficult to establish.  As discussed, this work does not assert 
that the negative reporting it has identified with regards to the BBC and Ofcom does 
indeed affect readers opinion of the respective organisations, but it does speak to the 
potential for such reporting to do so.   
 
However, the impact of such report on readers opinion has been studied before.  In 
1989, S Barnett undertook a study on behalf of the Broadcasting Research Unit that 
looked to understand the impact of cross-media ownership on public opinion.  
Undertaken in the context of News International’s ownership of six of the nine available 
satellite channels due to be broadcast by the end of 1989, the study considered the 
opinions of readers of News International’s five newspapers with regards to media and 
broadcasting issues, and whether they were influenced by the newspaper’s parent 
organisations interest in new channels.  Its focus was the comparison of the opinions 
of readers of News International newspapers compared with non-News International 
owned newspapers. 
 
Barnett (1989, pi) states that the results of the study “…suggests the presence of a 
measurable effect on public opinion which goes beyond the acceptable boundaries of 
promoting the commercial interests of proprietors.”  The study established this via an 
extensive survey that covered a many number of questions, including whether readers 
deemed certain changes to existing channels as a good idea, whether the level of 
supervision and regulation over the broadcast industry was appropriate, readers’ 
attitudes to new channel, and so on.   
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The study offers some key insights into the opinions of News International readers that 
are key to the central theme of this these.  Firstly, Barnett’s study found that readers 
of the News International newspapers were far less supportive of the BBC licence fee 
compared with readers of non-News International owned newspapers: 
 
“The BBC licence fee has majority support amongst viewers as a whole: 49% approve 
of it as a means of funding BBC television, while 44% disapprove.  By a substantial 
margin, the majority amongst News International readers is reversed: over half, 56%, 
oppose the licence fee compared to 37% who approve it” (Barnett, 1989, pii).     
 
Barnett’s study also considered audience opinions of the regulation and policies 
surrounding the broadcast industry, which again, were clearly influenced by the parent 
organisations approach to reporting on such matters.  Barnett (1989, piii) explains: 
 
“Readership of newspapers owned by News International is irrefutably associated with 
opinions about broadcasting policy which are out of step with the population as a 
whole.  Such readers tend to be more opposed to current and future regulation of 
commercial channels; more hostile to existing terrestrial channels; better disposed to 
new channels, with higher expectations of their quality; and more critical of the licence 
fee.”   
 
While the impact on audience opinion is not the primary focus of this thesis, the 
findings of Barnett’s study provide strong indication that the negative reporting 
identified via the content analysis in this work would have likely had a similar effect.  
Furthermore, it provides strong and reliable evidence that such negative reporting that 
aims to be persuasive in pursuit of the parent organisation’s corporate agenda.  
Barnett (1989, p19) summarises the study as follows: 
 
“Overwhelmingly, the weight of this evidence suggests that the editorial and reporting 
approach to broadcasting matters being pursued by News International is having a 
material effect on the opinions of readers… Most reporting and editorial comment 
involving the BBC has been relentlessly negative, whether dealing with the iniquity of 
licence fee levels; programme content; payment to staff; or Government intervention 
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in contentious programming.  Similarly, both news and editorial columns have warmly 
embraced the concepts of deregulation and choice, frequently advertising the new 
viewing opportunities available through satellite channels and criticising any 
recommendation which involve regulation of these channels.”   
 
The study identifies an obvious and concerning trend of reporting that aims to 
persuade the readers against both the BBC and broadcast regulators, both of which 
represented either significant competition in a market in which the newspapers parent 
organisation, News International, was looking to participate.    
 
Naturally, it begs the question of how any such influence over reader opinion will have 
a tangible effect on News Internationals business and its ability to participate in the 
UK broadcast markets.  As discussed earlier in this work, it can have such tangible 
effects in one of two ways.  Firstly, persuading the reader against the BBC, or certain 
areas of regulation and policy, may have an impact on that readers’ choice of vote in 
an election; for example, if a particular party is promising to review the BBC licence 
fee should it be voted into power, the News International readers may be more inclined 
to vote for that party given the continuously negative rhetoric about the licence fee that 
they will have read in their daily newspaper.     
 
Secondly, should the News International newspapers continuously print negative 
content regarding the BBC or certain areas of regulation, or both, the politicians may 
be more inclined to agree policies or initiatives that are aligned with News 
International’s desires within these areas so as to ensure its support when it comes to 
an election.  The effects of reporting on election outcomes are widely discussed in a 
number of academic sources; securing the support of popular newspapers, such as 
those owned by News International, can help a political party win an election, and as 
such is often considered the reason that politicians will look to remain ‘in favour’ with 
proprietors like Rupert Murdoch.   
 
Colin Seymour-Ure (1997) explored the effects of the national press reporting on the 
1997 general election.  His study looked at the partisanship of each newspaper during 
the 1992 election, if and how they changed, and the type of editorial commentary each 
published in the run up to the 1997 election.  He explained that leading up to the 1997 
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election the UK newspapers’ attitudes and approaches came under a lot of scrutiny, 
and that editorial partisanship became a political issue. 
 
He discussed the ‘unclear’ influences that would have been a factor in a newspaper’s 
decision with regard to which political party to support.  Noting that readers tend to 
share the papers’ political views, it would then become a somewhat risky decision for 
a paper to move away from long-standing support for one particular party, given it 
could alienate some of its loyal readers.  In discussing the Sun in particular, Seymoure-
Ure notes that its readers were typically from the social classes that Labour considered 
as its constituency, and yet The Sun had chosen to back the Conservatives during the 
Thatcher and Major reign.  He questioned whether, given Labour’s sharp rise in 
popularity leading up to the 1997election, could the Sun afford to go on supporting the 
Conservatives, and furthermore, risk losing irritated readers to its main competitor, 
The Daily Mail.   
 
Seymoure-Ure reports that The Sun did indeed lose readers , and sales fell by 
204,000; while the Editors at the time were not said to be pleased with the decision to 
change as instructed to do so by Murdoch, it was recognised that to support the 
Conservatives during a ‘Labour landslide’ would have resulted in worse losses. His 
commercial motives were therefore clear with regard to ensuring maintained 
readership and sales.  However, Seymoure-Ure states that Murdoch’s ‘policy motive’ 
could only be inferred, though it was not unreasonable to assume it played a role in 
his decision. “His media empire would be at risk from controls on concentration and 
cross-ownership, including the coming digital TV systems… His tabloid papers would 
also be hit by privacy legislation… Tony Blair was said not to have done a deal but 
certainly to have indicated that if Murdoch behaved responsibly, his British interests 
would not be damaged” (1997, p592). 
 
 This revisits one of the themes explored in chapter three, ‘Murdoch and News 
Corporation’, whereby Murdoch has been well known to change his political allegiance 
to suit his business needs, and that knowing he could secure the support of Tony Blair 
at a time when there was the potential for policy decisions that would likely be to the 
detriment of his plans for commercial expansion, he assigned his newspapers’ political 
support accordingly.  However, there is also an alternative view to be considered, as 
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explained by McChesney (2013) and also referenced in chapter three, that Murdoch 
likes winners.  Contrary to the theory that his assignation of political support amongst 
his newspapers is what secured Blair’s win, McChesney (2013) considers that in fact 
Murdoch foresaw the likely outcome of the election, and needing the support of the 
winner, chose to support the Labour party instead move his support to the Labour 
Party.   
 
Seymoure-Ure’s study focussed on the language used, and percentage of articles that 
were attributed to certain issues, for editorial pieces only.  This was likely due to in part 
to the nature of an editorial being the legitimate place in which a newspaper can 
establish its owners’ voice and opinion, as opposed to simply reporting the facts (which 
is what one would hope ‘news’ stories would do).  This thesis, however, includes 
empirical evidence that looked at all types of articles including news and editorial, and 
whether they were reporting positive, negative or neutral messaging.  We might 
normally expect a newspaper to be neutral in its news stories, confining its negative 
or positive opinions to the editorial pieces.   
 
However, as this study proves, negative messages about the subject matter were 
conveyed in the news stories as well as editorial, and indeed the ‘others’ (i.e. a piece 
in the sports section).  As outlined in the ‘key findings’ section at the beginning of this 
chapter, 47% of the ‘news’ stories about the BBC in the News International papers 
were categorised as negative, vs 28% categorised as the same in the non-News 
International.  70% of the editorials were categorised as negative.  This would indicate 
that the ideologies of the newspaper, or indeed the newspaper group given the 
correlation across the News International newspapers, have bled into the news 
reporting.  The demarcation between news and editorial has become blurred. Results 
for Ofcom were not quite as clear-cut, as was expected.  Only 9% of the News 
International news stories about Ofcom were negative, and less than 8% for the 
editorials.  That being said, when considering the total number of negative articles 
about Ofcom across all six newspapers (News International owned and non-News 
International owned), News International was responsible for publishing 78%.  
 
Des Freedman reflects on the press coverage of the 1997 election, stating it was just 
as much Blair who chose to make peace with media moguls such as Murdoch, as it 
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was Murdoch’s choice to support him and persuade him away from Labour’s manifesto 
proposals with regard to a monopolies and mergers investigation into media 
concentration in the UK.  However, Freedman asserts that “the argument that Labour’s 
defeat in 1992 was due to tabloid hostility has been decisively rejected” (2014, p93); 
there is no concrete evidence to support the theory that the press have such an 
influence on the public vote in an election.  
 
During the 2015 election, following a sustained and scathing attack on the Labour 
party in the press, the Conservatives unexpectedly won an overall majority.  However, 
as Barnett explains it is well known that voter ‘effects’ research is questionable, and 
so it is not possible to make solid assertions with regard to the impact of the press on 
the public’s decision; the same issue can be found with this study (2015, p91).  While 
it can confidently claim to have found a clear editorial bias in News International 
reporting about the BBC, it cannot infer a direct causal link with readers’ opinion of the 
BBC; a recognised limitation of this study. 
 
However, Barnett (2015) does explain that there are a number of factors that point to 
the mitigation of any argument that the decline in newspaper readership as a result of 
the ‘new digital environment’ means a ‘waning influence’.  Firstly, online news sites 
have broadened the reach of the already existing news providers in the UK; this issue 
was explored in detail in chapter two and suggests that traditional news providers still 
remain dominant in overall reach.  This is further supported by the Media Reform 
Coalition 2019 report ‘Who Owns the News’ that outlined similar findings; however, 
Barnett (2015) notes that it has to be considered whether the metrics for online 
readership can really be counted as thus, as an online ‘view’ does not necessarily 
mean the content has been consumed.   
 
Furthermore, through their exploitation of social media and online platforms, journalists 
and commentators have the ability to further promote opinions and information from 
personal and professional ‘accounts’ online (I.e. Twitter, Facebook, Instagram).  
Similarly, there is no mechanism at present that can provide reliable data regarding 
the influence this has on the reader (I.e. Does ‘following’ journalists and commentators 
encourage readers to turn to the newspaper or TV they are employed by?)  Barnett 
(2015, p91) concludes on this point that while social media has changed the way in 
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which a growing number of people engage with content, it remains unknown whether 
social media platforms are able to complete with the power of the ‘one-to-many’ model 
of the traditional mass media.   
 
Barnett also argues that, whether or not the press has any real influence on voter 
decision, they do have the ability to ‘drive the agenda’.  This in itself affords them 
considerable power, particularly during an election campaign, as it will determine 
which issues are discussed and therefore what information is put forward to the public.  
The 2015 election was often described as a ‘social media election’, however Barnett 
asserts “the UK press therefore still dominates Britain’s national conversation and was 
instrumental in setting the campaign agenda.  Its influence operates in inchoate and 
intangible ways which defies empirical measurement..27.” (Barnett, 2015).   If applied 
in the context of reporting on the BBC and Ofcom, while it cannot or has not been 
proven that News International’s overtly negative coverage would have an impact on 
the reader, we can at least hypothesise that they would have been influential in driving 
an anti-BBC and anti-Ofcom agenda within the news arena.  
 
The issue of negative reporting and its potential to influence the public is not only 
concerned with elections; there are other examples of issues covered in the press in 
a consistently negative way that have had the potential to damage society.  The News 
Corporation owned newspaper coverage of climate change has been considered and 
referenced by a number of authors and academics.   David McKnight states that “News 
Corporation had been a major outlet of climate change denial in the ten years before 
its owners’ 2007 ‘conversion’.  Moreover, Murdoch himself had been personally 
involved in the Cato Institute, a Washington based think tank that specialised in the 
denial; in 1997, he joined its board” (2013, p197).    
 
McKnight further states that “in the decade before Murdoch’s 2007 climate change 
‘conversion’, almost all of Fox news’ ‘voice-of-authority’ program hosts routinely 
scorned the idea of global warming and criticised those who accepted it.  Climate 
change was presented as merely a political issue” (op cit).  McKnight notes that the 
 
27 https://inforrm.org/2015/05/15/four-reasons-why-a-partisan-press-helped-win-it-for-the-tories-steven-
barnett/  
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Murdoch-owned New York Post also published stories with regard to climate change 
being an over-exaggerated, ‘non-scientific’ issue, but that “Murdochian climate change 
scepticism was not confined to the United States.”  The British Murdoch-owned 
newspapers also included climate change scepticism, with the Sun including various 
columnists who wrote polemical pieces claiming climate change to be a ‘false-science’ 
or ’tax-raising’ scheme.    
 
McKnight explains that Murdoch’s erratic approach to climate change as an issue was 
particularly revealing of the power exercised by such powerful conglomerates with 
access to a global audience: “At its most basic, it demonstrates that News Corporation 
adopts policy attitudes to particular issues and then campaigns on those issues.  When 
the parent company and its CEO announce such attitudes, it is expected to affect the 
kind of news and opinion published or broadcast by its media outlets.” (2013, p209).  
McKnight also discuss the ‘policy attitude’ Murdoch and his media outlets took with 
regard to the Iraq war.  His journalists and editors were said to have rallied behind him 
to support his message, and even went as far as to consistently publish 
unsubstantiated claims that Iraq had a meaningful connection with the 9/11 terrorist 
attacks in New York.  McKnight states that “it simply bypassed the normal process of 
trying to establish facts, understand them and convey them to readers” (2013, p210). 
 
Both examples align with the premise upon which this thesis and the hypothesis is 
based; that a concentration of ownership in the hands of a powerful media mogul can 
lead to a sustained level of reporting driven by the commercial and/or personal 
interests of the owner, and can therefore contribute to the degradation of the 
democratic process.  J Lidberg (2019) discusses this in his writings for the online blog 
‘The Conversation’, in which  he observes the press coverage of the 2019 Australian 
general election, claiming it to be deeply partisan in such a way that it must be 
entrenched within News Corporation as a global entity.  Lidberg (2019) explains that 
“…if the dominant outlet in such a media landscape decides to wholeheartedly back 
one side of politics, it will undoubtedly impact the tenor of a campaign and skew the 
information voters rely on to make up their minds.”   
 
The Potential to influence policy makers  
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In April 2019 the New York Times published the results of its six-month investigation 
into how the Murdoch family turned their media outlets into ‘right-wing political 
influence machines that have destabilised democracy in North America, Europe and 
Australia” (Stack, 2019).  The investigation included 150 interviews with people across 
three continents who either knew the family intimately, helped the family achieve their 
aims, or fought against the family in some form.  Much of it focused on the election of 
President Trump in 2016; a success in part credited to the strong support of the 
Murdoch-owned Fox News channel, and ’Brexit’, again credited in part to the sustained 
reporting in the Murdoch-owned newspaper The Sun (Murdoch is well known for his 
dislike of the European Union).   
 
Stack (2019) makes strong assertions with regard to the influence and power that the 
Murdoch’s wield over the political systems in those countries News Corporation 
predominantly operates in: The United Kingdom, the United States, and Australia.  He 
argues that “…to see Fox News as an arm of the Trump White House risks missing 
the larger picture. It may be more accurate to say that the White House - just like the 
prime ministers’ offices in Britain and Australia - Is just one tool among many that his 
family uses to exert influence over world events.”  He believes that the level of power 
and influence the Murdochs have gained is as a result of the culmination of years’ 
worth of ‘transactional relationships with elected officials’. A recurring theme identified 
in chapter one, ‘Media and Democracy’, and chapter three, ‘Rupert Murdoch and News 
International’, Stack agrees with the consensus that Murdoch owes much of his 
success to his relationships with prime ministers and presidents, even if he can rightly 
claim to have ‘never asked a prime minister for anything’.  Much like the findings of 
the Leveson inquiry, Stack states that “…press barons don’t have to ask when their 
media outlets can broadcast their desires.  Politicians know what Murdoch wants, and 
they know what he can deliver: the base, their voters – power” (Stack, 2019).    
 
 
A number of examples of Murdoch using the power of his press to express his desires, 
and politicians responding accordingly, have been discussed in this work.  Firstly, 
there is the Peacock Committee.  The committee was set up in 1985 by then Prime 
Minister Margaret Thatcher to assess the possibility of advertising revenue as a 
funding model for the BBC, so as to eradicate the existing guaranteed funding from 
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the licence fee.  It was also said to be created as a result of Thatcher’s ideological 
misgivings about the BBC, its size and funding, and her desire to move the 
broadcasting industry towards a commercially driven, free market model.  It was a 
fortunate coincidence that Murdoch shared very similar ideological misgivings and free 
market desires.   
 
It was even more fortunate that the same time that Thatcher decided to set up and 
announce the Peacock Committee, Murdoch’s press (in particular The Times) began 
to run a scathing campaign against the BBC, condemning its requests for a rise in the 
licence fee, and questioning the need for the broadcaster in Britain at all.  As expected, 
the newspaper denied that the negative reporting had anything to do with its parent 
organisation’s opinion on the matter.  However, as Barnett and Curry (1994, p22) 
stated “although the editor, Charles Douglas-Home, angrily denied any proprietorial 
interference, it was scarcely credible that the correspondence with his boss’s interests 
as pure accident.”   
 
Another example comes in the form of the Labour party’s media policy ‘volte-face’ in 
the 1990s, just as Tony Blair was set to come into power.  In contrast to the 
Conservative government that had held office for a long time under Thatcher, Labour 
had lobbied against the concentration of power within the media industry and had even 
tried to introduce bills to prevent proprietors from owning more than one national 
newspaper.  However, as Blair came into the running to be the next Prime Minister, it 
is said that an ‘understanding’ was reached between himself and Murdoch.   
 
McKnight (2012, p160) explains that Murdoch realised Blair represented less of a 
threat to his organisation than his predecessor, John Major, and Blair realised that he 
needed the support of Murdoch’s press to win.  Suspicions of such an agreement 
between the pair were further fuelled when in 1995 an inquiry was launched by the 
Monopolies and Mergers commission to examine Murdoch’s dominance in the cable 
and satellite television market; in traditional Labour style, the inquiry was supported 
by a Labour shadow minister, however, in contrast to what was expected of Labour, 
the minister was ‘ordered’ to withdraw his support by Blair’s office.   
 
If there was any doubt of an alliance between Murdoch and Blair, it was thought to be 
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all but confirmed when it came to the drafting of the Communications Act 2003.  The 
draft bill that proceeded the act was introduced under a Labour government, with Tony 
Blair as Prime Minister.  The bill was deemed as ‘de-regulatory’, and in spite of 
Labour’s history of lobbying against concentrated power in the media industry, the bill 
offered a number of very fortunate relaxations in regulation from which Murdoch stood 
to gain enormously.  Of particular note, Murdoch stood to gain from two particular 
clauses that would see the removal of restrictions on national newspaper owners 
purchasing Channel Five (which would allow Murdoch to enter the terrestrial 
broadcasting market), and the removal of the ban on foreign ownership of UK 
broadcasters.   
 
Freedman (2008, p118) explains that coincidentally, during the time the bill was being 
drafted, BskyB lobbyists met with Downing Street officials on six different occasions 
seeking to gain assurance that plurality concerns would not be used to block mergers, 
and that there would not be a change in approach to the proposed new rules allowing 
the purchase of Channel Five. It was felt at the time that Labour were proposing such 
rules so as to appease Murdoch, whose newspapers had helped Labour win the 1997 
election and had continued to support since then.  In the end, Labour had to 
compromise in light of considerable dissent within the House of Lords and included a 
‘plurality test’ for mergers and acquisitions.  However, many doubted the robustness 
of the test being included in the Communications Act 2003, as historically proprietors 
such as Murdoch had been successful in exerting influence persuading Prime 
Ministers to waive protocol in their favour.    
 
During the Leveson inquiry, a number of witnesses gave statements supporting the 
view that powerful media moguls, and Rupert Murdoch in particular, have the ability to 
exert considerable influence over politicians and prime ministers.  Conservative MP 
Jonathan Aitken stated, “One could give numerous examples of resignations by 
reporters, of the Australian Press Council upholding allegations of bias by Murdoch 
papers in their political reporting and of Mr Murdoch openly pushing his commercial 
interests by using his newspaper powers.”  This supports the theory that the ‘Murdoch 
approach’ with regard to the use of his media holding to exert influence is common 
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across all his media outlets, regardless of which country they operate in, and what 
type of regulatory framework they are subject to.   
 
Lord Justice Leveson concluded that there is no evidence the owner of The Times and 
The Sun made any explicit deals with prime ministers in return for support from his 
newspapers; however, he asserted that politicians were competing for Mr Murdoch's 
support and knew that "taking him on" would likely lead to a backlash from his popular 
press titles: “Sometimes the very greatest power is exercised without having to ask, 
because to ask would be to state the blindingly obvious and thereby diminish the very 
power which is being displayed," he wrote. "Just as Mr Murdoch's editors knew the 
basic ground-rules, so did politicians… The language of trades and deals is far too 
crude in this context. In their discussions with him, whether directly or by proxy, 
politicians knew that the prize was personal and political support in his mass circulation 
newspapers" (P1432, 2011).  
 
The judge said prime ministers would appreciate the consequences of "adopting 
policies which would damage Mr Murdoch's commercial interests" and "disturbing the 
status quo" by bringing in press regulation.  He found that "politicians' interests... would 
find themselves highly aligned with Mr Murdoch's" (op cit), even if the newspaper 
owner never asked a single favour of them. 
 
Chapter three of this thesis details the many prime ministers Murdoch has enjoyed 
friendships with; friendships that have often been of the utmost advantage to Murdoch 
and his global expansion plans.  Following the failure of their original bid for total 
control of BskyB in 2010-11, the Murdochs decided to try again in 2016, and once 
again sought to secure the loyalties of a prime minister to ensure it would happen.  
Stack (2019) discusses the friendship James Murdoch struck up with then Prime 
Minister David Cameron, stating that “…the aims of both parties were clear.  Cameron 
wanted the support of the Murdochs.  James wanted Ofcom, the British regulatory 
agency that would rule on whether the Murdochs were “fit and proper” operators of 
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Sky, out of his way28.”  When Cameron publicly promised that under a Conservative 
government Ofcom would ‘cease to exist’, James Murdoch privately promised 
Cameron that the most popular of the Murdoch owned newspapers, The Sun, would 
reverse its 12-year stance of supporting the Labour Party and put its full weight behind 
the Conservatives and Cameron instead.  This assumption forms the crux of this 
research; that where there is the potential for commercial gain, the Murdochs will use 
the full force of his political power via his newspapers, be it via the sustained criticism 
of a competitor in news content, the support of a political party and/ or leader, or both. 
 
Rupert Murdoch has long been known for disliking the incumbent nature of the 
regulators in Britain, just as he has long been known for his dislike of the BBC.  
However, this assertion with regard to James Murdoch’s needing Ofcom ‘out of his 
way’ provides an apt description of the potential, and likely, motivations on the part of 
the Murdochs when it comes to criticising Ofcom in their British newspapers. The 
results of this research clearly identify an upward trend in negative reporting on the 
part of the News International newspapers on the lead up to and immediately after 
David Cameron’s statement with regard to Ofcom ‘ceasing to exist’ should the 
Conservatives win the 2010 general election.  This was in stark contrast to a 
consistently low level of negative reporting in the non-News International owned 
newspapers (the comparative counterparts).   
 
The literature review touched upon ‘other areas’ of reporting in the Murdoch-owned 
press, particularly in the US, that was seen to be out of touch with general opinion, but 
closely aligned with Rupert Murdoch’s personal and political agenda.  Roy Greenslade 
(2003) wrote about the commonalities that can be found in the reporting in the 175 
Murdoch-owned newspapers around the world.  Greenslade reported that as Chief 
Executive of News Corporation, Murdoch owned “…more than 175 titles in three 
continents, publishes million papers a week and dominates the newspaper markets in 
Britain, Australia and New Zealand.  His television reach is greater still, but 
broadcasting - even when less regulated than in Britain - is not so plainly partisan, it 
is newspapers which set the agenda”.  Greenslade (2003) asserts that the agenda 
 
28 https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/04/03/magazine/james-murdoch-lachlan-
succession.html?mtrref=www.google.com&gwh=68E6DF32159D812036FC57E97BC2E6C6&gwt=pay&assetTyp
e=REGIWALL 
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setting, Murdoch-owned newspapers took a unified approach to promoting the views 
of Murdoch with regard to the Iraq War: “…after an exhaustive survey of the highest-
selling and most influential papers across the world owned by Murdoch’s News 
Corporation, it is clear that all are singing from the same hymn sheet.29”  There was 
no doubt as to Murdoch’s personal opinion on the war thanks to an interview he gave 
to an Australian magazine, ‘The Bullet’, in which he clearly stated he  was pro-war, 
and very supportive of the approach taken by the then Prime Minister Tony Blair and 
President Bush.     
 
In keeping with the findings of McKnight (2013) with regard to the Murdoch-owned 
media outlets reporting on climate change and the Iraq war, Stack (2019) too claims 
that the Murdoch-owned media have continuously looked to push messages that suit 
the agenda of their owner, resulting in such instances as undermining efforts to combat 
climate change.   Stack quotes a study by the Democratic firm ‘Navigation Research’ 
that states only 12 percent of Fox News viewers believe that climate change is a man-
made problem, as opposed to 62 percent of non-Fox news viewers.  Furthermore, as 
observed in an article by Stephen Glover for The Spectator30, Murdoch’s press not 
only took a vehemently pro-war stance, but they also took the opportunity to criticise 
the BBC for its reporting on the war.  Murdoch’s newspapers managed to champion 
two of their proprietor’s opinions and/or ideological beliefs; the need for the war in Iraq, 
coupled with fierce criticism of the BBC.  Unsurprisingly, Murdoch’s press has also 
been known to criticise or undermine the BBC’s coverage of climate change.  
 
Referring to the ‘Brexit’ issue, Stack (2019) not only claims that Murdoch had a hand 
in the final decision for Britain to leave the EU via the Sun’s pro-Brexit stance, but in 
discussing why Murdoch himself was ‘anti-EU’, he stated in an interview with the 
Evening Standard, “when I go into Downing Street, they do what I say; when I go to 
Brussels, they take no notice.”  Stack claims this to be the result of the Murdoch’s 
world view that “… the government was the enemy of an independent media and a 
business model that depended nonetheless on government intervention to advance 
his interests and undermine those of his competitors.  The Murdoch dynasty draws no 
 
29 https://www.theguardian.com/media/2003/feb/17/mondaymediasection.iraq 
30 https://www.spectator.co.uk/article/the-sinister-reason-why-the-murdoch-press-is-attacking-the-bbc 
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lines among politics, money and power; they all work together seamlessly in service 
of the overarching goal of imperial expansion.”   
 
If Murdoch and News International can be successful in this, it lends distinct credibility 
to the hypothesis upon which this thesis is based; that Murdoch and News 
International use sustained negative reporting that is critical of such organisations as 
the BBC and Ofcom to undermine their position in the mind of the public and the policy 
makers.  The issue becomes more serious in nature where News International is 
communicating directly with the public in such a way that undermines those 
organisations that are responsible for the provision of news and content according to 
a strictly public service remit, or those that are responsible for the regulation of much 
of the market in which News International itself operates.   
 
Conclusion 
 
The hypothesis and research questions for this piece of work were as follows: 
 
1. Does an agenda exist in News International’s publications that seek to undermine 
organisations and competitors, which in some way interfere with News International’s 
global expansion plans, specifically focusing on: 
 ⁃ Coverage of the BBC, its funding, structure, governance and ethos; 
 ⁃ Coverage relating to the notion of an independent regulator and Ofcom itself; 
focussing on coverage of Ofcom’s legitimacy, governance, structure and decision 
making. 
 
2. To what extent is this agenda manifested in News International’s publications, both 
through news stories and opinion I.e. The selection of news stories and the way they 
are reported. 
 
The key findings from the empirical evidence (drawn from the content analysis) are 
summarised below.  All statements are made in the context of the comparison between 
the News International owned newspapers compared with the equal standing, non-
News International owned newspapers: 
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• News International published a far greater number of articles about the BBC & Ofcom 
overall 
• News International published a far greater percentage of negative articles about both 
the BBC and Ofcom  
• 47% of the articles News International published about the BBC were negative, 
compared to only 11% of those published about Ofcom; in both cases, News 
International published twice the number of negative articles than that of its 
counterpart newspapers 
• In both cases, News International published a greater percentage of those articles that 
were negative and featured the BBC or Ofcom as the primary focus of the article 
• In both cases, News International published a greater percentage of unsourced 
articles 
• 42% of the News International ‘news’ stories about the BBC were negative, compared 
with 23% in the comparative newspapers 
• 70% of the News International editorials about the BBC were negative, compared with 
26% in the comparative newspapers 
• 10% of the News International ‘news’ stories about Ofcom were negative, compared 
with 2% in the comparative newspapers 
• 11% of the News International editorials about Ofcom were negative, compared with 
10% in the comparative newspapers.   
 
The results identify a clear, negative bias in the reporting of News International with 
regard to both the BBC and Ofcom; though as outlined in the results chapter, there is 
a more obvious negative bias towards the BBC.  The literature review identified a 
number of areas of behaviour on the part of Murdoch and News International that 
demonstrates an aggressive approach to competitors and/or policy makers where it 
poses a threat to the corporation’s expansion plans.  The increased level of negative 
reporting about the BBC as a direct competitor, and one that represents a ‘protected’ 
institution that forms part of the elite British establishment Murdoch abhors, 
demonstrates support for these assertions.  Equally, Ofcom being a regulatory 
authority that had the potential to stand in the way of News International’s plans for 
expansion, as well as a representation of what Murdoch dislikes with regard to the 
fundamental premise of regulation and its restriction of a  completely free market in 
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which he would likely dominate has made it another target. 
 
The volume and percentage of negative stories highlights the extent to which 
Murdoch’s agenda has manifested itself. The News International newspapers 
published a far greater number of stories about the BBC and Ofcom overall.  
Furthermore, the News International newspapers chose to publish a greater number 
of critical stories relating to the BBC or Ofcom than their non-News International 
counterparts.  Consideration of further work that could be undertaken around language 
and types of issues covered forms part of the recommendations that are discussed 
further on in this chapter.   
 
As identified in the analysis of the current policy framework, policy has, to date, lacked 
the required mechanisms to ensure ownership levels remain at an appropriate 
measure so as to avoid a newspaper market in which one or two newspaper groups 
can dominate.  This research proves that News International owning a number of titles 
with separate editorial departments does not mitigate the potential for sustained 
criticism that is clearly influenced or affected by the views of the parent company and/ 
or its owner. Furthermore, it supports the hypothesis that plurality and ownership 
legislation has not, to date, been able to address the ability of media businesses to 
exploit the scale of their enterprises to promote their own commercial interests and 
initiatives while denigrating their competitors.  Legislation needs to address the 
percentage of ownership of the media market as a whole that a newspaper group 
holds as well as the percentage of the market it can reach.  Moreover, given the issues 
identified in chapter two that considers the ‘new digital environment’ with regards to 
traditional news publishers dominating online news digital and social media sources, 
legislation and policy needs to do more to ensure the plurality of original news 
production so as to ensure there is no threat to the democratic process.   
 
Writing about the evidence he submitted to Lord Justice Leveson ahead of the 
Leveson Inquiry, Julian Petley (2012) argues that at present the notion of ‘press 
freedom’ is applied in the context of the freedom of press owners and their ability to 
communicate with the public without the constraints of statutory regulation.  The 
concept of ‘freedom’ is not in turn considered in the context of the reader who, as 
discussed in Chapter One, is heavily reliant on press content in order to function in a 
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democratic society.  Petley (2012, p532) argues that the issue lies in the press’ 
definition of freedom of expression, and the assumption that this applies to 
newspapers in the same way it does to an individual:  
 
“In this view of freedom of expression, it is the interests of the press, not of its readers 
nor of the subjects of its coverage, which are fundamental.  Such a view is based 
(albeit implicitly) on the property rights of press owners, on ‘free market’ economic 
theory, and on the closely related notion of the press as a marketplace of ideas”.   
 
As discussed in Chapter four, if freedom of expression can be considered to be a 
fundamental right of the press, and the press play a fundamental role in the democratic 
process, the principles of ‘free market’ economic theory surely cannot be applied.  
Efficiency in media markets has for a long time depended on vertical and horizontal 
integration that has seen extensive consolidation within the market, compounded by 
the effects of declining readerships and the new digital environment.  The press cannot 
necessarily produce goods of a quality that meet the criteria required by a democracy 
while also looking to produce goods that meet the criteria set by the advertisers 
keeping them in business.   
 
This forms part of the problem of the ‘market model’ of the ‘free press’ in the UK.  It 
operates according to a commercial business model that is profit driven while trying to 
deliver a public service product.  Arguably, the press is therefore a slave to two 
masters; the advertisers, and the public.  But where only one master can be served, 
the press will aim to first serve the needs of their business.  Petley (2012, p533) 
discusses this where he quotes Sparks (1999) as stating: 
 
“Newspapers in Britain are first and foremost businesses.  They do not exist to report 
the news, to act as watchdogs for the public, to be a check on the doings of the 
government, to defend the ordinary citizen against the abuses of power, to unearth 
scandals or to do any of the other fine and noble things that are sometimes claimed 
for the press.  They exist to make money, just as any other business does.  To the 
extent that they discharge any of their public functions, they do so in order to succeed 
as a business.”   
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Petley (2012, p533) states that this becomes most apparent in the popular 
newspapers, I.e. the tabloid press, and that is certainly found to be the case in this 
research where the Murdoch-Owned newspapers were reporting negatively on the 
BBC.  The Sun published the largest percentage of negative articles about the BBC 
(56%), though it was closely followed by The Times (42%) and the Sunday Times 
(46%).  However, in this scenario the Murdoch-owned newspapers were not 
necessarily aiming to serve advertisers (there is no suggestion in the material 
reviewed that this would be the case), but rather the commercial agenda of the 
business and/ or owner by undermining a direct competitor. Petley (2012, p534) 
argues: 
 
“…market power can be as damaging and corrosive as government power of the 
democratic purposes which newspapers are supposed to serve.  Those who argue 
that press freedom is best served by the operations of the ‘free market’ are, frankly, 
either entirely blind to the shortcomings of actually existing markets or dogmatically 
wedded to the notion that the market is always a better means of allocating resources 
than any of the alternatives on offer, or both.”   
 
Some insight into Murdoch’s attitude towards the issues discussed in this thesis can 
be derived from the evidence he gave to the Leveson Inquiry.  When asked if it was 
correct that he was ‘completely oblivious’ to the commercial benefits to his company 
of a particular party winning an election, he responded that he was, ‘absolutely’.  
Murdoch stated, “I have no commercial interests except the newspaper. I love 
newspapers…I take a particularly strong pride in the fact that we have never pushed 
our commercial interests in our newspapers.”  
 
This thesis asserts that, based on the evidence collected via the content analysis, 
Rupert Murdoch has used his newspapers to promote his commercial interests via the 
sustained criticism of the BBC and Ofcom.  The number of negative articles published 
about both entities in comparison with the equal standing, non-News International 
owned comparative newspapers provides overwhelming evidence for this statement.  
 
When asked during the Leveson inquiry if he did not have some duty to answer to the 
shareholders of his company to further its best interests (which would be its business 
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interests given it is a commercial, profit driven entity), Murdoch responded that his 
shareholders would have liked him to ‘get rid of all’ (meaning his newspapers).  As 
discussed in chapter three, Murdoch has run some of his newspapers at a loss, a 
controversial choice from a business and economic perspective.  It can be argued that 
it is to his credit that he does this, for it allows the continued provision of news content 
available to the public from a greater number of sources.  Conversely, it also enables 
him to ensure he has a broad and wide-reaching ability to push forward his agenda. 
 
Previous Prime Minister Tony Blair said in his witness statement to the Leveson inquiry 
“…certain newspapers are used by their owners or editors as instruments of political 
power... in which the boundary between news and comment is deliberately blurred.  
The Sun and the Mail frankly are the two most powerful of the papers, and the Sun in 
particular because it is prepared to shift, it makes it all the more important…”   
 
The results derived from this research support this statement; that the boundaries 
between news and comment are deliberately blurred, and they are done so in order to 
solidify the message.  In this case, it was done so as to reinforce negativity about the 
BBC and Ofcom, but also highlights the potential for reinforced messaging about much 
larger issues that may have direct and serious impact on the democratic process.  
 
Arsenault and Castells’ 2008 study on ‘Switching Power’ liken Murdoch’s powerful 
position in the societies in which he operates (and in which his media dominate) to a 
‘network switch’.  They argue that if society can be considered at the level of 
‘networked forms of organisation’, Murdoch’s ability to “…move between and to 
connect (or disconnect) critical nodes between political, media and economic networks 
creates a circuit that compounds his power to influence multiple networks, giving him 
disproportionate control over the networks of society as a whole.”  (2008, p501).  
 
As touched upon in this thesis, they too note the difficulty of asserting whether 
Murdoch and his News Corporation media holdings have the ability to influence public 
opinion, which is notoriously difficult to measure and assess.  All that can be 
reasonably measured, and is done so in this thesis, is a media corporation and/or 
owner’s ability to do so; and it is this potential that arguably should be suitably 
restrained by adequate policies and regulatory frameworks, not least because of the 
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power of perceived influence.   As Arsenault and Castells’ (2008, p501) assert, “…the 
perception that Murdoch, via his editorial control over his properties, wields 
disproportionate control over public opinion provides him with considerable political 
leverage, which in turn advances the expansion of NewsCorp.”   
 
If it is arguable that the potential for a dominant voice in the media landscape in Britain 
is not suitably contained at present, the issue surely becomes more prevalent as news 
content moves online and is subject to algorithms and gate keeper control.  The Media 
Reform Coalition (2019, p1) state that “…just three companies (News UK, DMG and 
Reach) dominate 83% of the national newspaper market (up from 71% in 2015).  This 
is a market that may be shrinking in terms of print circulation but, assisted by large 
online audiences, is crucial when it comes to setting the agenda for the rest of the 
news media.  When online readers are included, just five companies (News UK, 
Reach, Guardian and Telegraph) dominate some 80% of market share (up from 79% 
in 2015).” Based on MRC information to date, there has been a similar trend of 
consolidation and increased market share among the traditional, major news providers 
online.   
 
Sumpter (2018) examines how algorithms affect and interact with user’s online news 
feeds on social media, and the potential for the way in which these algorithms work to 
further promote certain news stories or areas of interest.  Sumpter (2018, p138-139) 
uses the example of Facebook, explaining that a user’s news feed is built by an 
algorithm that displays news stories based on the choices a user makes i.e. if the user 
‘likes’, ‘shares’ or comments on a news story from The Sun, the algorithm will 
recognise this and ‘suggest’ further news content from the sun.  Equally, if a user likes 
or comments on a news story about, for example, `Brexit and the European Union, the 
algorithm will select further news stories on this topic to populate the users feed.   
 
If such examples were to be applied in the context of this thesis, the issues explored 
could become exasperated because of this algorithmic technology.  If the user clicks 
on, likes or shares a story from The Sun, the algorithm is automatically going to 
populate their feed with more content from that same newspaper.  Equally, if the user 
does the same with a news story that is critical of, for example, the BBC licence fee, 
the same algorithm will apply the same logic and promote further, similar content in 
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the user’s feed.  Therefore, the user is not only subject to the biased, persuasive 
reporting found t to be published by The Sun with regards to the BBC, but the user 
also becomes subject to the effects of an algorithm that will look to further promote 
such content, creating what Sumpter (2018) describes as the ‘echo chamber’ effect.    
 
This argument is, of course, subject to a measure of challenge: it assumes the user 
will only interact with content from one news provider, when in fact it is likely they will 
do so with more than one, and the algorithm will factor in content from a number of 
sources into their daily feed.  Additionally, its effects are based on the premise that 
Murdoch’s newspapers are dominant online, and therefore more likely to be liked or 
shared on social media sites such as Facebook.  While it is possible to establish what 
reach and what following a newspaper has online. metrics with regard to how many 
times a specific story (i.e. an article from The Sun regarding the BBC licence fee) have 
been clicked on, liked or shared are hard to come by.   
 
It has already been established via the aforementioned work of the Media Reform 
Coalition (2019) that evidences News UK as being one of the five media organisations 
that enjoy 80% of the news market share (including online readers).  Ofcom’s 2019 
report31 on news consumption shows the different news organisations ‘following’ on 
social media, broken down by platform (Facebook, Twitter, Instagram and Snapchat).  
In all cases the BBC has the highest share of followers, with 56% on Facebook and 
54% on Twitter.  The BBC is closely followed by Sky News.  The Sun is the only of 
Rupert Murdoch’s newspapers to have a following on three of the four platforms 
(Facebook, Twitter and Snapchat), and is one of only a handful of newspapers that 
do.   
 
The move towards ‘online’ provides media companies with a limitless, popular, 
evolving and growing platform upon which to publish.  Those global media companies 
with well-established wealth and power, such as News Corporation, are able to further 
their presence and dominance by making deals such as that between NewsCorp and 
Google; deals that will allow for their content to be the first to appear in users ‘feeds’.  
If there is a trend towards the user becoming less engaged with the source of the news 
 
31 https://www.ofcom.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0027/157914/uk-news-consumption-2019-report.pdf 
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content they consume, this becomes a more dangerous threat to democracy.  Careful 
consideration will need to be given to the dominant news providers in the coming years 
to understand their continuing potential to influence the public and the news agenda.   
 
In Summary… 
 
Concentration of media ownership is problematic not just because a single media 
proprietor can potentially wield enormous power and influence over popular opinion, 
political debate and policy-makers’ decisions, but also because that power can be 
exploited to distort policy thinking with inaccurate or biased information.  Thus, one 
corporation can potentially exert considerable influence over government both 
because of their ability to influence political debate and because of government fears 
(whether justified or not) that they can change voters’ opinions.  Moreover, the greater 
the economic power, the greater the potential of dominant owners to both influence 
and intimidate governments, and the greater the potential threat to democracy.  There 
is, therefore, a dual element to the theory behind this research: a media conglomerate 
can reinforce its own dominance by using its media outlets to pursue a self-serving 
business-related agenda and thus influence public as well as political opinion. 
 
Without doubt, one of the most dominant news operations in the English-speaking 
world has been operated for almost five decades by Rupert Murdoch.  In Mahler and 
Rutenberg’s (2019)32 ‘Times Investigation into Murdoch and his family’ they cite 
Murdoch’s UK tabloid The Sun as leading the press campaign that was highly 
influential in producing the ‘Brexit’ vote, where the country voted to leave the European 
Union.  Murdoch has long been renowned for his hostility towards the EU: journalist 
Anthony Hilton (2016) wrote in the Independent that when he interviewed Murdoch 
and asked why he was opposed to the European Union, Murdoch replied that “when I 
go into 10 Downing Street they do what I say; when I go to Brussels they take no 
notice33”.   
 
In the US Murdoch owns a number of newspapers, publications and a popular 
 
32 https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/04/03/magazine/rupert-murdoch-fox-news-trump.html  
33 https://www.standard.co.uk/comment/comment/anthony-hilton-stay-or-go-the-lack-of-solid-facts-means-
it-s-all-a-leap-of-faith-a3189151.html  
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television network. As in the UK, he exploits his media holdings to advance his 
worldview. Mahler and Rutenberg (2019) credit Murdoch and his Fox News Channel 
with helping to ensure Donald Trump won the presidential election in 2016: “His 24-
hour news-and-opinion network, the Fox News Channel, had by then fused with 
President Trump and his base of hard-core supporters, giving Murdoch an 
unparalleled degree of influence over the world’s most powerful democracy.34” 
 
In Australia Murdoch is also believed to wield considerable influence over national 
politics, most recently when his newspapers launched a heavily negative campaign 
against the Australian Prime Minister Turnbull, which resulted in his resignation. 
Former Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd wrote for the Guardian of the  “gradual 
erosion of our democracy itself through a growing “pay for play” culture from financial 
donations to political parties, an increasing assault on the independence of the public 
service and the abuse of monopolistic media power” (2019) 35. 
 
More recently, anxieties with regard to media power have tended to focus on social 
media and large technology companies, such as Facebook and Google, and the role 
they play in the aggregation and dissemination of news.  While important and 
justifiable concerns – particularly in the widespread distribution of conspiracy theories 
and “fake news” - most news production in the form of professional journalism still lies 
in the hands of global news publishers.  As discussed in the literature review, the 
Media Reform Coalition (MRC) have found that in the UK just three companies, 
including News International, dominate 83% of the national newspaper market, and 
that figure has grown 12% in the last three years36.  The MRC state that “This is a 
market that may be shrinking in terms of print circulation but, assisted by large online 
audiences, is crucial when it comes to setting the agenda for the rest of the news 
media” (2019, p2).  For online news audiences, just five companies dominate 80% of 
the market (again, including News International).  
 
Within the media industry, that process of consolidation, mergers and acquisitions has 
 
34 https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/04/03/magazine/rupert-murdoch-fox-news-trump.html  
35 https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/sep/06/democracy-overboard-rupert-murdochs-long-
war-on-australian-politics  
36 https://www.mediareform.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/FINALonline2.pdf 
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continued as the business model of journalism becomes even more threatened by the 
rise of digital and social media behemoths. The Cairncross Review, which published 
its report in February 2019, reported on the “dramatic changes in the market for news: 
the fall in print circulation of both national and local papers, and the changes in the 
ways people now navigate to news online and the ways they absorb it” (2019, p7). It 
does not examine the originators of online news sources in depth, but there is no 
evidence that a shift to online news consumption leads to greater diversity of news 
exposure. Coupled with the MRC’s findings with regards to the continued dominance 
of the traditional news providers both off and online, the threat from powerful global 
media conglomerates which dominate the news agenda could become even more 
acute.  
   
Much critical analysis has been, rightly, devoted to the threat of media concentration 
to diversity of expression and a plurality of views. What I have attempted to 
demonstrate via this research is the way in which the news agenda can also be 
deliberately manipulated to suit the commercial self-interest of dominant owners. I 
have done so by analysing to what extent an agenda exists in News International’s 
publications to undermine public organisations and competitors, which in some way 
interfere with News International’s global expansion plans.  The empirical evidence 
that derives from this study challenges Murdoch’s assertion that his newspapers have 
widely divergent views, when clearly his newspapers having been reporting similar 
views, with a consistently negative editorial agenda towards the BBC and Ofcom. 
 
On the basis of content analysis of relevant articles published in three of the News 
International owned newspapers, compared with three non-News International 
newspapers of equal standing, it was clear than an explicit editorial agenda was being 
pursued, though with more vigour towards the BBC than towards Ofcom. In both 
cases, however, the data provided incontrovertible evidence that Rupert Murdoch, and 
his sons are prepared to use the powerful voice of their newspapers to criticise and 
undermine both institutions in pursuit of their commercial self-interest.   
 
I have distinguished between negative reporting in news stories and negative 
comment in editorial pieces; while it is legitimate for newspapers to use op-ed pages 
to express opinions – and even campaign or argue for positions that accord with their 
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proprietor’s commercial self-interest,  it is surely unacceptable for news articles that 
should adhere to normative principles of journalistic accuracy and integrity.  This 
research found a disproportionate level of negative news stories about the BBC and 
Ofcom in News International newspapers compared to their non-NI counterparts: 42% 
versus 23% for the BBC, and 10% versus 2% for Ofcom.  
 
When looking at the editorials, the results are even more pronounced: 70% of News 
International editorials about the BBC were negative, compared with 26% in 
comparator newspapers. Only for editorial content about Ofcom was there any 
equivalence: 11% of News International editorials were negative, compared with 10% 
in comparator newspapers.  While this particular finding did not accord with the original 
hypothesis, it does provide reassurance that the coding frame was robust and that the 
findings in respect of the BBC and news stories about Ofcom were real.   
 
Overall, these findings demonstrate categorically, for the first time, that Rupert 
Murdoch exploited his newspapers in pursuit of commercial self-interest, thus 
contradicting his categorical denial to the Leveson inquiry. They speak to assertions 
made by others in this field, such as Arsenault and Castells’ 2008 study on ‘Switching 
Power’, in which they discuss “…the perception that Murdoch, via his editorial control 
over his properties, wields disproportionate control over public opinion which provides 
him with considerable political leverage, which in turn advances the expansion of 
NewsCorp” (2008, p501).    It also builds on such work as that undertaken by Hardy 
that examined the level of cross promotion that can be found in the Murdoch owned 
newspapers for his other media holdings, such as (as it was then called) BSkyB.   
 
Hardy states: “that Murdoch-owned newspapers have been used as vehicles to 
promote News Corporation’s other media and corporate interests is a largely accepted 
charge and commonplace observation… however… evidence remains largely 
anecdotal” (2010, p119). While it differs from the focus of Hardy’s study on cross-
promotion, the results of this research contribute to a growing body of evidence that 
such ‘anecdotal’ assertions about Murdoch’s use of his newspapers for commercial 
gain are grounded in empirical fact.  
 
This work demonstrates the ability of a powerful media proprietor to use his or her 
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media companies to exploit their dominance in media markets through distorted or 
biased coverage of rival institutions or regulators, in a bid to influence both popular 
opinion and the decisions of politicians and policy makers, thus undermining the 
democratic process.  This re-emphasises the need for policy makers to consider not 
only democratic issues with regard to the narrowing number of voices in the news 
market, but also the ability of the major news companies that dominate the market to 
further their dominance through their news and editorial columns.  
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Appendix A: Overall Results for the BBC and Ofcom 
 
Please note the data is available in Excel format in the electronic version of this document. 
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Appendix B: Results for the BBC: The Sun 
 
 
Please note the full set of data is available in Excel format in the electronic version of this document. 
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Appendix C: Results for the BBC: The Daily Mirror 
 
 
Please note the full set of data is available in Excel format in the electronic version of this document. 
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Appendix D: Results for the BBC: The Times 
 
Please note the full set of data is available in Excel format in the electronic version of this document. 
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Appendix E: Results for the BBC: The Independent 
 
Please note the full set of data is available in Excel format in the electronic version of this document. 
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Appendix F: Results for the BBC: The Sunday Times 
 
Please note the full set of data is available in Excel format in the electronic version of this document. 
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Appendix G: Results for the BBC: The Sunday Telegraph 
 
Please note the full set of data is available in Excel format in the electronic version of this document. 
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Appendix H: Results for Ofcom: The Sun 
 
Please note the full set of data is available in Excel format in the electronic version of this document. 
 
 
 
  
 230 
 
Appendix I: Results for Ofcom: The Daily Mirror 
 
Please note the full set of data is available in Excel format in the electronic version of this document. 
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Appendix J: Results for the Ofcom: The Times 
 
Please note the full set of data is available in Excel format in the electronic version of this document. 
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Appendix K: Results for Ofcom: The Independent 
 
Please note the full set of data is available in Excel format in the electronic version of this document. 
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Appendix L: Results for Ofcom: The Sunday Times 
 
Please note the full set of data is available in Excel format in the electronic version of this document. 
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Appendix M: Results for Ofcom: The Sunday Telegraph 
 
Please note the full set of data is available in Excel format in the electronic version of this document. 
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Appendix N: Coding Schedule 
 
 
 
Name of publication 
1. The Sun 
2. The Daily Mirror 
3. The Times 
4. The Independent 
5. The Sunday Times 
6. The Sunday Telegraph 
 
Date article was published 
Length of article (no. of words) 
 
Type of article 
1. News 
2. Feature 
3. Editorial 
4. Business 
5. Other 
 
Tone of article 
1. Negative coverage of BBC/Ofcom (regulator) 
2. Positive coverage of BBC/Ofcom (regulator) 
3. Neutral coverage of BBC/Ofcom (regulator) 
 
Sources directly quoted in article  
 
1. BBC  
2. Ofcom 
3. Government 
4. Independent voice campaign/pressure group 
5. Other 
6. None 
7. Vested interest 
 
Focus of article      
1. BBC/Ofcom is primary focus 
2. BBC/Ofcom is secondary focus 
3. BBC/Ofcom is mentioned in passing 
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